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This study develops an interdisciplinary theoretical framework for understanding 
institutional change and resistance to change towards sustainability. The research rests on two 
leading theories of change within the social and ecological sciences: the New Institutionalism 
and Panarchy theory. A theoretical framework integrating insights from the two theories is 
applied in an analysis of the development of the Town of Caledon’s mineral resources policies. 
The research suggests that institutional change and inertia are interconnected and interdependent 
and, depending on the case and context, they may interact with each other across spatial and 
temporal scales. There may be overlap in the emergence of pressures for institutional inertia and 
change across temporal and spatial scales, and both institutional change and inertia may be 
present when opportunities arise for renegotiation of the “rules of the game”. Results show that 
the two theories share many concepts (e.g., thresholds or tipping points, fast and slow moving 
variables, etc.) to aid in understanding the dynamics of institutional and ecological realms.  
Moreover, the integrated theoretical framework can help to explain the dynamics of institutional 
systems in a way that overcomes the limitations in Panarchy and the New Institutionalism 
theories by themselves. Key concepts within Panarchy theory (e.g., regime shifts, etc.) 
complement the New Institutionalism’s ability to capture important contextual factors 
influencing institutional change and inertia, and help to overcome the current limitation in its 
capacity to explain the nonlinear, multi-scalar dynamics of institutional systems. In turn, key 
concepts within the New Institutionalism (e.g., uncertainty, etc.) complement and enrich 
Panarchy theory’s capacity to illustrate the social and economic dimensions of institutional 
dynamics. Results of the case analysis demonstrate that a range of overlapping, historic and 
immediate, local-to-provincial factors (e.g., socioeconomic costs, uncertainty, path dependent 
effects, etc.) and institutional elements (e.g., interests and values, power and resources, issues of 
fit, etc.) drove institutional change and inertia in the development of Caledon’s mineral resources 
policies. The slow moving institutional variables in Caledon’s case (core Town, industry and 
provincial government values and interests) were perhaps the greatest determinants of 
institutional change and resistance to change towards sustainability. The story of the 
development of Caledon’s mineral resources policies, then, is about the resilience and resistance 
efforts of a small Town committed to maintaining core community values under the constraints 
of a resilient and resistant, ecologically destructive and inequitable institutional system.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Substantive progress towards sustainability requires an understanding of why and how 
institutions change and resist change. In this study, institutions are defined as “…the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally…the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3). They are comprised of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws, 
processes, etc.), informal constraints (e.g. unwritten conventions, norms of behaviour, codes of 
conduct, values, etc.), and their enforcement mechanisms. They provide the structure and context 
within which human interaction takes place. Because people create, inherit, and maintain 
institutions over time, they can become deeply embedded in the socioeconomic and cultural 
fabric of societies. In this way, they can be very resilient and resistant to change. Resilient and 
resistant institutions can also be ecologically destructive and inequitable. Reliance on fossil fuels, 
for example, is ecologically destructive because it contributes to global climate change. A 
centralized decision-making system, for example, may be inequitable with respect to the 
distribution of power, costs and benefits, and opportunities across socioeconomic groups and 
generations. 
The purpose of this study is to expand our understanding of institutional change and 
resistance to change towards sustainability. It aims to strengthen the hands of advocates of 
sustainability in social-ecological problem solving. Since the rise to prominence of the concept 
of sustainability, many initiatives have been undertaken in pursuit of sustainability goals. 
Sustainability advocates assert, however, that the impacts of these initiatives have merely 
scratched the surface of deepening local-to-global environmental problems. David Runnalls, for 
example, has observed, “Despite all this progress, the problems that Brundtland and her 
colleagues warned us we had little time to solve are much worse now…” (Runnalls, 2008, p. 27). 
This is at least in part because the concept of sustainability fundamentally challenges the status 
quo and there is considerable resistance to the required transformations. At this juncture, then, it 
is more important than ever to seek a better understanding of the ways of our institutions. In 
particular, what can local struggles over natural resource management and land use planning 
reveal about the behaviour of institutional systems? How can lessons learned from these 
struggles inform the quest for sustainable societies?  
In the quest for sustainable societies, many scholars and practitioners have stressed that 
conventional approaches to environmental problem solving are too exclusive and fragmented 
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along disciplinary lines to deal effectively with the complexities of environmental issues (e.g. 
Dobson, 2000; Dovers, 2001; Paehlke &Torgerson, 2005). In response to these and many other 
insufficiencies, they have called for more inclusive and integrated approaches to planning, 
decision-making, and analysis. These approaches are inherently interdisciplinary in that they 
integrate consideration for the social, economic, and ecological dimensions of environmental 
problems, and traditional and scientific knowledge (e.g. Wali et al., 2003; Fraser et al., 2006; 
Gibson, 2006). Moreover, they are based on a conceptualization of “environment” as comprised 
of interconnected and interdependent social-ecological systems.  
Because institutions are among the major determinants of change in social, economic, 
and ecological spheres, traditional approaches to studying institutions have also been divided 
along disciplinary lines. Similarly, theories of change in ecological systems have evolved 
primarily within the natural sciences. Important insights have emerged from these independent 
branches of inquiry about why and how social and ecological systems change and resist change. 
Until recently, however, there has been little explicit exchange between them. The call from 
advocates of sustainability for more substantive recognition of the feedbacks between social-
ecological systems in environmental problem solving requires and encourages exchange within 
and between the social and natural sciences (Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2000; van Kerkhoff, 2005; 
Lawton, 2007; Macleod et al., 2008). Combining insights from theories of change in social and 
ecological systems, for example, will lead to more comprehensive frameworks for analysis and 
so enrich our comprehension of human-institutional-ecological interactions. This integrated 
approach to analysis should be especially relevant to scholars and practitioners who seek to 
implement solutions to complex social-ecological problems within resilient and resistant but 
ecologically destructive and inequitable institutional systems.  
This study develops an interdisciplinary theoretical framework for understanding the 
dynamics of institutional systems. It rests on two leading theories of change, which have 
emerged independently within the social and ecological sciences: the New Institutionalism and 
Panarchy theory. Despite the disciplinary divide between these theories, scholars working within 
them share many common and complementary concepts (e.g., multiple equilibrium orders or 
stable states, tipping points or thresholds, path dependency, uncertainty or bounded rationality) 
to understand and explain complex institutional and ecological phenomena (Hall & Taylor, 1996; 
Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Pierson, 2004). But there has been little deliberate exploration 
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and/or critical review of the potential strengths and limitations among them for the purpose of 
exchange and application in analyses of human-institutional-ecological phenomena in social-
ecological systems.  
This study demonstrates how integrating essential concepts from both theories in 
empirical analysis can help to generate important insights about institutional change and inertia. 
Increasing our comprehension of the behaviour of institutions will, in turn, produce critical 
insights about human-institutional-ecological interactions and so inform the quest for sustainable 
societies. The research has two key goals. The first is to develop a set of preliminary theoretical 
propositions based on the New Institutionalism and Panarchy theory. The second is to test the 
preliminary propositions by applying them in a case analysis of institutional change and 
resistance to change towards sustainability. 
The research employs a deductive, exploratory, qualitative methodological approach. 
Unlike an inductive approach to analysis, which generates theory based on experience with the 
phenomenon of interest, a deductive approach is guided from the start by a theoretical 
framework, the utility of which is determined by applying it in analysis (Palys, 2003, p. 36-39). 
Exploratory investigations seek to gain new insights into phenomena in order to develop 
hypotheses and/or refine a research question (see Palys, 2003, p. 72). This stands in contrast to 
descriptive research, which aims to illustrate the key features of a particular situation or 
individual; explanatory studies, which investigate causal relationships; and relational inquiries, 
which reveal how particular variables are related. This study utilises a literature review of the 
New Institutionalism and Panarchy theory to develop a set of theoretical propositions to guide 
the analysis. In turn, the analysis informs the refinement of the propositions and contributes to 
the development of both theories. Case studies provide an appropriate research method for 
exploratory investigations (Yin, 2003). This study utilises a single case, case study design, which 
involves multiple methods, including a critical review of academic literature and other relevant 
documentation, and semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. These methods are discussed in 
more detail in subsequent chapters. 
First, in Chapters 2 and 3, overviews of the New Institutionalism and Panarchy theory are 
provided. The New Institutionalism represents a sprawling literature within the social sciences. 
New Institutionalist scholars in several schools have devoted much attention to the role that 
institutions play in structuring cultural, political and economic spheres. With the renaissance of 
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the institutional approach to analysis in the late 20th century, the institutional perspective has also 
extended many valuable insights to the interdisciplinary field of environmental social science 
(Hotimsky et al., 2006). It has been widely recognized, for example, that human patterns of 
thinking and behaving can have devastating implications for other people, creatures, and all other 
forms of matter (Holling & Meffe, 1996; Gunderson & Pritchard, 2002; Young, 2002; Berkes et 
al., 2003; Connor & Dovers, 2004; Martinez-Ballesté et al., 2006; Hanna, 2008; Waples et al., 
2009). It has also been demonstrated that ecologically destructive and inequitable institutional 
systems can be highly resilient and resistant to change, even in the face of social-ecological 
degradation and/or collapse (e.g., Berkes & Folke, 2002; Allison & Hobbs, 2004; Brown, 2005; 
Runnalls, 2008; Finley, 2009; Walker et al., 2009).  
Panarchy theory offers an explanation of transformative change based on empirical 
evidence derived primarily from studies of attempts to manage resources in regional-scale 
adaptive ecosystems in temperate regions. It asserts that complex adaptive ecological systems are 
nested within a hierarchical arrangement of adaptive cycles. The basic adaptive cycle consists of 
four phases, which reflect recurring periods of exploitation, conservation, collapse, and 
reorganization. It has been applied as a useful metaphor for understanding transformative change 
in many terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. More recently, scholars have applied the metaphor to 
illustrate the interconnections and interdependencies between and among ecological and human 
systems, especially in the context of natural resource management. Because of the perceived 
similarities among social and ecological systems, some scholars have asserted that more research 
is required to determine the generality of the adaptive cycle metaphor, particularly with respect 
to understanding change in social systems (e.g. Gunderson & Holling, 2002). By incorporating 
the adaptive cycle and other key concepts from Panarchy theory in the analytical framework, this 
study begins to answer questions about their applicability to the dynamics of complex adaptive 
institutional systems.  
Aside from the adaptive cycle metaphor, prominent scholars whose work falls within the 
scope of Panarchy theory have recently adopted concepts (e.g. transaction costs, institutional 
entrepreneurs), which have long been applied by New Institutionalists to investigate the 
feedbacks between ecological and social realms (e.g. Berkes & Folke, 1998; Folke et al., 1998; 
Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Walker & Salt, 2006). This attests to the need within Panarchy 
theory for useful insights that can elaborate the social-institutional dimensions of ecological 
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change. Moreover, scholars whose work falls outside of the scope of Panarchy theory have 
recognized the value of applying an institutional perspective to problems in land use planning 
and natural resource management (e.g. Healey, 1998; Lowndes, 2001; Motte, 2001; Young, 
20002; Hanna, 2008). The comprehensive overview of the New Institutionalism, provided in 
Chapter 2, defines central concepts that have been utilised by New Institutionalist scholars to 
understand and explain the dynamics of institutions. These concepts can inform the above areas 
of inquiry, and Panarchy theory in particular, to help to illuminate the social-institutional 
dimensions of change in social-ecological systems.  
Chapters 2 and 3 lead to the development of two sets of preliminary theoretical 
propositions, one based on the New Institutionalism and one based on Panarchy theory. Based on 
a discussion of the strengths and limitations of each, a set of combined preliminary theoretical 
propositions is developed. Chapter 4 demonstrates the early usefulness of the combined 
propositions by applying them in an analysis of institutional dynamics in two case studies from 
the literature, one that demonstrates institutional change in the management of natural resources 
in the Columbia River Basin in the United States, and one that demonstrates resistance to change 
towards sustainability in integrated urban stormwater management in Sydney, Australia.  
To further test the strengths and limitations of the combined propositions, they are 
applied in a case study analysis. The research focuses on southern Ontario as a jurisdiction, the 
aggregates industry as a sector, and the development of the Town of Caledon’s new, 2003 
mineral resources policies as the focal case (see Chapter 5). These policies reflect a pioneering 
approach to local control over prime aggregate resources in southern Ontario, and they were met 
with significant resistance from key members of the aggregates industry and provincial 
government agencies involved in the development of the mineral resources policies.  
Southern Ontario contains the Greater Golden Horseshoe (GGH) region – the most 
intensely populated and urbanized landscape in Canada. Nowhere is the need for institutional 
transformation towards sustainability more evident in Canada than in such metropolitan 
conurbations as the GGH. In this region, local-to-global problems, notably urban and suburban 
sprawl, loss of farmland, and the degradation of ecosystems, threaten to degrade beyond repair 
the ecological goods and services upon which millions of people depend.  
Since the late 1950s, southern Ontario has been a location of choice for proponents of 
aggregate extraction operations. Most of the resource has gone into feeding the construction 
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booms in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Many complex land use issues concerning aggregate 
extraction operations have emerged, therefore, within municipalities across the GGH. Unlike 
other sectors in Ontario (specifically urban planning, forestry, energy, and waste management), 
which have undergone significant transformation (though far from complete) towards more 
sustainable practices, the aggregates sector has been highly resilient and resistant to change. This 
resistance is evident in the industry’s poor record of rehabilitation and largely unfettered access 
to the resource close to demand. The structure of the current institutional framework guiding 
aggregate extraction in southern Ontario (i.e., centralized, industry-provincial government 
control over the resource) positively reinforces this resistance to change.  
Industry-provincial government resistance to institutional change towards sustainability 
in the aggregates sector is especially evident in the story of the Town of Caledon’s new 2003 
mineral resources policies. This predominantly rural town sits just north of the GTA in the GGH 
region and contains portions of such provincially protected landforms as the Oak Ridges 
Moraine and the Niagara Escarpment. The Town also possesses the largest series of contiguous 
gravel deposits in North America (Chambers & Sandberg, 2007). Over the last 60 years, Caledon 
has been a major provider of aggregate resources to the GTA. Caledon’s mineral resources 
policies have over the years been influenced by many important contextual factors, notably the 
Town’s rich natural and cultural heritage and legacy of land use battles over aggregate extraction 
developments; changes in the balance of power among industry, municipal, and provincial 
players, and the evolving constraints of the provincial legislative framework. Notwithstanding 
these constraints, Caledon’s new 2003 mineral resources policies (Town of Caledon, 2004) are in 
many ways pioneering. Most significantly, they represent Caledon’s capacity to maintain core 
community values under the constraints of centralized, industry-provincial government control 
over prime aggregate resources. This institutional system threatens to chip away at the natural 
and cultural resources around which Caledon’s socioeconomic identity has evolved. The story of 
the Town of Caledon’s mineral resources policies, therefore, is a story about the resilience and 
resistance efforts of a small Town committed to maintaining core community values under the 
constraints of a resilient and resistant, ecologically destructive and inequitable institutional 
system.  
Key questions in the analyses undertaken in Chapters 6 and 7 include why and how and 
to what extent the Town of Caledon’s new 2003 mineral resources policies reflect progress 
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towards sustainability objectives. In addition to the analytical framework developed in Chapters 
2 and 3, then, this study requires a sustainability assessment framework. The framework chosen 
by this study is Gibson et al.’s (2005) core decision-making criteria for sustainability. It is 
described in more detail in Chapter 6. Also, Caledon’s older, 1981 policies provide the 
benchmark against which the new policies are evaluated for evidence of institutional change. 
Because quarry practice exists within a local-to-provincial legislative framework, this study 
examines to what extent institutional change occurred at these scales. Transformative change in 
the aggregates sector in southern Ontario requires local- to provincial-level changes in law, 
policy, and practice.  
The analyses undertaken in Chapters 6 and 7 were informed by semi-structured, face-to-
face interviews with the key actors who participated in the development of Caledon’s new 2003 
mineral resources policies. The information gathered helped to uncover why the key stakeholders 
involved in the development of Caledon’s policies rejected or embraced certain policies over 
others. The strengths and limitations of the preliminary theoretical propositions (see Chapter 8) 
were, in part, based on whether they were comprehensive of the major issues and consistent with 
the story as revealed through the primary and secondary research. 
The above-mentioned analyses contribute to knowledge about the dynamics of resilient 
and resistant but inequitable and/or unproductive social-ecological systems. These types of social 
and/or ecological systems are resilient and resistant to change in the short and medium terms but 
their behaviour contributes to the deepening vulnerability of higher and lower level systems, the 
collapse of which will be catastrophic. With respect to ecological resilience, most scholars who 
have adopted the adaptive cycle metaphor have devoted much attention to how to maintain 
social-ecological resilience through adaptive management. Research is also required to better 
understand how resilient and resistant but ecologically destructive and inequitable social 
institutions can be nudged towards contributing to sustainability. 
It is important to note that the theoretical propositions developed by this study are 
preliminary at best. They are not based on an exhaustive review of the three major strands (and 
their sub strands) of the New Institutionalism. Moreover, this study does not undertake a 
thorough review of the empirical studies that have contributed to the New Institutionalism and 
Panarchy theory. Rather, it relies on overviews of New Institutionalism and Panarchy theory, as 
well as seminal works by well-known authors. The study, therefore, does not provide an in-depth 
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exploration of the debates that exist between and among the strands of the New Institutionalism 
and around key concepts and other issues within the New Institutionalism and Panarchy theory. 
Rather, it delineates key concepts in order to develop a theoretical framework that begins to 
synthesize important insights. A more in-depth review of the New Institutionalism and Panarchy 
theory would certainly enhance any delineation of key concepts and subsequent theoretical 
propositions. More research, therefore, is required to refine the preliminary theoretical 
propositions here developed.  
More time and research also are required to determine the long-term impacts of 
Caledon’s new 2003 mineral resources policies on aggregate extraction practice in Caledon and 
the degree to which they have influenced Official Plan policies in other municipalities. 
Moreover, application of the propositions to a single sector/case context may not be 
representative of the strengths and limitations of the framework and institutional dynamics 
within the aggregates sector and beyond. More casework, therefore, is needed to confirm the 
results from this study.  
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CHAPTER 2: The New Institutionalism  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the New Institutionalism, leading to a discussion of 
the implications of New Institutionalist thought for understanding and explaining institutional 
resistance and change towards sustainability. As a last step, a set of preliminary theoretical 
propositions is developed. 
 
2.2 Methods 
It is now conventional practice to distinguish among three major varieties of New 
Institutionalist literature: rational choice, historical, and sociological. The literature review on 
these three strands was based on seminal works, and well-known overviews and summaries of 
years of empirical work. A review of academic, peer-reviewed academic articles about the theory 
and application of the New Institutionalism supplemented these works.  
Other relevant bodies of literature, however, could provide the basis for the 
interdisciplinary theoretical-analytical framework developed in this study. For example, other 
leading conceptual frameworks that scholars have applied to analyse the dynamics of policy 
change (e.g., policy windows, policy communities) provide helpful insights into why and how 
institutional change occurs. The policy windows literature emphasizes how changes in policy can 
occur when problems, solutions and politics converge to push an issue onto the public policy 
agenda towards governmental action (Kingdon, 2003). Similarly, the policy communities 
literature focuses on how public and private stakeholders coalesce around a particular issue and 
share a common interest in influencing its development (e.g., Pross, 1986; Coleman & Skogstad, 
1990).  
The New Institutionalist literature was chosen over the above bodies of literature for two 
key reasons. First, as described in detail, below, the three major varieties of New Institutionalist 
thought devote much attention to how people create, maintain, and change institutions, and how 
people are, in turn, influenced and constrained by institutions over time. New Institutionalist 
scholars, therefore, have developed many concepts to better understand and explain all of the 
stages in the development of institutions – from creation to maintenance, persistence and change. 
In contrast, the policy windows and policy communities frameworks focus more narrowly on 
how policy change might occur. This study seeks to increase our understanding of institutional 
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change and inertia. Unlike the policy windows and policy communities approaches, New 
Institutionalist scholars have developed many valuable insights that can enrich our understanding 
of why and how institutional inertia occurs.  
Second, according to Skogstad (2005), critics assert that the policy communities 
approach is limited in its capacity to explain policy outcomes because, among other reasons, 
scholars have largely neglected to link policy communities with contextual factors. It has also 
been criticized for not recognizing the role of agency in policy outcomes. Below, it will be 
demonstrated that contextual factors (e.g., history, cultural frameworks) and the role of agency or 
“institutional entrepreneurs” are central components of the New Institutionalist approach to 
analysis. Scholars working within the policy communities approach, therefore, might benefit 
from the New Institutionalism’s broad analytical scope.   
Moreover, with the renaissance of the institutional approach to analysis in the late 20th 
century, the New Institutionalism has extended many valuable insights to the interdisciplinary 
field of environmental social science (Hotimsky et al., 2006). It has been widely recognized, for 
example, that human patterns of thinking and behaving can have devastating implications for 
other people, creatures, and all other forms of matter (Holling & Meffe, 1996; Gunderson & 
Pritchard, 2002; Young, 2002; Berkes et al., 2003; Connor & Dovers, 2004; Martinez-Ballesté et 
al., 2006; Hanna, 2008; Waples et al., 2009). It has also been demonstrated that ecologically 
destructive and inequitable institutional systems can be highly resilient and resistant to change, 
even in the face of social-ecological degradation and/or collapse (e.g., Berkes & Folke, 2002; 
Allison & Hobbs, 2004; Brown, 2005; Runnalls, 2008; Finley, 2009; Walker et al., 2009). This 
study develops an interdisciplinary theoretical framework for understanding and explaining the 
dynamics of institutions as major determinants of social-ecological systems. The New 
Institutionalism is explicitly oriented towards understanding institutions and institutional 
phenomena. It is appropriate, therefore, for the purpose of this study.  
Finally, scholars whose work falls within the scope of Panarchy theory have incorporated 
insights and concepts from the New Institutionalism in order to understand and explain how 
ecosystems, people, and institutions behave in relation to each other (e.g., Adger et al., 2005; 
Abel et al., 2006; Yandle, 2007; Hanna, 2008). This attests to the need within Panarchy theory 
for useful insights that can elaborate the social-institutional dimensions of ecological change. But 
there has been little deliberate exploration and/or critical review of potentially useful concepts 
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within Panarchy theory and the New Institutionalism for the purpose of exchange. This study 
demonstrates how integrating essential concepts from the New Institutionalism and Panarchy 
theories in an analytical framework can enhance our comprehension of the dynamics of complex 
adaptive institutional systems. Increasing our comprehension of the behaviour of institutions 
will, in turn, generate critical insights about human-institutional-ecological interactions and so 
inform the quest for sustainable societies. 
 
2.3 Introduction to the New Institutionalism 
The New Institutionalism represents a sprawling literature divided along ontological and 
disciplinary lines. As noted above, it is now conventional to distinguish among three major 
varieties: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism. Regardless of the variety, New Institutionalists scholars have devoted much 
attention to five central and widely debated questions in New Institutionalist thought:  
What are institutions? 
How and why do institutions emerge? 
How and why do institutions persist? 
How do institutions affect human behaviour? 
How and why do institutions change? 
 
Various overviews of the three major strands of New Institutionalism reveal that there is 
much overlap at the intersection of the various schools (see Hall & Taylor, 1996; Scott, 1995, 
2001; Campbell, 2004; Peters, 2005). March and Olsen (1989), for example, draw from each 
variety in their examination of how political institutions function, shape political action, and 
change. Peters (2005) discusses the importance of sociological institutionalism to the study of 
institutions in political science (see p.107-122). Thelen (1999) highlights the influences that 
rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism have had on historical 
institutionalism’s understanding of political outcomes (see p. 370-371). According to Hall and 
Taylor (1998), rational choice new institutionalists are increasingly embracing more sociological 
explanations of institutional dynamics. Douglas North, for example, a notable theorist in this 
field, has recognized the value of sociological and historical institutionalist perspectives to 
analyzing the effects of institutions on economic performance (see North, 1990, 1996a, 1996b; 
2005; Schluter, 2007).  
Similar to other literatures divided along ontological lines, the New Institutionalism has 
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been criticized for not providing a unified theory of institutional behaviour: “The problem with 
much of the ‘new’ institutionalism literature to date…is that it is unclear on vital questions (e.g. 
how do institutions develop and how do they change?), is replete with ambiguities and is too 
discipline bound” (O’Riordan & Jordan, 1999, p. 84). O’Riordan and Jordan argue that a 
synthesis of the many strands of New Institutionalism will never be possible due to the 
contradictory interpretations of human behaviour among them. Despite these and other issues, 
however, many authors assert that the New Institutionalism as a whole would benefit from more 
exchange among the branches (see Hall & Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998; Thelen, 1999; 
Campbell, 2004; Katznelson & Weingast, 2005). Hall and Taylor (1996), for example, favour as 
much interchange as possible among the strands, despite their divergences: “None of these 
literatures appears to be wrong-headed or substantially untrue. More often, each seems to be 
providing a partial account of the forces at work in a given situation or capturing different 
dimensions of the human action and institutional impact present there” (p. 955). This study 
proceeds, therefore, under the assumption that there is much to gain from the erosion of 
boundaries between various new institutionalist schools.  
Sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.5 provide a brief sketch of the three major varieties of the New 
Institutionalism. They draw primarily from comprehensive overviews in order to describe each 
strand’s particular orientation to the central questions in New Institutional analysis. Because this 
study rests on the above-described assumption, it does not go into exhaustive detail on the many 
debates that exist around these central questions. Nor does it compare and contrast the 
approaches and highlight their strengths and deficiencies. Many potentially relevant debates in 
the literature are lost in this simplified overview. These debates may indeed be relevant to many 
analyses of institutional dynamics in social and economic fields. For example, based on the 
analytical benefits of a particular strand, students may choose one variety of New 
Institutionalism over another to investigate a specific case and context. This study seeks an 
inclusive understanding of the dynamics of institutions in order to develop a comprehensive 
theoretical-analytical framework. Because each variety emphasizes a different but valid 
dimension of institutional phenomena, the many debates in the literature are not especially 
relevant to this study. Moreover, the multidimensional implications of sustainability suggest that 
setting aside ontological differences based on disciplinary boundaries may be more appropriate 
with respect to understanding and explaining the behaviour of institutions.  
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2.3.1 What is an institution? 
According to Campbell’s (2004) overview, rational choice institutionalists define 
institutions as “formal and informal rules and compliance procedures; strategic equilibrium” (p. 
11). Douglas North, a leading scholar in the rational choice stand, has defined institutions as 
“…formal rules, informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes 
of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both” (North, 1993, p.36). North’s definition, 
which considers both formal rules and informal constraints, is one of the most widely used 
definitions of institutions in the literature outside of the New Institutionalism. Following Scott’s 
(1995) typology, this school tends to give prominence to the regulative elements (informal and 
formal rules, laws, and enforcement mechanisms) of institutions as opposed to the normative 
(prescriptive values and norms) or cognitive elements (symbolic systems and shared meanings).  
Similar to rational choice new institutionalists, historical new institutionalists have tended 
to define institutions as formal and informal rules, routines, and procedures (see Steinmo et al., 
1992; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Campbell, 2004). Historical new institutionalists have tended to 
emphasize the temporal dimension of the evolution of institutions: “Central to this perspective is 
the notion that the institutions that guide decision making reflect historical experience” 
(Campbell, 2004, p. 25).  
The sociological strand is concerned with applying an institutional perspective to 
understanding the structure and behaviour of organizations. They have tended to define 
institutions as “formal rules and taken-for-granted cultural frameworks, cognitive schema, and 
routinized processes of reproduction” (Campbell, 2004, p. 11). According to Scott (2001), 
sociological institutionalists have tended to make more explicit the role of agency and power in 
their definition of institutions. Arthur Stinchcombe, (1968) for example, has defined institutions 
as “a structure in which powerful people are committed to some value or interest” (in Scott, 
2001, p. 25). Hall and Taylor (1996) stress the importance of the moral dimension in their 
depiction of the sociological strand: “…not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the 
symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ 
guiding human action” (p. 947). Following Scott’s (1995) typology, then, this school tends to 
give prominence to the cognitive elements (symbolic systems and shared meanings) of 
institutions. The sociological approach to institutions, therefore, is much more encompassing 
 14 
than other approaches: “Whereas most economists and political scientists focus exclusively on 
economic or political rules of the game, sociologists find institutions everywhere, from 
handshakes to marriages to strategic-planning departments” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 9).  
 
2.3.2 How do institutions emerge? 
Campbell (2004) asserts that rational choice institutionalists have tended to attribute the 
emergence of institutions to a “logic of instrumentality” (p. 11). Hall and Taylor’s (1996) 
overview elaborates on this logic: “…actors create the institution in order to realize this value, 
which is most often conceptualized…in terms of gains from cooperation” (p. 945). Institutional 
emergence, then, depends on the “utility calculations of individuals” (Peters, 2005, p.61). The 
basis of this approach is to perceive institutions as responses to problems of opportunism, 
incomplete information, and transaction costs (see Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Rational choice 
institutionalists have tended to emphasize such factors as property rights (see North, 1990, p.33), 
transaction costs (see North, 1990, p.27), and concepts like bounded rationality to explain 
institutional emergence (see Alston et al., 1996, p.346-347; Campbell, 2004, p. 16). Bounded 
rationally refers to the limited capacity of actors to make well-informed decisions due to 
uncertainty and the constraints of the existing institutional environment.  
Historical institutionalists present a historically based analytical framework for 
understanding institutional emergence. Long-term temporal processes are emphasized. 
Institutions are perceived to be embedded in these temporal processes and as such they are the 
legacy of these processes: “…the emphasis tends to be on political development as a (structured) 
process and on the way institutions emerge from particular historical conflicts and 
constellations” (Thelen, 1999, p. 382). Historical new institutionalists are especially vague when 
it comes to explaining how institutions emerge. This is perhaps a consequence of their emphasis 
on history; institutions are understood to be rooted in the past and emerge through path-
dependent processes. Moreover, historical new institutionalists have tended to devote much more 
attention to the persistence of institutions once they are formed (Peters, 2005). 
The new institutionalism in sociology is primarily concerned with why organizations 
adopt certain forms, procedures, etc. over others, and how such forms and procedures, etc. spread 
through organizational fields or across nations (see Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947). According to 
Peter’s (2005) overview, the sociological take on institutional emergence rests, in part, on 
 15 
explanations of institutionalization. In other words, institutions emerge as symbolic 
manifestations of the needs of a society. They are institutionalized and legitimized through 
ongoing participation from actors (p. 118). Hall and Taylor (1996) assert that sociological new 
institutionalists emphasize social legitimacy over a more instrumental view adopted by some 
rational choice and historical new institutionalist scholars: “In other words, organizations 
embrace specific institutional forms or practices because the latter are widely valued within a 
broader cultural environment” (p. 949). This has been described as a “logic of appropriateness” 
as opposed to a “logic of instrumentality” (see March & Olsen, 1989, p. 22-23). Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991) recognize the role played by power in institutional emergence: “…it is clear 
that elite intervention may play a critical role in institutional formation” (p. 191). An 
organization may adopt certain rules and practices over others in order to gain needed resources, 
even if the organization becomes less efficient as a result. This is a more utilitarian assertion, 
similar to the position taken by rational choice scholars. 
 
2.3.3 How do institutions persist? 
Institutions are dynamic in that they are constantly evolving through their interactions 
with each other and with their participants: “There is a reciprocity between an individual and an 
institution in the sense that both of them influence and constitute each other” (Sjostrand, 1993, 
p.10). Institutional “persistence”, then, does not denote stasis. Rather, the persistence of a 
particular institution is dependent on the reproduction or transmission of that institution over 
time. Reproduction however, is not always simple and complete (see Sjostrand, 1993, p.13). In 
this way, institutional persistence connotes incremental institutional change, especially in the 
modern context of continuous technical, economic and other change.  
Again, rational choice institutionalists take a functionalist view of persistence, explaining 
it in terms of the “logic of instrumentality”, based on an actor’s interest in maximizing his or her 
interests. Actors will seek to change an institution if it ceases to achieve the ends for which it 
was originally created. Moreover, according to Hall and Taylor (1996), “Individuals adhere to 
these patterns of behaviour because deviation will make the individual worse off than will 
adherence” (p. 940). According to Scott (1995), institutions persist with the help of various 
“carriers” (culture, social structures, routines) that work to constrain behaviour. Rational choice 
institutionalists have tended to emphasize rules and laws (culture), governance and power 
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systems (social structures), and protocols and standard procedures (routines) as the carriers in 
which institutions are embedded. They have also tended to explain persistence with such 
concepts as path dependence, positive feedback, increasing returns, transaction costs, and 
bounded rationality (North, 1990, p. 95-100; Krasner, 1998; Campbell, 2004, p.13). According to 
Krasner (1988), path-dependence and positive feedbacks are closely related: “Path-dependent 
patterns are characterized by self-reinforcing positive feedback. Initial choices, often small and 
random, may determine future historical trajectories” (p. 83).  Campbell (2004, p.13) refers to 
positive feedback as a process whereby certain institutions, once established, generate support 
from a range of elite players who obtain increasing financial and other benefits from them. North 
(1990) refers to institutional persistence as “stability” and asserts that stability is accomplished 
through “…formal rules nested in a hierarchy, where each level is more costly to change than the 
previous one…” and “…informal constraints, which are extensions, elaborations and 
qualifications of rules and have tenacious survival ability because they have become part of 
habitual behavior” (p. 83). North is careful to note that an institution’s survival ability is not 
necessarily an indication of its efficiency. One major concern of rational choice institutionalists 
is to explain why actors continue to support inefficient institutional arrangements.  
Historical new institutionalists emphasize long-term temporal processes in their 
explanations of institutional persistence. According to Immergut and Anderson (2008), one of 
the most important tasks for historical new institutionalists is to explain the underlying 
mechanisms for institutional resilience. A long-term perspective on institutional resilience allows 
for the consideration of “…feedback links, demographic developments, threshold effects, and the 
like, which can be more important than short-term political decisions” (p. 354). Mechanisms of 
reproduction, increasing returns, path dependence, and long-term processes are essential 
elements of the historical new institutional approach to analysis. Institutions are understood as 
continually renegotiated and reinterpreted: “Thus…without continual renegotiation and 
reinterpretation, as well as the support of ancillary institutions, such as customs, beliefs and 
assumptions, institutions would lose their social embeddedness, and hence cease to function at 
all” (Immergut & Anderson, 2008, p. 356). Path dependence and increasing returns may work 
together to fix institutions along a particular trajectory (see Lecours, p. 56-57). Persistence, then, 
in part, is a product of institutional inertia generated by the mechanisms of path dependence and 
increasing returns. Similar to rational choice institutionalists, historical new institutionalists also 
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recognize the paradox of institutional inertia or persistence: “Institutional continuity…should not 
be interpreted as an indication of efficiency or optimality…Rather, institutional continuity is an 
indicator of the prohibitive costs of switching to a design that had been presented as an option at 
an earlier point in time” (p. 58). 
According to Hall and Taylor (1996), historical new institutionalists have tended to take 
either a “calculus approach” or a “cultural approach” to understanding how institutions persist. 
The calculus approach suggests that a particular institution will persist if it works to solve a 
collective action problem or of it reaps certain benefits from exchange. Here is the logic of 
instrumentality espoused by rational choice scholars. In contrast, the cultural approach suggests 
that institutions persist because they are socially constructed and taken-for-granted. Moreover, 
because they are collectively constructed, one individual alone cannot transform them. In this 
way, institutions resist change because they themselves work to define the options and choices 
that an individual may make in any given situation. 
Scott’s (2005) overview highlights three different perspectives on institutional stability 
and persistence within the sociological strand: cognitive, regulative, and normative. Sociological 
New institutionalists who embrace a cognitive perspective emphasize the taken-for-granted 
assumptions that define social reality and so ensure the cultural persistence of institutions. These 
taken-for-granted assumptions are internalized by actors and thus become part of objective 
reality. The regulative perspective emphasizes power relations, interest, and agency. Powell and 
Dimaggio (1991), for example, have adopted this view, along with cognitive explanations of 
persistence: “…once established and in its place, practices and programs are supported and 
promulgated by those organizations that benefit from prevailing conventions” (p. 191). Here, 
power plays a leading role in institutional persistence: “power has a great deal to do with the 
historical preservation of patterns of values” (in Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p.107). In other 
words, institutions persist as long as the people who are benefitting from them have the power to 
preserve them.  
Powell and DiMaggio have also recognized the path-dependent nature of institutional 
persistence: “Organizational procedures and forms may persevere because of path-dependent 
patterns of development in which initial choices preclude future options…” (p. 192). Similar to 
rational choice scholars, they have recognized that institutional persistence or inertia is partially 
caused by increasing transaction costs associated with path-dependence. They have also 
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highlighted the role played by interdependencies across organizations in institutional inertia: 
“When interdependencies extend across organizational boundaries to other organizations, 
particularly in the case of hierarchical relations…then practices become quite resistant to efforts 
at change” (p. 192). But, again, they prefer to emphasize such cognitive factors as an actor’s 
inability to conceive of appropriate alternative institutional forms: “Institutions do not just 
constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences. In 
other words, some of the most important sunk costs are cognitive” (p. 11).  
The normative view emphasizes shared norms as mechanisms for institutional stability. 
These norms are both internalized and enforced by others. March and Olsen (1989) have 
embraced a view of persistence that rests somewhat on the normative perspectives: “Institutions 
preserve themselves, partly by being resistant to many forms of change, partly by developing 
their own criteria of appropriateness and success, resource distributions, and constitutional rules. 
Routines are sustained by being embedded in a structure of routines, by socialization…” (p.55). 
According to Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 190) organizations adopt certain institutions 
because they are mandated by the cultural context within which they are embedded. This, in turn, 
may lead to inefficiency over the long term. Campbell (2004) asserts that the survival of one 
organizational structure over another may depend, in part, on how a particular model conforms to 
the culturally appropriate scripts and other organizational models in their environment. 
 
2.3.4 How do institutions affect human behaviour? 
Institutions shape the behaviour of humans and humans, in turn, shape institutions: 
“…humans design and create institutions but then are constrained by them” (Peters, 2005, p.63). 
Rational choice institutionalists posit that institutions constrain human and organizational 
behaviour through rules and constitutions, and bounded rationality (Campbell, 2004, p.11). The 
concept of bounded rationality has been used to explain how “ideas” (ideology, shared cognitive 
frames, beliefs, values, etc.) help to define an actor’s interests and choices about institutions. 
Ideas are defined as cognitive constraints. Campbell (2004, p.16) asserts that this concept is not 
yet well developed within the rational choice strand of New Institutionalism. Nevertheless, 
Campbell highlights that rational choice scholars have increasingly emphasized how ideas can 
constrain actors and even lead to inefficient institutions. According to Campbell (2004, p. 15), 
one influential contribution that sociological and political science scholars have made to the 
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rational choice strain of New Institutionalism is the “choice-within-constraints” approach to how 
institutions affect human behaviour. This approach posits that informal norms, etc., formal rules, 
etc., and enforcement mechanisms affect the range of alternatives available, and information (or 
lack of information) creates the certainty (or uncertainty) within which actors must pursue 
particular interests. In this way, an actor’s range of choices is limited and this influences his or 
her capacity to pursue their interests. Hall and Taylor (1996) assert that rational choice 
institutionalists take a “calculus approach” to explaining how institutions constrain human 
behaviour: “…an actor’s behaviour is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but 
by a strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by the actor’s 
expectations about how others are likely to behave as well” (p. 945).  
Similar to rational choice institutionalists, historical institutionalists recognize that formal 
and informal institutions form the context within which actors pursue their interests. Institutions 
are perceived to offer opportunities for action and to constrain action. Steinmo et al. (1992), 
however, are quick to note that historical institutionalists place more emphasis on the effects of 
informal institutions on personal choice: “In short, people don’t stop at every choice they make 
in their lives and think to themselves, ‘Now what will maximize my self-interest?’ Instead, most 
of us, most of the time, follow societally defined rules, even when so doing may not be directly 
in our self-interest” (p. 8). In other words, institutions influence an actor’s formation of 
preferences; norms, ideas, interests, and beliefs act as important informal, societal constraints. 
Moreover, the goals that actors decide to pursue are in themselves defined by the institutional 
context. In this way, historical institutionalists assert that interests are socially and politically 
constructed: “…unless something is known about the context, broad assumptions about ‘self-
interested behavior’ are empty” (p. 9). Also central to historical institutionalism is the 
assumption that institutions are historically constructed. An actor’s choices, therefore, may be 
greatly influenced by the “logic of institutional development and reproduction” (Lecours, 2005, 
p.23).  
Historical institutionalists also emphasize the roles played by power and the distribution 
of power across social groups with respect to how institutions affect human behaviour. Certain 
institutional arrangements, for example, give certain groups more or less influence in the 
decision making process: “…rather than emphasize the degree to which an outcome makes 
everyone better off, they tend to stress how some groups lose while others win” (Hall & Taylor, 
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1996, p. 941). Similar to some rational choice scholars, other historical institutionalists have 
stressed the importance of cognitive constraints on human behaviour. Campbell (2004) asserts 
that some historical institutionalists argue that ideas function to constrain an actor’s choices as 
long as they continue to provide answers to collective problems. 
Sociological institutionalists have recognized the constraining influence of both 
normative and cognitive factors on human behaviour. Indeed, Campbell (2004) asserts that this 
strand stresses an organization’s tendency to follow a more cognitive “logic of appropriateness” 
than a “logic of instrumentality”, even if it means choosing a less efficient organizational model. 
What is deemed most appropriate or legitimate is, in turn, dependent on the habits, routines, 
taken-for-granted scripts, and schema that influence an actor’s perception of the world. These 
institutionalized scripts, routines, etc. are thought to constrain, enable, and constitute behaviour 
because, among other things, they guide actors during times of uncertainty, when decisions must 
be made with incomplete information. According to Powell and DiMaggio (1991), because 
routines, habits, etc. are taken-for-granted, actors may not choose these routines, habits, etc. 
freely. Furthermore, an actor’s perception of what is appropriate is transmitted through 
socialization and societal enforcement. In this way, an actor’s interests, self-image, identity, and 
perception of the world are institutionally constructed (see also Hall & Taylor, 1996; Immergut 
& Anderson, 2008). Broader cultural frames and historical contexts help to define what is 
appropriate in a given situation.  
Sociological institutionalists also emphasize the roles played by power and the 
distribution of power across social groups with respect to how institutions affect human 
behaviour. March and Olsen (1989), for example, explored the implications of political equity 
for the design of political institutions. They define power as the ability of an individual or 
individuals to persuade others to act in a way that contributes to a particular interest or set of 
interests. The distribution of power in a society is affected by individual or collective 
preferences: “…political equality cannot be meaningfully achieved or assessed without a variety 
of political institutions concerned with the construction, elaboration, and empathic appreciation 
of individual preferences” (p. 144).  
 
2.3.5 How do institutions change?  
Campbell (2004, p.33-35) provides a useful overview of the three basic patterns of 
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institutional change most frequently discussed by new institutionalists: incremental or 
evolutionary, punctuated equilibrium, and punctuated evolution.  
Incremental or evolutionary change is slow and proceeds in small steps in a particular 
direction. These small steps build up slowly over time to contribute to an evolutionary process of 
institutional change. North (1993, p.38) asserts that the direction of incremental change is 
determined by path dependence. This type of evolutionary change may contribute to the 
persistence (maintenance or reproduction) of certain institutional forms because it reflects 
change that does not depart whole-heartedly from yesterday’s institutions. Institutional “inertia” 
and “stickiness” have been used to explain this slow process (see Campbell, 2004, p.33). Inertia 
and stickiness refer to a process by which choices made in the past constrain future choices by 
limiting available future options. In some cases, bounded rationality can play a leading role in 
inertia.  
Punctuated equilibrium describes institutional change that is more discontinuous, rapid 
and profound. These types of changes can represent dramatic shifts from one way of doing things 
to another. Campbell (2004) gives an example of discontinuous change in Fordist-style industrial 
production inspired by technological development in the 1970s: “…rapid changes in 
technologies, energy prices, and market demand sparked a dramatic shift toward post-Fordist 
institutions based on the principles of decentralized corporate structures…” (p. 34). This model 
of institutional change is generally known as Krasner’s (1984, 1988) model of punctuated 
equilibrium, which he derived from studies in evolutionary biology, specifically Stephen Jay 
Gould’s and Niles Eldridge’s theory of evolution. Krasner’s model of punctuated equilibrium 
distinguishes between short bursts of institutional creation or fundamental reorganization and 
longer periods of stasis. External and/or internal forces give rise to creation and reorganization.  
The third pattern of institutional change, punctuated evolution, incorporates both 
incremental and punctuated equilibrium conceptions of change. It posits that periods of 
intuitional stability are evolutionary rather than static. Intuitional stability, then, is characterized 
by slow and incremental change. Through a process of social learning, self-reflexive actors 
gradually adjust institutions within the constraints of existing institutional arrangements. During 
periods of crises, these actors vie for new institutional forms, which can result in the 
transformation of the previous status quo.  
According to Campbell’s (2004) overview, rational choice intuitionalists favour path-
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dependent evolutionary change as the norm. But some rational choice scholars have recognized 
the punctuated equilibrium pattern as well. Douglas North (see 1990; 1993; North, 1996b: North, 
1996c), has been a staunch defender of the evolutionary model. North distinguishes between fast 
and slow moving institutions. Formal constraints (rules, etc.), for example, can change overnight, 
while informal constraints (norms, etc.), change more gradually. According to North (1993, p. 
38), even revolutionary (discontinuous) change is not as revolutionary as many scholars would 
have us believe. This is because it is often the case that formal rules change while informal 
constraints do not. Because multiple equilibrium options are always possible when it comes to 
the creation of institutions, one central question for rational choice scholars is why one 
equilibrium outcome is reached over another (see Thelen, 1999, p. 381). Some rational choice 
scholars have used the concept of diffusion to explain how certain economic practices are more 
likely to spread through the market than others in a path-dependent way.  
According to Campbell (2004), rational choice scholars have tended to take a 
functionalist view of why institutional change occurs. In other words, when an institution no 
longer functions for the reasons for which it was originally created, actors will seek to change it: 
“…regardless of whether they focus on evolutionary or revolutionary change, rational choice 
institutionalists find that both norms and more formal institutions emerge and are enforced as a 
result of self-interested behavior” (p.15). Rational choice scholars have recognized the 
importance of the concepts of transaction costs and increasing returns when it comes to 
institutional change and/or persistence: “…even if there are unintended policy consequences 
from an institution over the long term, actors might have adapted to the institution itself in such a 
way that it would be too costly to create a new institution” (Lecours, 2005, p. 58). North (1990) 
also argues that two forces key to the path of institutional change are increasing returns through 
self-reinforcing feedbacks, and transaction costs. These forces exist at the scale of an individual 
institution and at the scale of the larger institutional matrix where the interdependencies that exist 
among institutions generate massive increasing returns. 
Historical institutionalists have embraced all three patterns of institutional change 
outlined above. Institutions, for example, have been perceived to evolve incrementally through 
path-dependent processes (see Campbell, 2004, p. 26). But historical institutionalists have also 
been interested in revolutionary institutional change, which represent abrupt breaks from the 
past. Campbell outlines the tensions between these two views of institutional change: 
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“According to some critics, this has created problems insofar as their explanations of rapid, 
revolutionary change do not square well with an analytic framework that talks much about path-
dependence” (p. 26). Historical institutionalists who have adopted the pattern of punctuated 
evolution recognize the validity of both incremental and punctuated equilibrium models of 
institutional change. The concepts of diffusion, path-dependence, and positive feedback have 
been central to historical institutionalists’ explanations of institutional change. The concept of 
diffusion, for example, has been used to explain how policy learning can help to spread certain 
policy models from one country to another (see Campbell, 2004, p. 26). Some historical 
institutionalists have used the concept of path-dependence in a similar way to rational choice 
scholars to explain the path-dependent nature of evolutionary and even revolutionary change. 
The concepts of “tipping points” and “thresholds” have been central to historical new 
institutionalist understandings of the punctuated equilibrium model of change, whereby a slow 
accumulation of pressure may eventually reach a critical point where rapid change occurs: 
“…path-dependent or self-reinforcing processes…are all based on threshold models—relatively 
small movements can push above some critical level, triggering a process of positive feedback 
that leads to much more dramatic (nonlinear) change” (see Pierson, 2004, p. 85). The threshold 
concept is emphasized in punctuated equilibrium and punctuated evolution models of change. 
The basic idea is that small shifts over the thresholds of individuals can lead to more significant 
shifts in collective behaviour. Pierson asserts that there are “tipping points” in many social 
processes and these tipping points can induce nonlinear consequences. Sometimes, these social 
processes are interconnected. Pierson further emphasizes that changes in one institution can 
influence and/or undermine others.  
Notable historical New Institutionalists, Streeck and Thelen (2005), have provided a 
typology of various ways that New Institutionalists have perceived institutional change. They 
criticize views that favour either an incremental or punctuated equilibrium model and offer an 
alternative view that posits that small adjustments over time can cumulatively amount to 
transformative change. They dedicate their entire volume to an examination of cases that do not 
conform to a punctuated equilibrium model of change. Important to this gradualist view of 
institutional transformation are the concepts of displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and 
exhaustion (see Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 18-30).  
Similar to rational choice scholars, historical institutionalists have also recognized the 
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motivating role that an actor’s self-interest plays in institutional change. This refers to the logic 
of instrumentality, which has been central to the rational choice perspective. But historical 
institutionalists have also argued that an actor’s ideas about the “good” institution may also 
influence institutional change. A logic of appropriateness, therefore, may be just as important as 
a logic of instrumentality (see Campbell, 2004, p. 27). 
According to Campbell’s (2004) overview, sociological institutionalists have emphasized 
all three patterns of institutional change (punctuated equilibrium, evolution, punctuated 
evolution) (see p. 20). Like rational choice and historical institutionalists, sociological 
institutionalists see the concepts of path dependency and diffusion as key to understanding 
institutional change. Whatever the favoured pattern of change is, the sociological strain is 
interested in the links between institutions and organizations; therefore, their explanations of 
change have tended to focus on how certain principles, rules, procedures, etc., diffuse through 
organizations to become taken-for-granted modes of operation. Hall and Taylor (1996) assert 
that unlike rational choice institutionalists, who view change as related to means-ends efficiency 
calculations, sociological institutionalist scholars emphasize the “logic of appropriateness”. In 
other words, organizations will adopt particular rules, procedures, etc., if they increase the social 
legitimacy of the organization: “…organizations embrace specific institutional forms or practices 
because the latter are widely valued within a broader cultural environment” (p. 949).  
Table 1, below, summarizes the orientation of the three main strands discussed above to 
the core questions in institutional analysis.  
 
Table 1. Summary of the three major strands of New Institutionalism 








Formal rules and informal 
norms of behaviour, 
conventions, etc., compliance 
procedures  
 
(Emphasis on regulative 
dimension) 
 
Formal and informal rules, 
routines, and procedures  
 
(Emphasis on formal structures, 
e.g. branches of government) 
Formal rules and taken-for-
granted cultural frameworks, 
cognitive schema, routinized 
processes of reproduction  
 






Logic of instrumentality 
 
Institutions emerge as 
responses to problems of 
opportunism, incomplete 
information, transaction costs 
Institutions are embedded in 
temporal processes, emerge 




Logic of appropriateness 
 
Manifestations of societal 
needs 
 
Institutions emerge from the 
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(Transaction costs, bounded 
rationality are featured 
concepts) 
 
Recognize role of power 
 
(Long-term temporal processes 
are emphasized) 
rubble or from extant 
institutions 
 
The role of power is 
emphasized 
 
(Emphasis on why 
organizations adopt certain 






Logic of instrumentality 
 
Rules, laws, routines, and 
systems of governance and 
power act as “carriers” of 
institutions, constraints  
 




(Path dependence, positive 
feedback, increasing returns, 
transaction costs, bounded 
rationality are featured 
concepts) 
 
paradox of institutional 
persistence is recognized 
Logic of instrumentality  
 
Long-term temporal processes 
are emphasized as constraints 
 
Institutional persistence is 





Institutions are socially 
constructed and embedded,  
 
(Path dependence, positive 
feedbacks, threshold effects, 
transaction costs are featured 
concepts) 
 
paradox of institutional 
persistence is recognized 
Logic of appropriateness  
 
Cultural persistence through 
internalized, taken-for-
granted cognitive schema 
 
Role of power relations is 
important (persistence is 
related to interests and values 
of elites) 
 




Role of internalized and 
enforced shared norms is 
important 
 
(Path dependence, transaction 
costs (cognitive), positive 







Logic of instrumentality 
 
Informal norms, formal rules, 
laws, constitutions; 
enforcement mechanisms, 
bounded rationality, and 
ideas (beliefs, cognitive 
schema) constrain human and 
organizational behaviour  
 
 
Logic of institutional 
development and reproduction, 
path dependency 
 
Formal and informal 
institutions influence human 
behaviour and political 
outcomes 
 
Role of socialization in 
formation of actors’ interests 
and preferences 
 
Role of power and distribution 
of power 
 
Cognitive constraints (ideas 
constrain actors’ choices) 
 










preferences, identity, etc. 
 
Role of power and 
distribution of power 
 




Logic of instrumentality 
 
Logic of instrumentality, Logic 
of appropriateness  
Logic of appropriateness 
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change? Evolutionary, punctuated 
equilibrium 
 
Fast and slow moving 
institutions 
 
Multiple equilibrium orders 
are possible 
 
Featured concepts: diffusion, 
path dependence, positive 






Featured concepts: thresholds, 
diffusion, path dependency, 









Featured concepts: diffusion, 




2.3.6 Defining some frequently invoked concepts in institutional analysis  
According to Pierson (2004), the concept of path dependence may be of greatest 
importance to social scientists in their explanations of institutional emergence, persistence, and 
change. Path dependence has been defined in many different ways (see Pierson, 2004, p. 20; 
Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 6-7). For the purposes of this study, path dependence refers to “…a 
process whereby contingent events or decisions result in the establishment of institutions that 
persist over long periods of time and constrain the range of actors’ future options, including 
those that may be more efficient or effective in the long run” (Campbell, 2004, p. 65). It is 
associated with a positive feedback process, which generates multiple possible outcomes, and 
which involves high costs of reversal and increasing returns for actors that behave in ways that 
support previous choices: “In the presence of positive feedback, the probability of further steps 
along the same path increases with each move down the path” (Pierson, 2004, p. 21).  
Campbell argues, however, that without a better explanation of the mechanisms that 
underpin path dependent evolutionary change, path dependency will remain more suited to 
describe institutional persistence. One such mechanism is “bricolage”. Bricolage refers to a 
process whereby actors create innovative institutions from previously existing principles and 
practices: “The key is to recognize that actors often craft new institutional solutions by 
recombining elements in their repertoire through an innovative process of bricolage whereby 
new institutions differ from but resemble old ones (Campbell, 2004, p. 69). These elements may 
be cognitive, normative, and/or regulative. The process of bricolage leads to incremental or path 
dependent change because the range of options available for actors is limited by the particular 
elements available to them. In this way, actors are both constrained and empowered by existing 
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institutions. One important benefit of the concept of bricolage is that it focuses our attention on 
the importance of agency; “bricoleurs” are central to the process of bricolage. 
Bricoleurs is a term coined by Joseph Schumpeter (1934) to describe the creative people 
who come forward to recombine institutional elements in innovative ways. Understanding their 
role in bricolage is important because it can explain why one set of institutions is created over 
another. In particular, an actor’s position within the social-institutional environment can impact 
the effects of bricolage. Campbell asserts, for example, that bricoleurs with extensive ties to 
people across a range of social networks, including organizations and institutions, enhance the 
success of a particular innovation, and can lead to more transformative change. An 
entrepreneur’s institutional environment may also constrain his or her choice of innovations, 
following norms of what is appropriate or legitimate, and regulative constraints: “In other words, 
the more entrepreneurs can demonstrate that their innovations fit the prevailing institutional 
situation, the greater will be their capacity for innovation and the greater will be the likelihood 
that their innovations will stick” (Campbell, 2004, p. 76). This constraining effect determines, in 
part, the degree to which an innovation is evolutionary or transformative. Campbell notes also 
that actors’ access to resources (e.g. money, political clout, opportunities for participation in 
decision making) affects the success of innovative ideas: “Thus, while entrepreneurs’ social, 
organizational, and institutional locations affect their capacity for creative innovation, they face 
institutional and resource constraints that affect their capacity to make their innovations stick” (p. 
77). 
Another ubiquitous concept in institutional analysis is diffusion. Diffusion refers to how 
institutional elements spread through a particular environment or population of actors with little 
alteration. Two important mechanisms that facilitate diffusion are translation and enactment. The 
more an innovative idea is translated and enacted, the more likely it is that the idea will lead to 
transformative change. An actor’s location within the institutional framework increases the 
likelihood that a new idea will be introduced in the first place. But once it has been introduced, 
the process of translation influences its impact: “Institutional entrepreneurs must blend new ideas 
into local practice. This tends to ensure that implementation of a new idea rarely constitutes a 
total break with past practice” (Campbell, 2004, p. 80). Success also depends on the degree of 
political support an idea carries, power struggles, and the capacity (financial, administrative, etc.) 
of an organization to adopt and implement the new idea. It is important to note too that the way a 
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particular innovation is translated depends on the actors responsible for translation. Some actors, 
for example, will be motivated to translate ideas in such a way to fulfill their own interests. 
Others will be more concerned with cognitive an/or normative goals. 
The third common concept to be discussed is ideas. Campbell asserts that it is well 
recognized that ideas can both inhibit and facilitate incremental and/or transformative 
institutional change. Here, ideas are defined as socially constructed worldviews, intellectual 
paradigms, identities, norms, values, culture, interests, beliefs, etc. that influence decision-
making. Campbell is careful to note that actors (e.g. decision makers, academics, institutional 
entrepreneurs, constituents, ideational brokers) play a key role in the emergence and spread of 
ideas. And the success of an idea is ultimately constrained by the institutional environment. The 
degree to which a government or organization is centralized, decentralized, and connected to 
other organizations for example, can influence the success of new programs or policy. 
The above overview of the three strands and frequently invoked concepts in the New 
Institutionalism have important implications for the purposes of this study. These will be 
discussed below. 
 
2.3.7 The New Institutionalism and institutional change and resistance to change towards 
sustainability 
Hall and Taylor (1996) provide a good critical comparison of the major strands of New 
Institutionalism, emphasizing strengths and weaknesses. They assert that historical 
institutionalism is weak in its approach with respect to how institutions influence human 
behaviour and suggest that it might benefit from some exchange among the schools. Rational 
choice scholars offer a more precise conception of the relationship between institutions and 
human behaviour. But, again, rational choice scholars would benefit from a more nuanced 
explanation of what motivates human behaviour and how interests are formed. For example, they 
might benefit from the sociological strand’s emphasis on the cognitive and cultural dimensions, 
which go beyond instrumental accounts of human action. Similarly, Hall and Taylor argue that 
the rational choice perspective on origins and persistence, which emphasizes the logic of 
instrumentality, may only be appropriate to certain contexts (e.g. legislatures and market 
competition). Here again, historical and sociological institutionalists have much to offer to fill 
out the historical and cognitive dimensions of institutional emergence and persistence. In 
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particular, previously existing institutions play a key role in historical and sociological 
explanation of origins, persistence, and change. From this standpoint, the more cognitive 
dimensions of culture and socialization can be elaborated. 
For the purpose of this study, insights are drawn from the three major strands in order to 
better understand and explain institutional change or lack thereof. It argues that each strand has 
produced a partial understanding of institutions; each captures a different dimension of human-
institutional behaviour. Indeed, it can be argued that the particular ingredients of institutional 
emergence, persistence, and change are context dependent. Moreover, understanding the 
dynamics of institutions in relation to sustainability requires a comprehensive conceptual 
approach. As previously mentioned, New Institutionalists have largely ignored the role of the 
natural environment in institutional analyses. The three major strands of New Institutionalism, 
however, carry important insights from cultural, economic, and political spheres, which are 
relevant to understanding institutional behaviour through a sustainability lens.  
It is important to note here that the topic of institutional resistance remains poorly 
understood by New Institutionalist scholars. According to the overview above, scholars in all 
three strands have attempted to understand and explain why and how institutions persist over 
time. But institutional persistence and resistance entail different dynamics. Institutional 
persistence refers to how institutions are maintained by actors over time through various 
processes (path-dependency, socialization, reproduction through renegotiation and 
reinterpretation, etc.). The emphasis is on recreating the same institution over time. In contrast, 
institutional resistance is about how institutions persist in the presence of (sometimes extreme) 
external and/or internal pressures to change. Nevertheless, the New Institutionalist explanations 
of persistence provide helpful clues about inertia.  
As a whole, the three major strands reveal that institutions are multi-dimensional. They 
consist of regulative, normative, and cognitive elements. These dimensions may evolve at 
different speeds. The regulative dimension, for example, may evolve faster than the normative 
and cognitive dimensions. Investigating institutional behaviour through a sustainability lens, 
then, requires attention to all three dimensions while recognizing that they do not necessarily 
evolve simultaneously. This may certainly be the case for institutional change towards 
sustainability, which is a concept and pursuit that requires integrated attention to multiple 
dimensions (social, economic, and ecological), a comprehensive suite of interrelated social-
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ecological concerns, present and future generations, and local to global scales. Moreover, the 
concept of sustainability inherently challenges the status quo, which is comprised of formal and 
informal institutions with regulative (legislative frameworks), normative (values), and cognitive 
elements (ideas, worldviews). Regulative changes in the aggregates sector, for example, may not 
induce transformative change towards sustainability without changes in norms of practice, 
values, and beliefs. Campbell (2004) asserts that institutional change is transformative when 
change occurs across most or all dimensions.  
The above elements represent particular constraints and opportunities for human action. 
When investigating institutional dimensions of change, then, it is important to devote attention to 
existing laws, interests and values of powerful groups, norms, etc. as important constraints and 
opportunities that determine of the choices that individuals make. Historical institutionalists 
would add that these institutional constraints and opportunities are embedded in long-term 
historic processes, which may in themselves represent limitations due to the effects of path-
dependency (positive feedbacks, increasing returns, transaction costs). Regulative, normative, 
cognitive factors, therefore, may all be present in certain situations and they may work together 
to both inhibit and facilitate institutional change towards sustainability. When pursuing 
institutional change towards sustainability, for example, actors may be limited to a certain degree 
by the particular range of inherited regulative, normative, and cognitive elements in the 
institutional environment, especially when institutional entrepreneurs are engaged in creating 
new institutions. Moreover, as discussed in section 2.3.6, Campbell argues that the degree to 
which institutional change is incremental or transformative depends on how well actors can 
demonstrate that a particular innovation “fits” the prevailing institutional environment. Powerful 
elites, for example, may reject institutional change if the proposed change is not in their best 
interests. This may explain, in part, why institutional change towards sustainability – a concept 
that fundamentally challenges the status quo – has been overwhelmingly incremental.  
The three strands of the New Institutionalism also suggest that investigations into the 
dynamics of institutions in relation to progress towards sustainability require consideration of the 
different types of reasoning or logic that may underpin decision-making. Rational choice 
institutionalism, for example, stresses the role of a logic of instrumentality in institutional 
emergence, persistence, and change. Actors will create, recreate, and dismantle certain 
institutions if the anticipated results will fulfill particular individual or collective interests – even 
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if the new institutions are less efficient or preclude more efficient alternatives. Actors also think 
strategically in terms of the transaction costs of change; if the immediate costs of change to the 
actor(s) are high relative to the costs of maintaining the status quo, resistance to change is likely. 
Similarly, if the individual and collective gains that result from preserving the status quo are 
relatively high, the incentive to change is low. In contrast, historical and sociological 
institutionalists suggest that the logic of appropriateness is equally if not more important. Here, 
the normative and cognitive elements of decision-making are made explicit. What an actor 
deems to be appropriate in a given situation, for example, may be underpinned by personal 
values, shared norms, and taken-for-granted cultural frameworks. These normative and cognitive 
elements are embedded in the broader cultural environment, which is inherited through long-
term historical processes. The historical and cultural embeddedness of these values and shared 
norms, etc., help to explain why they can be so resistant to change. With respect to progress 
towards sustainability, then, it is important to consider the influence of both logics and the 
historical time frame and broader cultural environment in which they are embedded. 
The logics of instrumentality and appropriateness both involve certain collective and/or 
individual gains from cooperation, especially if there are interdependencies among institutions at 
the scale of the institutional matrix. Gains from cooperation may be increased through path-
dependent processes, which involve positive feedbacks, increasing returns, and transaction costs. 
The particular ideas, norms, laws, etc. that influence the creation, maintenance, and persistence 
of institutions may be, in part, the effects of long-term path-dependent processes– for better or 
for worse. Moreover, individual and collective goals underpinned by the logics outlined above 
may be realized over the long term with the help of path-dependent processes. Sociological 
institutionalists particularly emphasize the cognitive transaction costs associated with path 
dependency, whereas rational choice scholars emphasize losses and/or gains in material 
resources. Analysing institutional progress towards sustainability necessitates integrated 
consideration of cognitive and material transaction costs. Certain communities, for example, may 
resist institutional change towards sustainability in certain approaches to natural resource 
management because of sunk socio-cultural and economic costs. It may be perceived that change 
is too costly in the short term, even in the face of the long-term benefits of change. In these 
cases, path dependence, positive feedbacks, increasing returns, and transaction costs work 
together to maintain the status quo.  
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The three strands also suggest certain social and other processes may be involved in 
institutional progress towards sustainability. Sociological institutionalists emphasize cultural 
persistence through the process of socialization as integral to an actor’s definition of his or her 
interests, values, self-image, worldview, etc. Institutional change towards sustainability, then, 
may require events where such cognitive elements can be exposed and debated and where certain 
socially and ecologically destructive and inequitable institutionalized norms, etc., may be 
“unlearned”. Historical institutionalists’ emphasize that persistence is associated with a constant 
process of renegotiation and reinterpretation over the long term. It follows, then, that change and 
resistance to change may relate back to the different logics, shared norms, taken-for-granted 
schema, and other such dynamics as bounded rationality, and the distribution of power across 
social groups. Path dependent processes and the interdependencies across organizations and 
institutions may further entrench these logics and power dynamics so that renegotiation and 
reinterpretation result in slow, incremental change or resistance to change. Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) demonstrate that the process of renegotiation and reinterpretation may sometimes be 
explicit, for example through decision making around policy reform. Here are opportunities for 
institutional change towards sustainability through social learning.  
Usually, however, as sociological new institutionalists emphasize, certain actors have 
more access to the political decision making process than others, giving certain groups more 
influence than others in policy development. Moreover, powerful elites who benefit from certain 
institutions are inclined to preserve them over time. The persistence of institutions, then, is 
related to the interests and values of powerful elites. The balance of power among social groups 
is especially important when considering the impacts of renegotiation and reinterpretation.  
Institutional change towards sustainability over the long term also depends on the degree 
to which institutional change is incremental or transformative. The concept of “tipping points” or 
thresholds is relevant here. Changes in the beliefs, opinions, etc. of one individual may lead to 
broader, more collective change. Such mechanisms as bricolage and diffusion many also carry 
the potential for transformative change towards sustainability – if certain powers, resources and 
capacities are available to a particular set of actors. Campbell (2004) highlights some of these 
important resources and capacities (e.g. adequate information, financial, administrative, political 
support, etc). Uncertainty or lack of information about a particular programme or policy, etc., for 
example, can stall change and support institutional inertia. Other important resources include 
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openings for public participation and deliberation, where social learning might occur. A lack of 
administrative capacity and financial resources may explain why certain natural resource 
management crises were not met with transformative institutional changes in associated 
management organizations.  
All three strands underscore the centrality of actors as agents who practice and maintain 
institutions, create new ones and reform old ones. Moreover, actors and institutions are 
interconnected and interdependent in that they continually interact with each other. The 
importance of the role of actors is especially evident in Campbell’s mechanisms (bricolage, 
translation and enactment) and other processes for incremental-to-transformative institutional 
change (see Streeck & Thelen, 2005).  
The above discussion highlights the implications of the three main strands of New 
Institutionalism for understanding and explaining the dynamics of institutional systems. These 
implications form the basis of the preliminary theoretical propositions based on the New 
Institutionalism. The theoretical propositions defined in Box 1, below, assume a basic 
understanding of institutions and human-institutional relationships. They are oriented towards 
answering questions about why and how institutional change and resistance to change occur and 
the factors that determine the extent to which they occur. The are underpinned by the following 
essentials: 
• Institutional dynamics (emergence, persistence, change, and resistance to change) occur 
within and are constrained by a particular set of culturally embedded (norms, habits, etc.), 
regulative (laws, etc.), normative (values, etc.), and cognitive (beliefs, worldviews, 
cultural frameworks, etc.) institutional elements, which define a particular institutional 
system. These institutional elements are interconnected and interdependent across scales 
and they evolve at different speeds.  
 
• Institutional dynamics occur within and are constrained by the effects of long-term path 
dependent processes, including positive feedbacks, increasing returns, and transaction 
costs. Path dependent processes may be reinforced more broadly by the interconnections 
and interdependencies between and among institutions within the institutional matrix, and 







Box 1. Preliminary theoretical propositions based on the three strands of the New 
Institutionalism. 
 
1. Actors may resist or facilitate institutional change in order to maximize individual and/or 
collective interests and/or to achieve cultural appropriateness and legitimacy as defined by a 
particular, culturally embedded institutional environment. Actors’ interests are determined, in 
part, by the institutional system and by long-term historic processes (e.g. socialization). 
 
2. Actors may resist or facilitate institutional change through the process of renegotiation and 
reinterpretation and/or by creating innovative institutions from previously existing institutional 
elements. These processes lead to path-dependent change because the range of options available 
to institutional entrepreneurs is constrained by the particular characteristics (e.g. power 
relationships, actors’ interests, laws and informal norms, etc.) of the existing institutional 
system. 
 
3. The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is determined, in part, 
by: 
 
• the socioeconomic costs associated with change. Path-dependent processes involve high 
socioeconomic costs of reversal or reorganization, especially when the interconnections 
and interdependencies among and between the institutions, organizations, and certain 
socioeconomic groups in a particular institutional arrangement are considered; 
 
• the power and resources (esp. financial, ties to people in power, political support, 
opportunities for participation) held by particular socioeconomic groups to develop, 
translate and enact innovation(s); 
 
• the capacity of actors to translate and enact an innovation (with suitable accommodation 
but no alterations that undermine the essentials) across a range of organizations or 
across a population. Translation and enactment occur within and are constrained by a 
particular institutional context and by a particular set of actors;  
 
• the nature of the proposed institutional change. The more that actors can demonstrate 
that a particular innovation “fits” the existing institutional framework, the more likely 
that it will be adopted by particular actors (powerful elites, communities, organizations, 
etc.) and stick; 
 
• how much variation occurs in fast and slow moving institutions (regulative, normative, 
and cognitive) over time. Transformative change occurs when there is change across 
most or all of these dimensions. 
 
• whether a threshold is crossed. Small changes (e.g. changes in the opinion of one 
individual or a particular group) can trigger a process of positive feedback that leads to 
more transformative change. 
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• uncertainty: limitations in the quality and quantity of information and knowledge about 
certain problems; available or potential solutions, and the methods available for 
evaluating the effectiveness of certain policies and programmes, etc. 
 
 
The above propositions incorporate key concepts utilised by New Institutionalist scholars 
within the three major varieties of New Institutionalism. The propositions have particular 
strengths and limitations for the purpose of this study. These will be discussed in section 3.4. The 
next step in the development of the preliminary propositions is to combine them with insights 
based on Panarchy theory.  
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CHAPTER 3: Panarchy theory 
3.1 Introduction 
This section provides an overview of Panarchy theory, which leads to a discussion of the 
implications of the theory for understanding and explaining institutional behaviour in relation to 
change towards sustainability. A set of preliminary theoretical propositions is developed based 
on insights from Panarchy theory. This leads to a discussion of the strengths and limitations of 
both sets of preliminary theoretical propositions and the development of a combined set of 




The review of Panarchy theory included seminal works, well-known compilations of 
empirical studies, and a review of academic, peer-reviewed articles about the theory and 
empirical application of key concepts to ecological and social-ecological systems. The review 
focused on delineating key concepts of the theory to form the foundations of the preliminary 
theoretical propositions. 
Gunderson and Holling’s (2002) Panarchy theory was chosen for the purposes of this 
study for two key reasons. First, Panarchy theory is a theory of transformative change in 
ecological systems, but it recognizes the feedbacks between and among social and ecological 
systems. In particular, it emphasizes the implications of ecological collapse for institutional 
systems and points to the roles of resilient and resistant but destructive institutional systems in 
the regrettable transformation of ecological systems. This fundamental orientation is appropriate, 
therefore, for the development of a comprehensive, interdisciplinary theoretical framework for 
analysis. Secondly, key concepts from Panarchy theory have recently been extended to studies 
that investigate resilience (and resistance to change) in ecological and/or social-ecological 
systems. The adaptive cycle metaphor has been especially helpful in investigations into when 
ecological and/or social-ecological systems are most resilient and when they are most vulnerable 
to disturbances. This study is especially concerned with resilient and resistant institutional 
systems for the purpose of understanding why and how institutions change and resist change. 




3.3 Panarchy theory 
The essentials of Panarchy theory include the proposition that ecosystems experience 
continual adaptive cycles of slow growth and conservation and rapid release and reorganization. 
During the release and reorganization phases, innovations may emerge to become subsequently 
embedded, but they are always constrained (and pushed) by existing and historical factors. 
Adaptive cycles do not exist in isolation. Rather, they are interlinked in a hierarchical structure 
across temporal and spatial scales; what happens at one scale at one time can influence what 
happens at higher and lower scales from moments to years into the future. Gunderson and 
Holling created the term “Panarchy” to describe the hierarchical structure within which adaptive 
cycles are nested.  
Gunderson and Holling and colleagues have developed Panarchy theory with particular 
objectives in mind. Chief among these objectives is to improve understanding of how and why 
transformative change occurs within ecological systems. The interconnections and 
interdependencies between and among social and ecological systems are emphasized. Second, 
they aim to extend their understanding of transformative change in ecological systems to social 
systems – to institutional design in particular – to emphasize the implications of nonhuman 
systems for human systems in order to ameliorate the stubborn mismatches between ecological 
and social realms.  
Key features of the theory will be described, including the metaphor of the four-phase 
adaptive cycle and the concept of Panarchy. This description will form the basis of the 
theoretical propositions based on Panarchy theory.  
 
3.3.1 The metaphor of the four-phase adaptive cycle  
The four-phase adaptive cycle developed by Gunderson and Holling (2002) is a metaphor 
for understanding transformative change in complex adaptive ecosystems. It emerged from 
experience with natural, disturbed, and managed ecosystems in temperate regions, including 
boreal coniferous forests of the Northern Hemisphere, temperate deciduous forests, and 
productive grasslands. It was developed to have generality; therefore, Gunderson and Holling are 
careful to note that the adaptive cycle metaphor is a useful framework and not a theory in itself. 
Below, the fundamentals of the adaptive cycle heuristic are described. 
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The adaptive cycle metaphor rests on the proposition that change in most ecosystems 
occurrs within a four-phase cycle of rapid growth (r), conservation (K), release (Ω) and 
reorganization (α). Three key ecosystem properties (potential available for other kinds of 
ecosystems and futures, degree of internal connectedness, and resilience) determine how the 
ecosystem behaves from one phase to the next. In effect, these properties work to determine the 
future responses of a particular ecosystem. During the rapid growth phase, pioneer species (“r-
strategists”) with the ability to reproduce quickly and disperse extensively begin to exploit 
available resources and create niches for themselves. During this phase, the components of the 
ecosystem are loosely interconnected and weakly regulated. But connectedness and stability 
increase slowly as the system moves into the conservation phase. During this slow stage of 
incremental growth, energy is sequestered and materials slowly accumulate, creating an increase 
in the potential for other kinds of ecosystems and futures. Potential is high but it is more and 
more rigidly controlled by a characteristic set of species and processes. Near the end of the 
conservation phase, the growth rate slows due to an increase in connectedness (rigidity); 
consequently, resilience declines: “The cost of efficiency is a loss in flexibility. Different ways 
of performing the same function (redundancy) are eliminated in favor of doing the function in 
just the most efficient way” (Walker & Salt, 2006, p.77). Although the system is now more 
stable, it is more vulnerable to internal and/or external disturbances. Finally, internal and/or 
external disturbances that exceed the system’s resilience cause the system to change rapidly. 
Uncertainty rules. Stability is lost. Sequestered energy and stored materials are suddenly 
released. But the energy and materials released create the source for reorganization. During this 
phase, some potential leaks away because some of the previously stored materials leave the 
system. But by the end of the release phase, the beginning of a new identity for the system 
emerges as it reorganizes itself once again. This new identity may be similar to the previous 
system, or it may be an entirely different system, or it may collapse into a degraded state. 
The degree to which an ecosystem can maintain a particular identity as it faces 
disturbances and as it proceeds through the phases of the adaptive cycle depends on the 
resilience of the ecosystem. Ecosystem resilience is discussed in detail in section 3.3.2, below. 
Gunderson and Holling assert that an ecosystem’s resilience expands and contracts throughout 
the four-phase cycle as slow variables change. During the reorganization and exploitation phases, 
connectedness among system variables is low, internal regulation around a particular stable state 
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is weak, but the potential for various futures is high, and an ecosystem’s resilience is 
consequently high. This is, in part, due to the capacity of pioneer and other types of species to 
adapt to the stresses and opportunities of a highly variable environment. As connectedness 
increases from the exploitation to the conservation phase, species that are able to control external 
variability begin to dominate. Positive feedbacks reinforce established relationships and 
processes and support their expansion. According to Gunderson and Holling, at this stage more 
positive gains are achieved by increasing system efficiency in the way energy is used, etc. 
Newcomers to the system may find it very difficult to penetrate the system. Resilience decreases. 
Small disturbances from smaller or larger scales can now trigger change, crises and sometimes 
transformation. From the release to reorganization phases, when connectivity among species is 
loose, and when a particular stable state is not yet strictly regulated, resilience is high: “This is 
the time when exotic species of plants and animals can invade and dominate future states, or 
when two or three entrepreneurs can meet and…turn a novel idea into action” (Gunderson & 
Holling, 2002, p.46). At this juncture, unpredictable critical events can determine the future 
trajectory of the ecosystem. 
Recently, scholars have applied the metaphor to illustrate the interconnections and 
interdependencies between and among ecological and social systems, especially in the context of 
natural resource management. The concept of ecological resilience is highlighted as an integral 
element of social-ecological sustainability and the adaptive cycle metaphor has helped both 
scholars and resource management practitioners understand when an ecological system is most 
vulnerable and most resilient in the face of internal and external disturbances. Because of the 
perceived similarities and differences among human and ecological systems, some scholars have 
asserted that more research is required to determine the generality of the adaptive cycles 
metaphor, especially when it comes to explaining and understanding change in social systems.  
 
3.3.2  Key concepts involved in the metaphor of the adaptive cycle 
Multiple stable states  
A “stable state” (or state of equilibrium, stability domain, basin of attraction, regime) 
refers to a distinguishable arrangement of a system. A stable state is characterized by a particular 
set of organisms, structures, processes and feedbacks that work to reinforce that state. Gunderson 
and Holling (2002) assert that many ecosystems have multiple potential stable states, which 
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represent different possible states for that ecosystem. Beisner et al. (2003) explore some 
conceptual frameworks used by ecologists to explain alternative stable states. Peterson (2002) 
describes the dynamics of alternative stable states in meta-population dynamics, shallow lakes, 
reefs, kelp forests, sandhill communities in North Florida, and the Serengeti-Mara savanna. 
Kinzig et al. (2006) describe a savanna system as one that can occupy one of two dominant 
stable states, a grassy savanna or a woody savanna, depending on pressures on the system. 
Carpenter et al. (1999) describe two states of many lakes (oligotrophy and eutrophy), which are 
characterized by the amount of nutrient inputs, plant productivity, turbidity, and the level of the 
value of ecosystem services.  
 
Thresholds 
According to Walker and Meyers (2004), Holling’s (1973) seminal paper on resilience 
inspired an explosion of interest in thresholds in ecosystems with multiple stable states. The 
Resilience Alliance defines thresholds as points “…between alternate regimes in ecological or 
social-ecological systems” (Resilience Alliance, 2009). In order for an ecosystem to pass from 
one stable state to another, a critical threshold of a controlling (slow) variable must be passed. 
External or internal disturbances can push a system beyond a critical threshold. Once a critical 
threshold has been passed, the feedbacks that characterized the previous stable state change so 
that the system shifts from one stable state or basin of attraction to another. The consequences 
can be dramatic and sudden or more continuous and gradual. Walker and Meyers (2004) provide 
a useful typology of five classes of thresholds. This typology has been adopted by the Resilience 
Alliance, whose response to the need for empirical evidence of thresholds has included the 
development of a database of examples of thresholds and regime shifts from ecological, social, 
and social-ecological systems (see Resilience Alliance, 2009).   
Regime shifts 
A regime shift is defined as “a rapid modification of ecosystem organization and 
dynamics, with prolonged consequences” (Carpenter, 2003). Regime shifts occur when a system 
crosses a threshold. The system then undergoes rapid reorganization, which represents a flip 
from one stable state (or regime) to another: “A regime shift, then, initially represents a loss of 
resilience, in that former functions, structures, feedbacks, and therefore identities…give way to 
new versions” (Kinzig et al., 2006, p. 1). According to Carpenter (2003), certain regimes are 
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distinguishable (e.g. clear water, algae blooms, etc.) in that they have somewhat predictable 
dynamics. But a regime shift involves rapid and large changes in the internal feedbacks and 
external drivers of a particular regime. This flip from one regime to another is often difficult to 
predict. Carpenter argues that while ecosystem change is incremental most of the time, rapid and 
big changes that occur during regime shifts are less frequent. But when they do occur, they may 
have devastating effects on linked social systems. Karunanithi et al. (2008) provide a good 
overview of studies undertaken by various scholars to understand regime shifts in ecological 
systems, social systems, and climate systems. 
Cascading effect 
Sometimes, whole panarchies can be transformed, either when novelty within the system 
causes a cascade of changes up the levels, or when harmful catastrophes cause a cascade of 
collapses down the levels in a system (Gunderson & Holling, 2002). For example, if the potential 
within a system accumulates beyond a certain threshold, it can cause a cascading effect up the 
levels in the panarchy until it creates a new panarchical level. Similarly, stochastic events can 
trigger a collapse at one level, which, in turn, may cause a cascade of collapses down the levels 
in a panarchy. Kinzig et al. (2006) provide a useful definition of a cascading effect in that it 
highlights the multiple scales and domains across which a cascading effect may occur: 
“…crossing a single threshold between alternative regimes often leads to a ‘cascading effect’ in 
which multiple thresholds across space, time, and social organization and across ecological, 
social, and economic domains may be breached”. A regime shift in one domain, then, may affect 
change at other scales and in other domains. For example, a drastic change in climate may have 
devastating consequences for the conditions for a particular crop and way of farming. This, in 
turn, may have drastic implications for local cultural identity, and local and regional social and 
economic stability. Kinzig et al. provide helpful summaries of the dynamics of cascading effects 
in four different social-ecological systems: Roquefort and Fedou cheese production in the Causse 
Méjan region of France, the agricultural region of the lower Goulburn-Broken Catchment in 
Australia, the western Australian Wheatbelt, and the agricultural Androy region in southern 
Madagascar.  
Slow and fast variables 
The interplay between fast and slow variables can influence the trajectory of ecological 
systems. In general, different processes are happening at different speeds throughout the 
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panarchy. Slow moving processes are often called “controlling variables” or “system drivers” 
because they strongly influence the location of thresholds within a system. Faster variables 
include small disturbances that work to generate innovation or collapse, especially if a system is 
in a vulnerable phase of the adaptive cycle. According to Resilience Alliance (2007), ecological 
systems are comprised of interconnections and interdependencies between spatial and temporal 
scales. In general, large-scale components (e.g. a stand of trees) change slowly, while small-scale 
components (e.g. needles) change more quickly. Walker et al. (2006) assert that social-ecological 
resilience is determined by the interactions between slow an fast variables at different scales: “In 
ecosystems, the variables that control regimes shifts, such as soil, sediment concentrations, or 
long-lived organisms, tend to change slowly…In social systems the controlling variables may 
change rapidly, e.g., fads or technology, or slowly, e.g., culture” (p. 5).  
Path dependency 
According to Levin (1998), complex adaptive ecosystems are constrained by history in 
that there is path dependency in their development: “The colonization history of an island, or of a 
patch in a forest, will exhibit such path dependency, as early recruitment changes the landscape 
for future potential colonists” (p. 433). Ecologists have used the concept of path dependency to 
understand and explain how historic events influence present ecosystem dynamics and, by 
extension, how present human activities and ecological processes may influence future social-
ecological systems (e.g. Carpenter, 2002).     
Ecological Resilience 
As described in section 3.3.1, ecological resilience is a key concept in Gunderson and 
Holling’s (2002) adaptive cycle metaphor. It is described independently in this section because 
of its particular double meaning to this study and because of its central role in studies that 
demonstrate the implications of ecological resilience for the design of institutions for social-
ecological sustainability. This study refers to ecological resilience instead of other types of 
resilience (e.g. engineering resilience), which are based on different assumptions about how 
nature works (see Gunderson & Holling, 2002, p. 27-29). Moreover, similar to treatment of the 
adaptive cycle metaphor, the concept of ecological resilience has been extended to encompass 
social systems and social-ecological systems.  
Ecosystem resilience is defined as “…the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and 
reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, 
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identity, and feedbacks – in other words, stay in the same basin of attraction” (Walker et al., 
2004, p. 10). Ecosystem resilience is measured by “…the magnitude of disturbance that can be 
absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that 
control behavior” (Gunderson & Holling, 2002, p. 28). Folke (2006) provides an excellent 
overview of how the concept of ecological resilience has emerged and how it has been applied in 
a variety of studies across various disciplines, in particular natural resource management. For the 
purposes of an examination of institutional change, resilience is significant as a quality to be 
maintained in some circumstances and overcome in others.  
Scholars have devoted much attention to how to maintain social-ecological resilience, 
especially in the context of ecosystem management (e.g. Anderies et al., 2002; Carpenter, 2003; 
Janssen et al., 2004; Folke et al., 2004; Kinzig et al., 2006; Lawson & Walker, 2006). These 
studies have drawn insights from the adaptive cycle metaphor in order to investigate how to 
maintain social-ecological resilience in the face of internal and/or external disturbances that 
threaten to push the system beyond a critical threshold. Walker and Salt (2006) have developed a 
set of criteria for a resilient world: ecological variability, modularity, acknowledging slow 
variables, tight feedbacks (but not too tight), social capital, innovation, overlap in governance, 
and attention to the value of ecosystem services in development proposals and assessments (see 
p. 145-149).  
Less attention has been devoted to understanding and explaining the relationship between 
resilience and resistance in social-ecological systems, especially in resilient and resistant but 
inefficient and/or unproductive social-ecological systems. Resistance is a key aspect of 
ecological resilience and is defined as “…the ease or difficulty of changing the system; how 
‘resistant’ it is to being changed” (Walker et al., 2004, p. 2). It refers to the amount of pressure 
required to bring about a given amount of change in a particular system. Resilient and resistant 
but unproductive social-ecological systems may contribute to the deepening vulnerability of 
higher and lower level systems, the collapse of which may be catastrophic. Kinzig et al. (2006) 
have demonstrated how cascading thresholds can lead to very resilient but less desirable, 
alternative states. The new regime is often also highly resistant to rehabilitation management 
strategies. Other studies have demonstrated the impacts of resilient and resistant but inefficient 
natural resource management institutions on ecosystem integrity (Brown, 2005; Hodge, 2007; 
Bradley & Millington, 2008; Bauch et al., 2009; Bottom et al., 2009; Finley, 2009; Guven, 
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2009). These types of institutions erode the capacity of ecosystems to respond to shocks and 
surprises and their potential to generate alternatives for the future. Sociopolitical systems too can 
get locked into supporting unsustainable behaviour. Levin et al. (1998), for example, assert that 
many low-income countries can get caught in poverty traps, a resilient but destructive state that 
has been the cause of much environmental degradation. Brock highlights other types of resilient 
but destructive “traps”, including our dependency on hydrocarbon-based technologies, 
discriminatory class systems, racism, and inflexible institutions that stand as roadblocks to 
change. These types of “rigidity traps” (see Holling, 2001) exhibit a perverse sort of resilience 
where an unsustainable system has the capacity to persist in the midst of external disturbances 
and sometimes intense pressures to change: “Resilience thus makes no distinctions, preserving 
ecologically or socially undesirable situations as well as desirable ones. It helps maintain our 
environments… it similarly translates into resistance to change when such change is mandated” 
(Levin et al. 1998, p. 225).  
The institutional framework that underpins the aggregates sector in southern Ontario has 
since the 1950s, for example, been highly resilient and resistant to change towards sustainability. 
Panarchy theory’s focus on reorganization and transformation in complex adaptive social-
ecological systems may be especially appropriate for better understanding of how such 
institutional frameworks maintain their resilience and how their resilience to change towards 
greater sustainability may be overcome. Holling (2001), for example, describes how a cascade 
effect can effect positive rather than destructive change in a system: “A societal version occurs 
when local activists succeed in their efforts to transform regional organizations and institutions, 
because the latter have become broadly vulnerable” (p. 398). The metaphors and concepts used 
to maintain positive resilience, therefore, can also be used to degrade a perverse form of 
resilience. Transformation of the aggregates sector in southern Ontario towards sustainability, 
then, requires an identification of a desirable alternative regime and critical thresholds that, once 
crossed, may cause a cascade of local-to-provincial changes that contribute to progress towards 
sustainability in pit and quarry law, management, and practice.   
 
3.3.3 Panarchy 
As previously described, “Panarchy” is a term used by Gunderson and Holling (2002) 
and colleagues to describe the interconnections and interdependencies between adaptive cycles 
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across scales of time and space. The basic idea is that the variables (e.g. needles, foliage, insects, 
etc.) that comprise ecosystems all experience adaptive cycles at various speeds and scales: 
“Needles, for example, cycle with a generation time of one year, foliage cycles with a generation 
time of ten years, and trees cycle with a generation time of one hundred years and more” (p. 71). 
These cycles are nested across space and time and the speed and size of the variable determines 
its place in the space-time hierarchy. A landscape, for example, has a slow and large adaptive 
cycle of centuries. Nested within the landscape are trees, needles, etc., which experience smaller 
and faster adaptive cycles. Each semi-autonomous level in the hierarchy continually transmits 
information and material to the next higher level. In this way, slower levels in the panarchy are 
shaped by faster levels. In turn, larger, slower levels constrain the behaviour of faster levels. 
These interactions across levels occur through various connections that work to maintain the 
integrity of the whole structure.  
The phases of the adaptive cycle at various scales create opportunities for adaptation and 
reorganization of the whole structure. For example, the release phase at one level can trigger a 
release phase at the next larger and slower level, particularly if the next level is experiencing a 
phase where resilience is low. Faster and smaller levels, then, can overwhelm larger and slower 
ones: “And that effect could cascade to still higher slower levels if those levels had accumulated 
vulnerabilities and rigidities” (p. 75-76). In turn, the changes that occur are constrained by the 
conservation phase of the above larger and slower levels. In some cases, whole panarchies can be 
transformed by cascading changes up and down the levels.  
 
3.3.4 Panarchy theory and institutional change and resistance to change towards 
sustainability 
This section summarizes the above overview of Panarchy theory, focusing on the 
implications of key concepts for understanding and explaining institutional behaviour in relation 
to sustainability objectives. A certain amount of translation was required to place the dynamics 
of institutional systems in the context of Panarchy theory. The translation was as literal as 
possible to delineate precisely where more research is required to refine the theory for the 
purpose of investigating the dynamics of social institutional systems.  
When investigating institutional change and resistance to change towards sustainability, it 
may be useful to place the focal institutional system in the context of the four-phase adaptive 
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cycle of growth, conservation, release, and reorganization, recognizing multi-scale influences. 
Following the adaptive cycle metaphor, the degree to which institutional change occurs is 
determined, in part, by the resilience (and resistance) of a particular institutional system as it 
progresses through the four phases. According to Gunderson and Holling (2002), during the 
reorganization and exploitation phases, resilience in certain ecosystems is high because internal 
regulation around a particular stable state is weak, the potential for alternate stable states is high, 
and the components of the ecosystem are loosely connected and weakly regulated. Moreover, the 
pioneer species that emerge during these phases are able to survive in a highly variable 
environment. Similarly, during the reorganization and growth phases in institutional systems, 
internal regulation around a particular institutional arrangement may be weak; the 
interconnections and interdependencies between the players may be loose; and there is a high 
potential for alternative institutional systems to form. Actors with access to decision-making may 
exploit opportunities to create alternative institutions and/or reform old ones. Resilience is high.  
Gunderson and Holling assert that in certain ecosystems connectedness increases from 
the rapid growth to the end of the conservation phase as internal regulation around a particular 
stable state increases. Certain species begin to dominate; path-dependent positive feedbacks 
reinforce established relationships, and the system becomes increasingly efficient and 
consequently inflexible. Resilience declines and vulnerability to disturbances is high. With 
respect to institutional systems, stability increases while actors grow accustomed to the new rules 
of the game. Certain new and old norms become further entrenched in law and practice. There 
are pressures for relationships between and among new and old actors to form and solidify 
around these new and old rules and norms. Path-dependent positive feedback forces reinforce 
these relationships so that the interdependencies and interconnections between them become 
increasingly locked in. Concurrently, however, actors gain experience with and learn about the 
effects of the institutional system. Certain actors (e.g. advocates of sustainability) become aware 
of required adjustments to achieve desired ends. These actors may begin to act at several scales 
(e.g. lobbying local, regional and provincial decision makers) to achieve their goals. But the 
transaction costs (especially for those with the most power in the system) associated with change 
may be very high due to the locked in interdependencies and interconnections among and 
between the dominant players at several interlinked scales in the prevailing institutional system; 
consequently, as with ecological systems, the institutional system becomes inflexible and 
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resilience declines. As in ecological systems, vulnerability to disturbances increases during this 
stage in the sense that the costs (economic, political, cultural) of reform are very high. According 
to Walker and Salt (2006), at this late point in the conservation phase, there is a preoccupation 
with process and novelty is suppressed.  
In certain ecological systems, internal and/or external disturbances may finally exceed the 
system’s resilience, forcing it to cross a critical threshold to a different state or basin of 
attraction. Uncertainly rules. Stability is lost. Sequestered energy and stored materials are 
suddenly released. But the energy and materials released create the source for reorganization. 
With respect to investigating institutional progress towards sustainability, it follows that it may 
be important to consider where these critical thresholds are in a given institutional system. If a 
critical threshold is crossed, a period of renegotiation and reinterpretation of the rules of the 
game may begin. Similar to ecosystems, a certain amount of resilience is lost and uncertainty and 
instability rule. During this phase, resources (economic, administrative, technological, etc.) are 
put into adjusting the institutional framework. A diverse range of actors may bring forward ideas 
from other jurisdictions, the rubble of previous institutions, institutions “waiting in the wings”, or 
from extant institutions. These ideas represent potential alternative equilibrium states for the 
emerging institutional system.  
According to Carpenter (2003), in ecosystems a regime shift can occur when a threshold 
of a controlling variable is crossed. Regime shifts involve rapid and large changes, often with 
devastating impacts on linked social systems. When studying the dynamics of institutional 
systems, the regime change concept is useful because it leads to corollary concepts that, even if a 
regime change has not occurred within the institutional system, work to describe the potential 
multiscale impacts of institutional behaviour. Adjusting one part of the institutional infrastructure 
guiding aggregate extraction, for example, can cause a cascade of changes down or up the levels 
of the “institutional panarchy”. Moreover, a regime shift in one domain (e.g. the management of 
aggregate resources) may affect change at other scales and in other domains (e.g. land use 
decision making). Similar to ecosystems, then, institutional systems may also be thought of as 
nested across scales of time and space. They are interconnected and interdependent; what 
happens at one scale at one time can drive what happens at scales above and below – from days 
to years in the future. Slow moving institutions, therefore, may constrain faster moving 
institutions and vice versa. According to Gunderson and Holling (2002), whole panarchies can 
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be transformed by cascading changes up and down the levels.  
The above discussion highlights the implications of Panarchy theory for understanding 
and explaining institutional progress, specifically change and resistance to change, towards 
sustainability. These implications form the basis of the preliminary theoretical propositions, 
below. A discussion of the complementarities, strengths and limitations of these propositions and 
the preliminary propositions based on the New Institutionalism will be discussed in section 3.4. 
Based on this discussion, a combined framework is developed.  
Similar to the preliminary theoretical propositions based on the New Institutionalism, the 
propositions based on Panarchy theory are oriented towards explaining why and how 
institutional change and resistance to change occur and the factors that may determine the extent 
to which they occur. They assume an understanding of the following fundamentals: 
• Institutional systems are comprised of a hierarchical arrangement of quickly and slowly 
evolving institutions that are interconnected and interdependent across space and time. 
Slow moving institutions constrain and influence fast moving institutions and vice versa.    
 
• Institutional systems are influenced by and, in turn, influence complex adaptive 
ecological systems, which are comprised of a hierarchical arrangement of fast and slow 
moving variables that are interconnected and interdependent across temporal and spatial 
scales.  
 
Box 2, below, lists the preliminary theoretical propositions based on Panarchy theory. 
 
Box 2. Preliminary theoretical propositions based on Panarchy theory 
 
1. Institutional change and resistance to change occur within a four-phase adaptive cycle of 
growth, conservation, release, and reorganization. The degree to which institutional change and 
resistance to change occurs is determined, in part, by the resilience of the institutional system as 
it progresses through the four phases of the adaptive cycle: 
 
• During the reorganization and growth phases, resilience is high. As the system matures 
and progresses to the end of the conservation phase, resilience declines. Near the end of 
the conservation phase, internal and/or external stresses may push the institutional system 
beyond a critical threshold, commencing a period of renegotiation and reinterpretation of 
the rules of the game. Uncertainty and instability rule. Significant resources are spent to 
adjust the institutional framework. Actors with access to decision-making bring forward 
new and/or old ideas, which are sources for reorganization.  
 
2. The extent to which institutional change occurs is determined, in part, by: 
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• whether a regime shift occurs. A regime shift involves rapid and large changes in the internal 
feedbacks of a particular institutional system. They are less frequent than incremental 
changes and they may occur when a system crosses a critical threshold, especially when the 
resilience of a particular institutional system is low 
 
• whether change at one scale causes a cascade of changes at other scales. Sometimes, when a 
single threshold is crossed, a cascading effect can occur in which multiple thresholds across 
scales are breached. A regime shift in one institutional arrangement in one domain may 






3.4 A combined theoretical framework for understanding and explaining institutional 
change and resistance to change  
 Panarchy theory and the three major strands of New Institutionalism offer common and 
complementary concepts that, when combined, should enhance our understanding of the 
interconnections and interdependencies between, and among, humans, nonhumans, and 
institutions. 
These common concepts include thresholds, path dependency, self-reinforcing positive 
feedbacks and increasing returns, multiple equilibrium orders or stable states, and fast and slow 
moving variables. Scholars’ understandings of these concepts are also similar. Both New 
Institutionalist and Panarchy theorists, for example, have used the concept of path dependency to 
understand and explain the constraining influences of past and present circumstances. More 
research is required to explain the subtle differences in interpretation and application of these 
concepts, however. At this early stage, the commonalities among these theories suggest their 
basic compatibility for the purpose of developing an interdisciplinary analytical framework. 
They also provide evidence of the similarities in the dynamics of social and ecological systems. 
Panarchy theory’s greatest strength is that it offers concepts and metaphors that allow 
students to consider explicitly the nonlinear, multi-scale dynamics of institutional systems. The 
New Institutionalism, especially the recent work by Pierson (2004), begins to understand and 
explain multi-scalar dynamics with such common concepts as path dependency, multiple 
equilibrium orders, and thresholds, and by emphasizing the interconnections and 
interdependencies between and among institutions. New Institutionalists have also observed how 
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both the conflicts between the beliefs of many individuals on the microlevel and the substantive 
contents of formal laws and procedures on the macrolevel can generate institutional change (see 
Sjostrand, 1993; Farrell & Haritier, 2003). But Panarchy theory’s metaphor of the adaptive cycle, 
and the concepts of panarchy, thresholds, regime shifts and cascading effects offer highly useful 
tools for students to explicitly explore the multi-scale dynamics of institutional systems. This is 
where Panarchy theory complements the New Institutionalism and helps to overcome the current 
limitation in its capacity to understand and explain multi-scalar interactions.  
Another particular strength of Gunderson and Holling’s adaptive cycle metaphor is that it 
is broad enough in its interpretation of change to incorporate all of the models of change 
developed by the New Institutionalism. It can account for both incremental and more rapid 
transformative change. The adaptive cycle metaphor for episodic change is most similar to the 
New Institutionalist conceptualization of change as punctuated evolution, which incorporates 
both incremental and punctuated equilibrium models. Moreover, following Panarchy theory, 
even when critical thresholds are crossed, an institutional system may only give way to 
incremental change. On other words, rapid transformation is rare due to the constraining 
influences of the past. This is similar to North’s (1990) and Streek and Thelen’s (2005) assertion 
that change is overwhelmingly incremental due to the speeds with which different types of 
institutions evolve and especially due to the embeddedness of institutions in societies. The 
adaptive cycle metaphor therefore helps to overcome the ongoing debate within the New 
Institutionalism about which model is most appropriate generally.  
With respect to explaining institutional dynamics across a range of different scales, 
however, the adaptive cycle metaphor may be limited. More research is required to investigate 
this possibility. It may be that Gunderson and Holling’s (2002) illustration of the particular 
dynamics that occur during the four phases of the adaptive cycle is too limited in scope to 
incorporate the intricacies of context and multi-scale interactions. This is because it is essentially 
geared towards explaining transformative change at the regional level and focuses on cases 
involving only a few key interventions. Gunderson and Holling recognize, however, that the 
adaptive cycle is just a helpful metaphor and not and theory in itself; therefore, it is limited in its 
explanatory capacity. Second, they stress that adaptive cycles are nested across space and time 
and so they are continually happening everywhere at different speeds. But questions remain 
about whether the particular dynamics of the four phases differ across scales, especially in light 
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of the possibility that the smaller and faster components of a regional-scale system may not be as 
complex as the regional system as a whole. Regardless of this potential limitation, however, 
Panarchy’s key concepts of thresholds, multiple stable states, regime shifts, fast and slow 
variables, and cascading effects remain useful outside of the metaphor and can be applied in any 
context.  
The New Institutionalism’s greatest strength is that is fleshes out the social dimensions of 
institutional dynamics. Panarchy theory is limited in its ability to elaborate on the social 
dimensions of institutional behaviour because it is fundamentally oriented towards the ecological 
sciences. In this way, the New Institutionalism complements and enriches Panarchy theory’s 
concepts and metaphor of the adaptive cycle. For example, both the New Institutionalism and 
Panarchy devote attention to the interactions between fast and slow variables. The New 
Institutionalism, however, is capable of more precisely defining what slow (e.g. informal 
institutions) and fast (e.g. formal institutions) variables are in the context of institutional systems. 
It further distinguishes among regulative, normative, and cognitive dimensions. Moreover, unlike 
Panarchy theory, the New Institutionalism emphasizes agency and the feedbacks between 
humans and institutions; people create institutions and are, in turn, constrained by them. Such 
essential concepts as ideas, worldviews, power, resources, the logics of appropriateness and 
instrumentality, bricolage, and diffusion complement and enrich Panarchy’s key concepts and 
metaphor of the adaptive cycle.  
The concept of path dependency is central to the above-described strength in New 
Institutionalism. All three strands emphasize the importance of the effects of path dependency 
(positive feedbacks, increasing returns, transaction costs, etc.) as major determinants of 
institutional emergence, persistence, and change. The effects of path dependency are also 
essential to Panarchy theory’s adaptive cycle metaphor, which contributes to the compatibilities 
between the two literatures. The New Institutionalism, however, stresses the importance of 
transaction costs (economic, political, social, cultural) as one effect of path dependency when it 
comes to institutional emergence, persistence, and change. Panarchy essentially cannot speak of 
transaction costs as an effect of path dependence because it is oriented towards the structures and 
functions of ecological systems (nutrient cycling, energy sequestration, microorganisms, etc.). 
The economic, political, and cultural costs of change, however, may be major drivers of 
institutional progress and resistance towards sustainability. The New Institutionalism’s 
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understanding of path dependency complements and enhances Panarchy theory’s capacity to 
explain why a system may change only incrementally.  
At the same time, in the business of institutional change towards sustainability, there is a 
sense that more than incremental change is required – today. This begs the question of how 
advocates of sustainability can purposefully nudge institutions towards greater sustainability. 
Here is where Panarchy theory’s emphasis on multi-scalar effects, which include the adaptive 
cycle metaphor and such concepts as thresholds, regime shifts, cascading effects, and panarchy, 
come in handy. They provide for advocates of sustainability a handbook of sorts for how change 
might be facilitated. Strategies may be based on an understanding of how linked local-to-global 
institutions might be transformed, or how a healthy type of institutional resilience may be 
maintained. The New Institutionalism is highly complementary here, again, because it stresses 
the social forces that help to determine institutional behaviour. But the New Institutionalism has 
not incorporated into its research agenda over the years a devotion to figuring out how to achieve 
social-ecological sustainability. In contrast, scholars whose work falls within the scope of 
Panarchy theory have extended insights about ecological resilience to natural resource 
management systems for the purpose of maintaining and enhancing the resilience of social-
ecological systems. This lends to Panarchy theory a greater practical purpose, while the New 
Institutionalism remains a theoretical and conceptual approach to analysis.  
As previously noted, with respect to resistance to change, the greatest weakness in both 
the New Institutionalism and Panarchy is that they devote little attention to understanding and 
explaining the dynamics of resilient and resistant but inefficient and/or unproductive social and 
ecological systems. In particular, there is little attempt in either bodies of literature to understand 
the relationship between resilience and resistance. How does resilience impact resistance and 
vise versa? Panarchy theory offers the concept of resilience as one determining feature of 
ecological and, by extension, institutional systems. Moreover, panarchy theory asserts that 
resistance is one fundamental component of resilience (see Walker et al., 2004 for a discussion 
of three other key components of resilience: latitude, precariousness, and panarchy). But they are 
measured in different ways. Resilience is measured by the size of “basins of attraction” or the 
size of “stable state space” whereas resistance is measured by the amount of pressure required to 
disturb a given system by a given amount (see Carpenter et al., 2001). One aim of resilience 
management is to prevent a social-ecological system from shifting to an undesired state in the 
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face of internal and/or external stresses. Resilience management strategies therefore might focus 
on enhancing system resistance. According to Walker et al. (2002), however, increasing 
resistance can lead to increased system rigidity, which, in turn, reduces system resilience and 
resistance. Most often, studies that investigate ecological resilience focus on how resilience can 
be maintained and enhanced. Similarly, the New Institutionalism seeks to understand 
institutional persistence but it does not go far to distinguish among persistence, resilience, and 
resistance. Nevertheless, both theories offer clues about institutional resilience and resistance. 
According to Gunderson and Holling, for example, resilience in ecosystems is highest 
during the reorganization and growth phases of the adaptive cycle and lowest near the end of the 
conservation phase. As previously discussed, this may also be true for institutional systems. But 
institutional systems may be highly resilient and highly resistant to change, or not very resilient 
and not very resistant to change. Similarly, resilience may be low while resistance to change is 
high and vice versa. If resilience and resistance to change are both high during the reorganization 
and growth phases, it may be because the actors with the greatest power to influence decision-
making are most interested in maintaining the status quo. Similarly, at the end of the 
conservation phase when resilience is low, certain actors may resist change in order to avoid 
significant losses. If resilience is low during this stage, however, certain actors may not be able 
to resist change for very long, especially if there are significant pressures for change. Long-term 
path dependent processes (positive feedbacks, increasing returns, transaction costs) may 
reinforce these dynamics. Resistance to change may be high, for example, if the financial returns 
for maintaining the status quo are high.  
Box 3, below, depicts the combined preliminary theoretical propositions based on the 
New Institutionalism and Panarchy theory. Again, they are oriented towards explaining why and 
how and to what extent institutional change and resistance to change occur.  
 
Box 3. Combined preliminary theoretical propositions based on the New Institutionalism 
and Panarchy theory 
 
1. Actors may resist or facilitate institutional change in order to maximize individual and/or 
collective interests and/or to achieve cultural appropriateness and legitimacy as defined by a 
particular, culturally embedded institutional environment. Actors’ interests are determined, in 
part, by the institutional system and by long-term historic processes (e.g. socialization). 
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2. Actors may resist or facilitate institutional change through the process of renegotiation and 
reinterpretation and/or by creating innovative institutions from previously existing institutional 
elements. These processes lead to path-dependent change because the range of options available 
to institutional entrepreneurs is constrained by the particular characteristics (e.g. power 
relationships, actors’ interests, laws and informal norms, etc.) of the existing institutional 
system.  
 
3. Institutional change and resistance to change occur within a four-phase adaptive cycle of 
growth, conservation, release, and reorganization. Long-term path dependent processes 
(positive feedbacks, increasing returns, and transaction costs) influence change and resistance 
to change throughout the adaptive cycle. Path dependent processes are reinforced by the cross- 
scale interconnections and interdependencies between the institutions that comprise the 
institutional system. The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is 
determined, in part, by the resilience and resistance of the institutional system as it progresses 
through the four phases of the adaptive cycle: 
 
• During the reorganization and growth phases, resilience is high. As the system matures 
and progresses to the end of the conservation phase, resilience declines. Near the end of 
the conservation phase, internal and/or external stresses may push the institutional 
system beyond a critical threshold, commencing a period of renegotiation and 
reinterpretation of the rules of the game. Uncertainty and instability rule. Significant 
resources are spent to adjust the institutional framework. Actors with access to decision-
making bring forward new and/or old ideas, which create the source for reorganization.  
 
4. The extent to which institutional change occurs is determined, in part, by: 
 
• whether a regime shift occurs. A regime shift involves rapid and large changes in the 
internal feedbacks of a particular institutional system. They are less frequent than 
incremental changes and they may occur when a system crosses a critical threshold, 
especially when the resilience of a particular institutional system is low.  
 
• whether change at one scale causes a cascade of changes at other scales. Sometimes, 
when a single threshold is crossed, a cascading effect can occur in which multiple 
thresholds across scales are breached. A regime shift in one institutional arrangement in 
one domain may affect change and/or induce a regime shift in other institutional 
arrangements in other domains.  
 
5. The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is determined, in part, 
by: 
 
• the socioeconomic costs associated with change. Path-dependent processes involve high 
socioeconomic costs of reversal or reorganization, especially when the interconnections 
and interdependencies between and among the institutions, organizations, and certain 
socioeconomic groups in a particular institutional system are tight.  
 
• the power and  resources (esp. financial, ties to people in power, political support, 
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opportunities for participation, ecological) held by particular socioeconomic groups to 
develop, translate and enact innovation(s). 
 
• the capacity of actors to translate and enact an innovation (with suitable accommodation 
but no alterations that undermine the essentials) across a range of organizations or 
across a population. Translation and enactment occur within and are constrained by a 
particular institutional context and by a particular set of actors.  
 
• the nature of the proposed institutional change. The more the actors can demonstrate that 
a particular innovation “fits” the existing institutional framework, the more likely that it 
will be adopted by particular actors (powerful elites, communities, organizations, etc.) 
and stick.  
 
• how much variation occurs in fast and slow moving institutions (regulative, normative, 
and cognitive) over time. Transformative change occurs when there is change across 
most or all of these dimensions. 
 
• uncertainty: limitations in the quality and quantity of information and knowledge about 
certain problems; available or potential solutions, and the methods available for 





CHAPTER 4: An initial test of the combined theoretical propositions 
4.1 Introduction and methods 
This chapter explores the strengths and limitations of the combined preliminary 
theoretical propositions by applying them to two peer-reviewed, academic studies about 
institutional progress towards sustainability. There are many case studies from which to choose 
for this purpose (e.g. see Gunderson, Holling & Light, 1995; Connor & Dovers, 2004; Lafferty, 
2004; Walker & Salt, 2006; Anderies et al., 2006; Duit, 2007; Stuart, 2007; Hanna, 2008).  An 
in-depth review of a range of case studies across the literature is required to refine the 
preliminary combined theoretical propositions; however, it is beyond the scope of this study. 
Two case studies were selected, one focusing on institutional change towards sustainability and 
one investigating institutional resistance towards sustainability. These studies were selected 
because they (a) are contemporary examples of institutional phenomena in natural resource 
management in industrialized countries; (b) explicitly investigate the dynamics of institutions in 
the context of sustainability objectives; and (c) provide a sufficient amount of detail for analysis. 
The first case study is about a deliberate effort to achieve progress towards sustainability in the 
Columbia River Basin in the Pacific Northwest, United States. The second is about institutional 
resistance to integrated urban stormwater management in Sydney, Australia. 
 
4.1.1 Institutional change towards sustainability in the Columbia River Basin, Pacific 
Northwest, United States 
 Lee (1995) investigated institutional change towards sustainability in the institutional 
system guiding both the salmon population and the hydropower system in the Columbia River 
Basin in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States. The Columbia River is one of the 
largest rivers in North America. It rises in the Rocky Mountains in Canada and flows 
approximately 1900 kilometres through the Pacific Northwest. It drains an area that includes 
parts of two Canadian provinces and seven U.S. states.  
 For centuries before European colonization, the Columbia River Basin was an aboriginal 
cultural landscape, centred on the yearly salmon migrations that brought about 10-16 million 
salmon back to their native streams to reproduce. The salmon provided trade goods and food for 
the indigenous people of the river basin. By the mid-nineteenth century, European settlers began 
to convert the river basin into an industrialized landscape. Between 1930 and the early 1970s, 
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one of the word’s largest hydroelectric power systems was built primarily by the U.S. 
government. These dams and the inexpensive electricity marketed by the Bonneville Power 
Administration, a U.S. Department of Energy agency, facilitated the industrialization of the 
Pacific Northwest. Plantation agriculture was soon to follow. Today, over three million acres of 
farmland are watered by the Columbia Basin Project irrigation works, which includes the largest 
dam in the U.S. According to Lee, the Bonneville Power Administration is central to the regional 
economy: “…the agency’s power sales contracts, together with the water rights that control 
where water flows on croplands, shape the landscapes of the Pacific Northwest about as 
decisively as does the weather” (p. 216). This engineered landscape also provides for world-class 
windsurfing facilities and sport and commercial fishing and hunting. According to Lee, the 
dominant worldview underpinning this development has been one in which economic efficiency 
and engineering control of nature are paramount: “The inferior position of fish and wildlife is 
evident in the decline of the annual fish runs of 10-16 million in the preindustrial era to 2.5 
million by the late 1970s” (p. 217).  
 Over the years, three intertwined stressors have shaped the institutional system that 
presently governs the Columbia River Basin. First, the indigenous peoples of the Pacific 
Northwest gained legal rights to their treaty title to harvest fish. By 1969, the Columbia River 
Basin’s indigenous tribes had won lawsuits to claim their treaty rights to harvest half of the 
salmon. This shift in the allocation of shares of the salmon harvest severely impacted the sport 
and commercial fishing industry, which was already in economic decline. By the late ‘70s, after 
decades of competition over harvest shares and Supreme Court affirmations of aboriginal treaty 
rights, non-aboriginal and aboriginal leaders concluded that the only feasible solution was to 
rebuild the salmon populations so there would be enough for all. They demanded that the 
Columbia River’s fish migration routes be repaired.  
Second, there was a dramatic shift in the price of electric energy largely due to a crisis in 
the development of nuclear power. The Bonneville Power Administration’s response to an 
increase in demand for power in the 1970s was to pressure utilities to build new nuclear power 
plants. These projects, however, suffered from cost overruns and high interest rates; 
consequently, electricity rates increased to pay for the new nuclear power projects. These 
economic issues intensified during the 1980s when demand for power decreased alongside an 
economic recession. Only one nuclear generating plant was ever completed. This crisis of 
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nuclear power generation placed more pressure on the Columbia River system to produce low-
cost electricity.  
Third, environmental awareness among the Pacific Northwest voters encouraged and 
supported particular innovations in institutional design. Citizen activism in the 1970s played a 
major role in convincing authorities that energy conservation could meet a significant portion of 
the demand for power while being more economically efficient and environmentally friendly. As 
the rates of electricity increased, energy conservation became a more attractive option.  
 These changes in fisheries, energy, and environmental awareness culminated in the 1980 
federal Northwest Power Act. It established the Northwest Power Planning Council, comprised 
of two members from each of the four Pacific Northwest states that share the Basin (Idaho, 
Montana, Oregon, and Washington). This Council, which shares state and federal authority, is 
responsible for developing and implementing the Northwest Power Plan to guide electric power 
development. According to Lee, when it comes to power planning, the Council’s chief guiding 
principle is cost effectiveness, including investments in energy conservation. The Northwest 
Power Act also addresses conflicts that arise over competition among stakeholders for salmon 
harvest shares. Congress, for example, included in the Act directives that aim to give “equitable 
treatment” to fish, wildlife and hydropower. The Council also responded with a Columbia River 
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, which established the means for the rehabilitation of fish and 
wildlife. Stakeholders (state, federal, and aboriginal agencies, and the utilities that operate in the 
Columbia Basin) implement the Program. According to Lee, the revenues of Bonneville Power 
Administration fund implementation of the Program. In the early 1980s, implementation cost 
approximately $130 million per year, roughly 1.5% of Bonneville’s annual budget of $3 billion. 
In 1984, the Council adopted an adaptive management approach to the implementation of the 
Fish and Wildlife Program. In 1987, this approach was expanded to include “system” planning – 
an experimental, consensus-based approach to program implementation. By 1990, however, the 
Council discovered that all five salmon stocks were in jeopardy of being listed on the federal 
Endangered Species Act because their numbers had dwindled so drastically. In response, the 
Council adopted an amendment to the Fish and Wildlife Program, which provided the basis for a 
salmon recovery plan formulated under the Endangered Species Act. 
According to Lee, the new and more ecologically sustainable institutional framework was 
able to form because of a combination of conditions:  
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• regulative change reinforced by broad political support 
• explicit recognition of uncertainties (ecological, social, economic) 
• adequate funding 
• broad acceptance that conflict (e.g. different perspectives) is essential to social learning 
• adoption of a systems and adaptive, experimental management style, and 
• broad commitment to respond to acquired knowledge. 
Lee also asserts that the passage of the Northwest Power Act represents a cognitive shift in the 
way that the Columbia River Basin was perceived: “The transition beyond industrialism toward a 
search for sustainability is marked symbolically here by the passage of the Northwest Power 
Act” (p. 235). 
 
4.1.2 Institutional resistance to integrated urban stormwater management, Metropolitan 
Sydney, Australia 
 Brown (2005) investigated institutional resistance to integrated urban stormwater 
management (IUSM) in Metropolitan Sydney, Australia. The idea of IUSM emerged in Sydney 
over the last 20 to 30 years as a reaction to standard urban stormwater management techniques. 
According to Brown, these standard techniques contribute to the deterioration of “urban 
waterway environments” by altering fluvial corridors, water quality, and aquatic ecosystem 
habitat. They also perpetuate the waste of a valuable water resource. In contrast, key goals of 
IUSM include flood reduction, pollution mitigation, stormwater retention (water harvesting and 
reuse), urban landscape improvement (incorporating stormwater into urban infrastructure), and 
the reduction of drainage investments (reducing the cost of infrastructure)  
(p. 456). IUSM challenges conventional stormwater management because it integrates flood 
prevention, pollution reduction, water conservation, and infrastructure design in an institutional 
environment that has historically fragmented these initiatives across a range of administrative 
departments. Sydney’s current system has separate stormwater and wastewater infrastructure.  
Brown’s analysis traces the institutionalization of urban stormwater management over the 
last century in Metropolitan Sydney, concentrating on three prominent urban stormwater 
management discourses that have shaped the prevailing system: stormwater quantity (1900 - 
1985), stormwater quality (1980 - 1995), and stormwater sustainability (1995 – ongoing). 
Brown’s account of this history illustrates the influence of previous cognitive (“best practice” 
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thinking), normative (values), and regulative (administrative organization) institutions on the 
current system. Briefly, by 1890, a separate stormwater system was constructed to accommodate 
increasing urban development. Urban stormwater was considered environmentally benign and a 
nuisance with little social or ecological value. The design and construction of stormwater 
management systems emphasized economically efficient passage of urban stormwater to avoid 
flooding. This task was considered to be an incidental engineering job, assigned to junior civil 
engineers in the local, public engineering department. The low status of urban stormwater, rapid 
urban development, and construction, design and maintenance practices led to increased 
flooding. The standard solution was to increase local drainage capacity. Over time, this 
“economic-risk optimization” approach to the flooding issue required increasingly specialized 
technical expertise. Eventually, a small number of highly skilled engineers dominated 
stormwater quantity management at the local level. These engineers belonged to the Institution 
of Engineers Australia, the primary conduit for developing and sharing urban stormwater 
management knowledge. Over much of the twentieth century, they focused on technically 
refining stormwater system design to make it more economically efficient for flood control. By 
the mid 1970s, the economic-risk optimization approach was enhanced by computer software 
programs that improved estimations of rainfall-runoff and subsequent stormwater drainage 
infrastructure design. Eventually, in 1977, 1987, and 1999, the Institution of Engineers Australia 
codified design specifications for stormwater management best practice. 
By the mid-1980s, best practice thinking and community values had started to shift. 
Water quality, waterway pollution, and the quality of urban stormwater attracted local and 
international attention, raising disputes about the assumption that stormwater runoff is 
environmentally benign. In Sydney, public concern over the pollution of Sydney’s waterways led 
to a gathering of approximately 250 000 people on Bondi Beach for a protest rally. Public 
concern was heightened again in the early 1990s with outbreaks of blue-green algae in Sydney’s 
Hawkesbury-Nepean River system. Finally, in the early 1990s, urban stormwater, as opposed to 
wastewater, was identified as a major contributor to the pollution of Sydney’s waterways. 
According to Brown, a community volunteer program, the “Clean-up Australia Campaign”, was 
instrumental in this shift in focus. The volunteers collected over 10,000 tons of rubbish from 
around Sydney Harbor: “It was soon publicly concluded that it was the stormwater drainage 
system that was transporting this rubbish and polluting Sydney’s harbor and waterways” (p. 
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459). Local awareness and pressure was reinforced by international evidence that urban 
stormwater quality is associated with the degradation of urban waterways. Soon, Sydney’s urban 
stormwater engineers found that Sydney’s urban stormwater contains high concentrations of 
pollutants. This led to research and development around stormwater infrastructure design and 
pollution control technologies to augment the existing infrastructure (e.g. “end-of-pipe” 
solutions). These research and development activities led to the emergence of a private sector 
industry specializing in designing, constructing and maintaining pollutant control traps. 
Guidance manuals encouraging local governments to adopt stormwater quality protocols were 
also produced during this time and were influenced by North American standards.  
According to Brown, the implementation of quality control technologies was slow and 
ad-hoc at best. The resistance came primarily from local governments. Moreover, although the 
Institution of Engineers Australia and the Local Government Engineers’ Association were 
advocates of stormwater quality, there was competition from other engineering specialists for 
control over dealing with the stormwater pollution problem. By the mid-1990s, Sydney Water 
Corporation, a state owned entity, announced that the pollution issue was indeed a local 
government responsibility. In 1993, a State Inquiry, which brought together relevant stakeholders 
concluded by consensus that the current management of Sydney’s urban stormwater was not 
sustainable; therefore, many administrative changes were required: “Sustainable development 
was reported as the agreed framework for future policy development and for implementing 
solutions to the current urban stormwater issues” (p. 461).   
IUSM emerged within the above-mentioned sustainable development discourse. 
According to Brown, since the mid-1990s, public awareness and concern about local waterways 
and water conservation have increased, especially in light of Sydney’s more recent droughts. 
Sydney’s stormwater environment is now considered an important resource for social-ecological 
sustainability. The technological insights from the stormwater quality discourse therefore flowed 
into the improved technologies for sustainable management discourse. According to Brown, a 
“water sensitive urban design” approach to stormwater management has emerged. This approach 
is essentially interdisciplinary in that it has particular implications for infrastructure design, land 
use planning, and catchment management. Brown asserts, however, that despite the burst of new 
technologies since the mid-1990s, and the recognition for an integrated approach, administration 
of IUSM has not been widespread. Overall, the extent to which implementation has occurred has 
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included state position papers, public opinion research, and a few demonstration projects.  
According to Brown, the most significant roadblocks to progress towards IUSM include 
the prevailing administrative arrangements, lack of funding to urban stormwater management, 
fragmentation of organizational responsibilities, a lack of legal accountability, and insufficient 
political leadership and support. One major roadblock that Brown highlights is that the cognitive 
and normative changes that have occurred have not been reinforced by changes in the regulatory 
framework. Brown asserts that this administrative inertia is one consequence of the technocentric 
and fragmented structure of the leading governmental organizations. Underlying this fragmented 
structure is a particular administrative ideology “…where the environment is conceptualized as a 
machine with technically efficient State departments and organizations representing functionally 
based services and systems…” (p. 464). It facilitates vertical processes rather than collaborative 
(horizontal) relationships and decision-making across vertical administrative silos. In contrast, 
IUSM requires cross-sectoral and cross-organizational governance. The prevailing, technocratic 
administrative structure, however, favours economic rationalism and technological expertise 
over an interdisciplinary, more participatory and collaborative alternative.  
 
4.2 Analysis and implications for preliminary combined theoretical propositions  
 The combined preliminary theoretical propositions developed by this study are 
comprehensive enough to explain the behaviour of institutions in both cases. In fact, the 
propositions illuminate some aspects of change and resistance to change that the authors do not 
consider in depth. The discussion, below, focuses on examples where the propositions clarify 
some ambiguities.  
Both authors acknowledge fast and slow variables, and regulative, normative, and 
cognitive dimensions. Lee emphasizes the Northwest Power Act as the regulatory innovation that 
emerged as a consequence of and potential solution to resolve three major, regional stressors that 
had built up over time. According to Lee, the Northwest Power Act represents a cognitive shift in 
the way the Columbia River Basin is perceived. Lee, however, does not explain why salmon 
stocks continued to decline despite the Northwest Power Act and the fish and wildlife program. 
This may indicate incongruence between the fast and slow moving institutions involved; the 
regulative dimension changed while the cognitive and normative dimensions lagged. More 
research is required to determine if the Act and the fish and wildlife program came too late for a 
 63 
salmon population destined to crash in a heavily dammed watershed, or if the Act was not 
reinforced by changes in the practices, values, and beliefs that had and continue to have negative 
consequences for salmon stocks. Some combination of these and other factors may have been 
involved. While the Northwest Power Act may represent a cognitive shift in the way the 
Columbia River Basin is perceived, then, this perceptual shift may have been confined to a 
particular group of actors, the governmental officials and stakeholders who in the early 1980s 
developed the Act.   
Brown focuses on slow moving stormwater management discourses and subsequent 
changes and/or lack of changes in urban stormwater management. Although Brown does not 
explicitly acknowledge the importance of variation in fast and slow moving institutions, it is 
clear that the changes in the discourses did not lead to changes at the administrative level, 
indicating an even slower moving ideology and other path-dependent effects that reinforce the 
prevailing, fragmented administrative structure. Brown concludes that the challenges posed by 
IUSM to the administrative system are major roadblocks to implementation and then leaves the 
situation as one seemingly hopelessly stuck. The preliminary combined theoretical propositions, 
however, would add that one reason why implementation has been met with such resistance is 
that IUSM does not “fit” the prevailing institutional framework. This problem of fit indicates that 
IUSM in Metropolitan Sydney may require a long-term implementation strategy that allows for 
incremental adaptation and transformation from one type of administrative structure to another.  
Both authors provide historical background to set the context for their analyses. Brown, 
again, emphasizes the progression of three major urban stormwater management discourses and 
in particular how the earlier discourses set in motion an approach to infrastructure design 
underpinned by economic efficiency. Lee focuses on the major social-ecological stressors that 
led to regulative change. Both authors, however, neglect the importance of path dependent 
processes. In Brown’s case, for example, path dependency in infrastructure design from the early 
1900s through to codification of engineering specifications to technological augmentation locked 
in a high degree of complexity and rigidity, a major roadblock to IUSM. IUSM implementation, 
for example, has involved only public opinion research, position papers, demonstration projects, 
and “end of pipe” solutions, as opposed to integrated land use and stormwater management 
planning. The rigidity of the old infrastructure system is reinforced by a rigid administrative 
system and engineering and manufacturing industries whose interests may be more vested in 
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older infrastructure designs. For these interests, the economic, social, cultural, and political costs 
of change, therefore, are potentially very high, especially in light of the interconnections and 
interdependencies between the administrative and private spheres. Brown’s analysis would have 
benefitted from a more explicit recognition of these interdependencies and transaction costs.  
Similarly, Lee fails to emphasize that one major reason why the Northwest Power Act 
could emerge and have some success in implementation was that the costs (social, cultural, 
economic, political) of creating and adhering to the new legislation were relatively low compared 
to the costs of continuing along as usual. The Act offered a premise for affordable electricity 
through conservation, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts over salmon shares and use of the 
water budget to facilitate the migration of salmon versus additional power generation. Low 
transaction costs, therefore, may have underpinned the broad political support and funding that 
Lee argues were so important to making the regulative changes. In both cases, transaction costs 
are closely associated with the resources that various actors may or may not have had at their 
disposal to enact the required changes. In Lee’s case, the Bonneville Power Administration could 
easily provide the funds to implement the Fish and Wildlife Program. But in Brown’s case, one 
major roadblock to IUSM has been a lack of funding.   
Finally, the historical backgrounds provided by both articles could have been placed in 
the context of the adaptive cycle with the four phases of growth, conservation, release, and 
reorganization elaborated for each. Lee’s article, for example, implies that a threshold was 
crossed in the old institutional framework, commencing a period of renegotiation and 
reinterpretation, which led to the Northwest Power Act. Similarly, Brown’s article traces the rise 
of the current infrastructure and administrative system, whose rigidity poses a major barrier to 
the transition to IUSM. But Brown does not consider any slow moving stressors that might force 
the system beyond a threshold, perhaps leading to more support for IUSM. Brown considers the 
influence of global scale attention to the environment as one influence that led to the Bondi 
Beach protest. But neither article explicitly considers how resistance to change and change were 
influenced by and influence other domains and regimes across scales. In Lee’s case, for example, 
explicit consideration of scale may have helped to explain the gaps between slow and fast 
moving variables.  
The above cases, then, would have benefitted from more explicit attention to the 
dynamics of fast and slow moving variables, issues of fit, thresholds, multi-scalar interactions, 
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and path dependent effects, notably transaction costs. In Brown’s case, the transaction costs of 
change may be especially high in light of the tight interconnections and interdependencies 
between and among the major players. The adaptive cycle metaphor may have been useful to 
both cases in that it may have helped to illuminate the interconnections and interdependencies 
across scales. These two articles, however, cannot provide the basis for any general statements 
about the strengths and limitations of the combined theoretical propositions. More research is 
required, therefore, to refine them. Most likely, the propositions would highlight different gaps in 
analyses in other studies. As an initial test, however, the two cases presented here reveal that the 
preliminary combined theoretical propositions are comprehensive and potentially quite useful for 
a range of cases that analyse institutional progress towards sustainability. 
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CHAPTER 5: The Town of Caledon’s new mineral resources policies 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter describes the current institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in 
southern Ontario. It also tells the story of the history of the Town of Caledon’s mineral resources 
policies, from approximately 1980 to 2003. Three different sets of mineral resources policies are 
described: Caledon’s 1981 “Cabinet Corners” policies, the Region of Peel’s 1996 Regional 
Official Plan mineral resources policies, and Caledon’s new 2003 Official Plan Amendment 161. 
The story highlights the significance of multi-scalar dynamics, interests, values, historical, and 
cultural and natural heritage in influencing why and how institutional change occurred in the 
development of Caledon’s policies. These details are analysed through the lens of the combined 




 As described in Chapter 1, this study utilises a single case, case study design, including a 
review of academic literature and other relevant documentation (e.g. provincial, regional, and 
municipal government documents), and semi-structured, face-to-face interviews.  
Case studies allow investigators to explore real-life circumstances. According to Yin 
(2003), one rationale for a single case design is when the case represents a unique case. The 
Town of Caledon is a unique case for three key reasons. First, Caledon was one of the first areas 
in southern Ontario to undergo aggregate extraction in the 1940s. Since the 1950s, Caledon has 
been a major supplier of aggregates to the GTA. Unlike other aggregate producing municipalities 
in Ontario, Caledon has had a long history of experience with the aggregates industry. This 
history has undoubtedly influenced the Town’s aggregate extraction policies. Second, the Town 
of Caledon is well known for its strong sense of place and culture of stewardship. This strong 
cultural identity has evolved around the Town’s rich cultural and natural resources, which 
include portions of such provincially protected areas as the Niagara Escarpment, the Greenbelt, 
and the Oak Ridges Moraine. These valued resources and culture of stewardship have influenced 
Caledon’s mineral resources policies profoundly over the years. Third, Caledon’s new 2003, 
Official Plan Amendment 161 policies are also extraordinary in that they are more 
comprehensive than the aggregate extraction policies in other municipalities and they introduce 
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some new requirements for aggregate producers that other municipalities have not yet adopted. 
Caledon, therefore, is unusually valuable as a leading edge case, better positioned than other 
municipalities historically and in other ways to confront the recalcitrant aggregates industry and 
government officials. Other municipalities may be expected to follow Caledon’s lead. 
Consequently, it can be both unique and a source of generalizable findings.  
Criteria applied in the selection of the focal case study included the following:  
• Case study provides an opportunity to investigate institutional change and resistance to 
change towards sustainability; 
• involves resilient and resistant but ecologically destructive and inequitable institutions; 
• involves a range of stakeholders and social-ecological concerns; 
• involves an obvious ecological component, where the feedbacks between ecological and 
institutional systems are evident; 
• includes a history sufficient to evaluate institutional progress towards sustainability;  
• data is available and easily accessible; and 
• interviewees are accessible and willing to participate in the study. 
As previously described in Chapter 1, the history of aggregate resources and land use 
planning law and policy form the context within which Caledon’s Official Plan Amendment 161 
policies have emerged. This chapter includes a description of the history of aggregate resources 
and land use planning law and policy in Ontario from 1950 to the present. It illuminates the 
significance of particular historical events and trends in the evolution of Caledon’s policies, 
which were important in analysis. The historical research drew from two key academic sources, 
Winfield and Taylor (2005) and Baker, Slanz, and Summerville (2001). These authors provide 
excellent descriptions of the evolution of aggregate resources legislation in Ontario. Baker et al. 
analysed the content of 140 Ontario Municipal Board hearings over a twenty-five year period 
(1971 – 1996) to investigate the role of legislation and policy in decision-making, and to 
examine the conflict between provincial and municipal governments. Winfield and Taylor 
examined 30 years (1970 – 2005) of Ontario legislation and policy for trends in the aggregate 
and land use planning legislative framework. See Appendix A for the detailed description of this 
history.  
 This story of the evolution of Caledon’s mineral resources policies was drawn from an 
analysis of secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources included Town of Caledon 
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meeting minutes, letters from Town Council members and Ministers of Parliament, Official 
Plans and reports; various types of environmental studies, government and community websites; 
and articles from National News, The Globe and Mail, and a popular Caledon community 
magazine, In the Hills. Interviews were undertaken with eleven interviewees who represent the 
key stakeholders involved in the development of Caledon’s new, controversial Official Plan 
Amendment 161: Municipal Planners and Councilors, the Mayor of Caledon, staff from the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, members of environmental nongovernmental 
organizations (the Coalition of Concerned Citizens and Gravel Watch), and members of the 
aggregates sector in southern Ontario. The data collected from the interviews complemented and 
enriched the secondary research. They were oriented towards answering questions about why 
and how specific policies were rejected or embraced by particular individuals and/or groups. 
They focused on exploring local and provincial scale influences and why, how, and to what 
extent institutional change and resistance to change occurred. Interview questions (see Appendix 
B) were based on the preliminary propositions and story of the evolution of Caledon’s mineral 
resources policies. The questions were adjusted slightly depending on the interviewee. 
 
5.3 Aggregate extraction in the Greater Golden Horseshoe Region, southern Ontario 
The GGH region is one of the largest metropolitan conurbations in the world. It consists 
of over 100 municipalities that form a horseshoe shape around the western tip of Lake Ontario. 
Many of these municipalities have a population of over 100, 000. As the most populous and most 
heavily urbanized region in Canada, the GGH is a major consumer of the ecological goods and 
services provided by ecosystems in southern Ontario and beyond. Most of the prime aggregate 
produced in southern Ontario, for example, goes to feed the demand in the GTA. Residents rely 
heavily on the ecological goods and services of such major provincially protected areas within 
the region, notably the Greenbelt, Niagara Escarpment, and Oak Ridges Moraine. In and adjacent 
to these areas are watersheds whose rivers and underlying aquifer systems provide drinking 
water to millions of inhabitants.   
The above-mentioned protected areas represent recent growth management planning 
initiatives that respond to the current and emerging social and ecological problems associated 
with intense growth in the GGH region. They recognize and anticipate a variety of 
interconnected problems and stresses that threaten the region’s wellbeing. Chief among these 
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problems are urban and suburban sprawl, loss of farmland for food production, and the 
degradation of vital ecological goods and services. The demand for aggregate products, 
extraction of prime aggregate resources, and the institutional system guiding aggregate extraction 
in southern Ontario sit at the nexus of these issues and stresses. Population growth, for example, 
contributes to residential housing needs and the building of new subdivisions and municipal 
roads and other infrastructure in suburban and/or rural areas. In turn, this influences the demand 
for prime aggregate resources. It is important to note that population growth may not be the most 
significant driver in the demand for gravel. Provincial highway maintenance and highway 
construction, for example, which are the leading consumers of prime aggregate resources in 
Ontario (Winfield & Taylor, 2005), may also be associated with such factors as economic growth 
and the transportation of trade goods.   
Aggregate resources are nonrenewable raw materials, including sand, gravel, clay, earth, 
shale, mixed stone, limestone, dolostone, sandstone, marble, and granite. When combined in 
various mixes, they form concrete, cement, asphalt, and other essential building materials. These 
materials are used in the construction of buildings, infrastructure, glass and glass products, water 
filtration systems, fertilizers, cosmetics, toothpaste, and even chewing gum (Ontario Stone, Sand 
& Gravel Association, 2009). The top five prime aggregate producing municipalities in the GGH 
include the City of Kawartha Lakes, the City of Hamilton, the Municipality of Clarington, the 
Township of Uxbridge, and the Town of Caledon (The Ontario Aggregate Resources 
Corporation, 2007). Most aggregate extraction in Ontario, therefore, is concentrated 
geographically within the Niagara Escarpment and the Oak Ridges Moraine, two of southern 
Ontario’s most significant environmental features. Both provide habitat for many threatened and 
endangered species and contain vital wetlands, prime agricultural land, and the headwaters of 
major river systems. The Oak Ridges Moraine has been called the “rain barrel of southern 
Ontario” because of its massive size and hydrological functions. It provides a vital groundwater 
recharge role for the GTA and beyond. 
 Aggregate extraction operations permanently alter the natural environment. Among other 
reasons, this is because many pits and quarries operate for decades and often reach dozens of 
meters below the water table. According to Gravel Watch (2006), less than half of the total 
hectares of land excavated between 1992 and 2001 have been rehabilitated. Winfield and Taylor 
(2005) provide a good overview of some of the impacts of aggregate extraction. Major concerns 
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include impacts on the structure and function of hydrological and hydrogeological systems; 
greenhouse gas emissions from equipment and trucks; contamination of groundwater and surface 
water; loss of wildlife; and the degradation, loss and fragmentation of natural habitat and prime 
agricultural land. Because thousands of people rely on regional groundwater and surface water 
sources, there is concern that the cumulative impacts of aggregate extraction may lead to water 
quantity and quality issues in some areas. These impacts interact with other environmental 
problems in the GGH (e.g. urban sprawl) to contribute to such global-scale issues as loss of 
biodiversity and global warming. Other local-level problems arise from social impacts, including 
heavy truck traffic, noise, dust, damages to private property and property value losses, loss of 
cultural identity and sense of place, and costs of road maintenance (Centre for Spatial 
Economics, 2009). Moreover, aggregate extraction contributes indirectly to the social-ecological 
impacts of cement manufacturing. According to Huntzinger and Eatmon (2009), approximately 
5% of global carbon emissions come from the manufacturing of cement.  
For these and other reasons, many complex land use issues related to potential and 
existing aggregate extraction operations have emerged and continue to surface across the GGH. 
These land use issues have raised awareness about the above and other aggregate extraction-
related social-ecological issues. In recent years, pressure from environmental nongovernmental 
organizations for “Green Gravel” has emerged out of this context. Priorities for Green Gravel 
have been set out by some prominent environmental nongovernmental organizations in southern 
Ontario. These priorities represent some of the local-to-provincial changes that are required to 
reform the prevailing institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in Ontario. They will be 
described in more detail in section 6.3.  
 
5.4 The institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in the GGH 
Proponents of aggregate extraction operations in the GGH shape and, in turn, are 
constrained by a complex dynamic institutional system. The effects of this system reach far 
beyond the process of extraction to influence the demand for the resource in the GGH and 
beyond. As described above, it also contributes to local-to-global environmental problems. This 
study focuses on the development of the Town of Caledon’s mineral resources policies. These 
local policies are situated within a particular institutional system. In southern Ontario, 
proponents of aggregate extraction operations shape and, in turn, are constrained by both natural 
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resource management laws and practice and land use planning laws and practice. These include 
the Aggregate Resources Act and a host of land use planning laws and policies (Ontario Planning 
Act, Provincial Policy Statement, Greenbelt Act and Plan, etc.). Similarly, the institutional 
system is comprised of many local-to-global informal norms and values, etc., many of which 
have been embedded in law and policy. This study highlights the “shortage of supply” discourse 
that underpins the now legislated norm of ensuring largely unfettered access to the resource close 
to demand. This norm ensures the continued supply of affordable gravel for infrastructure and 
other urban developments. Beyond these local- and provincial-level norms is a global-level 
worldview that acts as a deep undercurrent in the demand for aggregate resources. Simply put, 
this worldview is one in which continued economic growth is believed to be integral to the long-
term viability of local communities, provinces, and nations. It fuels such trends as global 
economic integration, and increasing worldwide industrialization and urbanization. Lastly, this 
institutional system is also comprised of a range of actors (people and organizations) that 
participate in, shape, and in turn, are constrained by the system. The power to influence the 
system, however, is not evenly distributed among these actors. It should be noted too that the 
position of power in this system is dynamic and changes according to the case and context.  
Currently, the most powerful actors in this institutional system are multinational 
corporations, Canadian-owned corporations, associations representing the aggregates industry; 
and the provincial government (in particular the agencies most responsible for promotion, 
protection and regulation of the aggregates industry). Traditionally, regional, and municipal 
governments, and local to global nongovernmental organizations have been less influential. 
Closely tied to the major industrial players are the multinational and national corporations that 
provide goods and services for the major players (e.g. engineering and construction consulting 
firms, export corporations, etc.); other companies in Ontario and the United States that directly 
or indirectly contribute to the demand for aggregate resources (e.g. construction companies, 
commercial, industrial and residential developers, etc.) and the companies that provide services 
to them (e.g. real estate firms, etc.). Less directly involved are the people who use the 
infrastructure and buy the homes, etc. These players are interconnected and interdependent 
horizontally across sectors and vertically across local-to-global scales. Changes to one part of the 
institutional system may impact some or all of these players to varying degrees. Moreover, with 
respect to demand for the resource, it is difficult to identify one major player as the driver. This 
 72 
is further complicated by the fact that approximately 6 million tones of the resource are exported 
to the US annually (Messerschmidt et al., 2008). Multinational corporations have a vested 
interest in continued demand for the resource. In Southern Ontario, however, most of the 
resource goes into building municipal and provincial road networks. The need for new roads is 
driven, in part, by urban and suburban growth, the movement of goods for trade, everyday 
commuting, etc. Residential developers have a vested interest in building subdivisions, but these 
are subject to provincial planning legislation, regional and municipal plans and municipal 
residential needs assessments, which take into account projected population growth. Although 
there are major players in this supply-demand chain, then, the above described players in 
southern Ontario and beyond form one gigantic consumer of aggregates.  
Multinational corporations (e.g. Holcim Incorporated, Votorantim Cement, and Lafarge 
Group) own and operate dozens of pits and quarries in Southern Ontario. These companies are 
vertically integrated in that they specialize in the production and distribution of aggregates, 
cement, concrete, and asphalt. They may also provide construction services. Holcim, for 
example, is a Switzerland-based company with offices in over 70 countries. In southern Ontario, 
Holcim operates as Dufferin Aggregates, which has supplied millions of tonnes per year of 
aggregates to its sister-companies, Dufferin Concrete and Dufferin Construction.  A few 
Canadian companies, Walker Industries Holdings Limited and James Dick Construction Limited 
have managed to survive among the above-mentioned giants in Southern Ontario. James Dick 
Construction has been operating in the Town of Caledon since the mid-1960s. 
Key provincial governmental departments that participate in this institutional system 
include the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, the 
Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, and the Ministry of 
Energy and Infrastructure. The Ministry of Natural Resource’s policy staff administers the 
Aggregate Resources Act. Ministry of Natural Resources Inspectors process applications for 
licences and permits, conduct inspections, enforce infractions of the Aggregate Resources Act, 
and participate in Ontario Municipal Board hearings. Ministry of Natural Resources Planners 
participate in the municipal planning process through the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing to ensure that Official Plans give proper regard to the Aggregate Resources Act and 
other provincial policies. The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing and Ministry of Energy 
and Infrastructure are directly involved in land use planning in that they administer key 
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provincial land use planning laws and policies. These will be discussed in more detail below. 
The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing approves or rejects Regional and Municipal 
Official Plan policies based on whether or not they are consistent with provincial interests. In this 
way, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing can influence local mineral aggregate 
policies. It also participates in Ontario Municipal Board hearings. The Ontario Municipal Board 
sits at the centre of land use planning in Ontario in that it provides a public forum for resolving 
land use disagreements. Operating under the Ontario Municipal Board Act, the Board is an 
independent tribunal that hears appeals from individuals, public agencies, or corporations with 
respect to land use decisions made by a particular approval authority. Many disputes over pit and 
quarry licences are referred to the Ontario Municipal Board. The Ministry of Northern 
Development and Mines geologists prepare Aggregate Resource Inventory Papers and resource 
maps for various regions of Ontario. These papers form the basis for the Ministry of Natural 
Resource’s High Potential Mineral Aggregate Resource Areas mapping, which are adopted at 
the Regional and Municipal levels. The Ministry of Transportation processes applications for 
aggregate extraction permits for provincial road projects, and conducts its own inspections and 
enforcement of these projects. It is also responsible for planning and maintaining Ontario’s 
provincial highways. It develops standards for pavement, which impact the quality and quantity 
of aggregates required for highway construction. Through law and policy development, mapping, 
licensing, and enforcement, these Provincial departments, including the independent Ontario 
Municipal Board, influence the amount of aggregate that is extracted and consumed, as well as 
the nature of extraction and consumption.  
Regional and municipal governments develop Official Plan policies for mineral aggregate 
resources and many other local and provincial interests. Similarly, Conservation Authorities 
develop environmental and watershed policies that affect aggregate extraction operations. These 
policies, however, are significantly constrained by provincial law and policy. This will be 
discussed in more detail, below. Here, it is important to note that under the Aggregate Resources 
Act and the Planning Act, regional and municipal councils and planning departments may 
establish zoning by-laws and develop policies that define for proponents of aggregate operations 
the requirements for zoning by-law and Official Plan amendments to permit aggregate 
extraction.  
Local-to-global environmental nongovernmental organizations act as watchdogs of the 
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industry and pressure governments and corporate players to make certain changes in the mineral 
aggregate supply-demand chain. In southern Ontario, the desired alternative is Green Gravel. As 
previously described, priorities for Green Gravel represent some of the local-to-provincial 
changes that are required to reform the prevailing institutional system guiding aggregate 
extraction in Ontario. Some key provincial-level environmental nongovernmental organizations 
in the institutional system include the Ontario Greenbelt Alliance, which has been vocal about 
priorities for aggregate reform in Ontario; and Toronto Environmental Alliance, whose “Dig 
Conservation, Not Holes” campaign calls for the production of sustainable aggregate centered on 
initiatives to reduce, reuse, and recycle. With respect to change in the institutional system 
guiding aggregate extraction in Ontario, some of the most instrumental players are community-
level groups that have formed around local quarry land use issues. Some of these include 
Protected Escarpment Rural Land in Burlington, Friends of Rural Communities and the 
Environment in Hamilton, and the Coalition of Concerned Citizens in Caledon.  
There is much overlap and divergence among the interests and concerns of the above-
described players. Moreover, as previously described, the power to influence the institutional 
system is not equally distributed among them. The multinational and national corporations have 
the greatest financial base for influence in decision-making. They can afford to maintain 
sophisticated lobbying efforts and to hire the best lawyers and consultants for the municipal and 
provincial application review process and Ontario Municipal Board hearings. The relationships 
between these players reinforce the balance of power among them. For example, the above-
described global players often work closely with the Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of 
Energy and Infrastructure on major energy and infrastructure projects. Dufferin Construction, for 
example, had been awarded many provincial highway construction contracts. The economic 
interests of construction and development industries and the provincial government are also 
closely aligned in that the provincial government and other infrastructure providers have an 
interest in low aggregates prices that depend on the proximity of aggregate extraction operations 
to demand and consequently low transportation costs. At the local level, then, regional and 
municipal governments too have an interest in low aggregates costs for local infrastructure 
projects. At the same time, however, they have a political interest in defending their voters and 
ratepayers and roads, water supplies and other valued natural and cultural heritage against 
aggregate extraction operations.  
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The formal institutional framework governing aggregate extraction in southern Ontario 
reinforces the above distribution of power among the players. Baker et al. assert that the 
evolution of aggregate resources legislation and policy in Ontario “…reflects a power struggle 
between provincial and municipal interests” (p.464). The overall trend has been for provincial 
governments to push municipalities through legislation from the centre to the periphery of the 
policy process dedicated to aggregate mining. This has allowed the province to give greater 
consideration to the demands of the aggregate industry and less consideration to the social-
ecological impacts of aggregate mining. It has also eroded the capacity of municipalities to 
protect the interests of local citizens and anti-aggregate groups. Winfield and Taylor (2005) 
underscore that the protection of aggregate resources over the years has been reinforced by 
Ontario’s land use planning laws and policies, which give priority to aggregates over other 
potential land uses. They assert that this provincial priority will likely contribute to increasingly 
intense land use issues, especially in southern Ontario, where growing awareness of the social-
ecological impacts of aggregate extraction compete with the desire of the aggregate industry to 
access resources close to demand. Baker et al. also highlight conflicts due to tensions between 
the provincial need to control the supply of aggregates and the municipal need to control land use 
and respond to concerned citizens and environmental groups about the impacts of mining.  
A handful of laws and policies sit at the top of the hierarchy of land use planning law in 
Ontario. Individually and as a package, they constrain Municipal and Regional Official Plans and 
local-to-provincial land use planning and decision-making. The above described and other 
players shape these laws and policies. This description focuses on the land use planning laws and 
policies that reinforce the current situation of centralized, industry-provincial government control 
over prime aggregate resources. Key among these laws is the Ontario Planning Act. It aims to 
provide for a land use system led by provincial policy and gives the Minister of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing the authority to issue policy statements on matters relating to municipal 
planning. Ontario’s current Planning Act requires Regional and Municipal Official Plans and 
planning decisions to be “consistent with” Provincial Policy Statements and “conform with” or 
“not conflict with” Provincial Plans.  
Ontario’s Provincial Policy Statement, which is administered by the Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing, is closely tied to the Ontario Planning Act. It provides direction 
to planning authorities with respect to land use planning by setting out policies on a range of 
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economic, social, and environmental matters. With respect to mineral aggregate resources, the 
Provincial Policy Statement stipulates that, among other things, “As much of the resource as is 
realistically possible shall be made available as close to market as possible” (Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2005, p. 23). It explicitly rejects the requirement for 
demonstration of need for the resource, and it sets out a requirement for progressive and final 
rehabilitation. It points to Official Plans as the most important vehicle for implementing the 
Provincial Policy Statement.  
Current provincial plans in effect in southern Ontario include the Growth Plan for the 
Greater Golden Horseshoe under the Places to Grow Act, 2005, administered by the Ministry of 
Energy and Infrastructure. Other Plans include the Greenbelt Plan under the Greenbelt Act, 
2005; the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan under the Oak Ridges Moraine Act, 2001; and 
the Niagara Escarpment Plan under the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, 
administered under the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. The Growth Plan for the 
GGH guides local decisions on a range of issues (transportation, infrastructure, housing, resource 
and natural heritage protection, etc.). With respect to mineral aggregate resources, the Minister 
works with the Ministry of Natural Resources, municipalities, aggregate producers, and other 
stakeholders to identify, protect, and manage the resource.  
The objectives of the Greenbelt Plan, Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan, and 
Niagara Escarpment Plan seek to contribute to the viability of agricultural communities, protect 
and enhance ecological goods and services, control urban sprawl, and promote the sustainable 
use of natural resources. They pursue these goals through such mechanisms as land use 
designations and policies aimed at guiding municipal planning and development. The Plans, 
however, contain policies that may facilitate sprawl, the degradation of ecological goods and 
services, and an unsustainable use of natural resources. All three Plans, for example, contain 
policies for the development of infrastructure. Moreover, all three Plans allow for aggregate 
extraction operations in key areas (e.g. Protected Countryside Areas, Natural Linkage Areas, 
Rural Areas, etc.), subject to particular criteria and applicable legislation. Because Municipal and 
Regional Official Plans must be consistent with and/or conform to these laws, policies, and 
plans, they embody a particular institutional context. With respect to mineral aggregate 
resources, the above formal institutions both shape and are shaped by a particular set of informal 
institutions, which may evolve more slowly than the formal ones.  
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The above-described provincial institutional framework governing aggregate extraction 
in Ontario reflects an institutional system that is exceptionally strong in its commitment to 
aggregate extraction as the priority land use. According to Winfield and Taylor (2005), this 
policy framework maximizes access to prime aggregate resources as close to market as possible 
in order to ensure an abundance of inexpensive gravel by keeping the costs of transporting the 
resource (e.g., from extraction sites to markets) as low as possible. This policy approach stands 
in stark contrast to that of other jurisdictions (e.g., the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark), 
which have adopted policies to, among other goals, increase aggregate recycling and reduce 
demand (see Winfield & Taylor, 2005, p. 29-32). The institutional arrangements operating in 
these jurisdictions provide excellent examples of potential alternative institutional frameworks 
for aggregate extraction in Ontario. The United Kingdom’s policy approach to aggregate 
resources, for example, is underpinned by such sustainable development objectives as, among 
others, the maximization of conservation of prime aggregate resources; the minimization of 
waste and waste recycling; and the complete prohibition of extraction in designated areas. These 
and other sustainable development objectives for aggregates are encouraged through such 
mechanisms as an aggregates levy of £1.60 ($3.73 CAD) per tonne; a sustainability fund oriented 
towards reducing the social-ecological impacts of extraction; and guidelines for the recycling of 
aggregates. A portion of the sustainability fund, for example, goes towards increasing the use of 
recycled aggregates. The 2001-2016 guidelines for recycling aim to increase the use of 
alternative materials to meet 23% of demand by 2016.  
The above description of the provincial institutional framework guiding aggregate 
extraction in Ontario also begins to sketch out the feedbacks that exist between institutions, 
organizations, people, and the natural environment. People produce and reproduce the 
institutional system by which they are, in turn, constrained. This institutional system has 
implications for social-ecological systems. Changes in social and/or ecological systems can, in 
turn, induce institutional change. Many New Institutionalists (e.g. North, 1990; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005), assert that institutional change is overwhelmingly incremental, especially due to 
the differences between fast and slow moving variables. Even ecological catastrophes, then, may 
induce changes in local or provincial laws and policies, while putting only a small dent in the 
worldviews that contributed to the crisis.  
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5.5 The aggregate extraction application process  
 Proponents of aggregate extraction operations must file an application with the Ministry 
of Natural Resources for a licence, permit, or wayside permit. If the extraction operation will be 
on private land, a licence is required. If the extraction operation will be on Crown land, lands 
under water, or if the Crown owns the aggregate, an aggregate permit is required. Licence and 
permit applications are categorized according to how much aggregate will be removed form the 
site, whether the extraction will be below or above the water table, and whether the site will be a 
pit or a quarry. Unconsolidated materials (e.g. sand and gravel) come from a pit whereas 
consolidated bedrock (limestone, granite, etc.) comes from a quarry and usually involves 
blasting. As previously described, the Ministry of Transportation has the authority to issue and 
administer wayside permits for its own Provincial highway projects. All other wayside permits 
(e.g. to municipalities) are issued and administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources.  
Proponents must also submit applications with the appropriate local authority for a 
Zoning By-Law Amendment and, if required, an Official Plan Amendment. Under the Aggregate 
Resources Act, the Ministry of Natural Resources cannot issue a licence or permit for aggregate 
extraction unless the proponent has demonstrated that the appropriate land use changes have 
been made at the local level. The requirements for Official Plan Amendments and Zoning By-
Law Amendments vary in detail depending on upper and lower-tier regional and/or municipal 
policy; some municipalities have more stringent requirements than others. This inconsistency, in 
part, is a consequence of different interpretations of the Provincial Policy Statement, different 
local cultures, and different historically based relationships between local communities and the 
aggregates industry. On the other hand, standards for licence and permit applications with the 
Ministry of Natural Resources are the same across Ontario, although they vary according to the 
application category. 
Regardless of the type of permit or licence, all applicants must submit to the Ministry of 
Natural Resources a site plan and technical reports as part of their application package, following 
provincial standards. The Ministry then has 20 days to determine if the application meets the 
requirements of the Aggregate Resources Act. If the Ministry determines that the application is 
complete, the applicant must proceed with the notification and consultation process. Under the 
Aggregate Resources Act, the applicant must provide a 45-day public notification period to allow 
the public to comment on the application package. The applicant must provide an information 
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session to the public sometime within this 45-day window. The public must have at least 10 days 
for comment after the information session. The applicant must try to resolve all objections and 
submit documentation of all resolved and unresolved issues to the Ministry. At this stage, the 
Minister may refer the application to the Ontario Municipal Board for a hearing. If the applicant 
does not submit all required documentation to the Ministry within 2 years of the notification 
period, the application will be considered to be withdrawn. Recent changes to the Ontario 
Planning Act allow municipalities to develop by-laws that require applicants to consult with the 
municipality before they submit Official Plan and Zoning By-Law Amendment applications.  
 
5.6 The Town of Caledon in the Region of Peel 
The Town of Caledon is the northernmost lower-tier municipality in the Regional 
Municipality of Peel. The Region of Peel extends northward from Lake Ontario in the west 
GTA, in the southwestern corner of the GGH (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. The Town of Caledon in the Region of Peel 
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The Town of Caledon is the largest of Peel’s three lower-tier municipalities. Brampton 
and Mississauga constitute the southern half of the Region, with Brampton situated between the 
Town of Caledon to the north and Mississauga to the south. The Town’s population is 
approximately 57,000 and it is expected to grow to approximately 84,000 by 2021 (Town of 
Caledon, 2004, p. 4-2).  
Caledon’s Official Plan describes the Town as “…characterized by its rolling hills and 
valleys, rivers and streams, natural landscapes, agricultural lands, rural residential areas, historic 
hamlets/villages, parks and conservation areas, hiking trails, the Niagara Escarpment, and the 
Bruce Trail” (Town of Caledon, 2004b, p. 5-105). The Iroquois and Algonkian Nations inhabited 
the area for hundreds of years. By the early 19th century, European settlers began to survey the 
land and establish farms. Today, these historical settlements represent a valued heritage unique 
to Caledon (see Town of Caledon, 2004c, p.1-1). The Town was created in 1974 through the 
amalgamation of some old area townships and the dissolution of other historic village 
governments under the Regional Municipality of Peel Act, 1973. It is primarily rural in character 
and contains some major natural and cultural heritage features, including parts of the Oak Ridges 
Moraine, the Niagara Escarpment, the Peel Plain, and the Credit and Humber river systems. The 
Town of Caledon is situated within the Credit River Watershed, which drains into Lake Ontario.  
Local residents of Caledon take pride in the Town’s picturesque countryside, rural 
character, and sense of community (see Planning & Engineering Initiatives Ltd. & Associates, 
1998, p.32). In 2008, a Caledon Countryside Alliance survey found that most residents want 
municipal officials to resist development pressures in order to keep Caledon a small town 
(Caledon Enterprise, 2008). Over the years, a culture of stewardship has become a notable aspect 
of the Town’s character. In 2003, Caledon was co-recipient of the “TV Ontario Greenest Town 
in Ontario” award, which recognized the Town’s progressive environmental initiatives (Town of 
Caledon, 2009). These progressive initiatives are reinforced by Caledon’s strong environmental 
civil society, which is comprised of a variety of groups that are active on a range of local issues 
broadly present across the GGH (loss of farmland, degradation of ecological goods and services, 
and sprawl). The Caledon Countryside Alliance, for example, works to ensure that the Town 
maintains its rural nature. Similarly, the Coalition of Concerned Citizens is committed to 
sustainable land use planning. The activities of this latter group are centered on defeating the 
Rockfort Quarry application. This group will be discussed in more detail in section 5.7. Because 
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the Town of Caledon contains portions of the above-mentioned major natural and cultural 
heritage features, Caledon’s environmental civil society also includes larger organizations whose 
presence may be felt in many communities. Among others, these organizations include the 
Niagara Escarpment Coalition and Save the Oak Ridges Moraine. 
Caledon’s picturesque countryside has also attracted a community of well-to-do ex-urban 
retirees and commuting professionals: “…over the past two decades ex-urbanites have sought out 
this area for reasons of natural aesthetics, real estate value, small town appeal, and small ‘c’ 
conservative values” (Chambers & Sandberg, 2007, p. 332). This community is comprised of 
many households with annual incomes in excess of Can$100,000 and high levels of education. 
The recent trend in demographics has been that people who can afford the increasing cost of real 
estate have replaced lower income families (p. 332). These ex-urban residents have formed a 
solid base for activism against aggregate extraction in Caledon. It is important to note that this 
demographic shift has occurred alongside the emergence of land use legislation (e.g. Niagara 
Escarpment Act and Plan, Oak Ridges Moraine Act and Plan, and Greenbelt Act and Plan) that 
restricts residential, commercial, recreational and industrial development in the Niagara 
Escarpment Plan, Oak Ridges Moraine Plan, and Greenbelt Plan areas. As previously described 
in section 5.4, these Acts and Plans seek to contribute to the viability of agricultural 
communities, protect and enhance ecological goods and services, control urban sprawl, and 
promote the sustainable use of natural resources.  
The Town of Caledon possesses the largest series of contiguous gravel pits in North 
America (Chambers & Sandberg, 2007). Caledon, therefore, has been a major provider of sand, 
gravel, and limestone to the construction booms in the GTA. According to Chambers and 
Sandberg (2007), Caledon’s reliance on this single industry has made the Town prone to 
attracting more aggregate extraction operations. Moreover, the horizontally and vertically 
integrated multinational corporations that dominate the cement market in Canada have over the 
years shaped Caledon’s natural and cultural landscape. According to the Caledon Community 
Resources Study (Planning & Engineering Initiatives Ltd. & Associates, 1998), by 1970, the 
areas that later became the Town of Caledon included a significant amount of land disturbed by 
aggregate extraction operations.  
Chambers and Sandberg (2007) emphasize the socially constructed nature of Caledon’s 
identity as an aggregates town. The aggregate industry, for example, has constructed several 
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narratives that support certain norms in practice. One such narrative is that aggregate operations 
must be sited close to demand in order to avoid high transportation costs. The industry rightly 
argues that lower transportation costs reduce the cost of cement, government-funded 
infrastructure, and private home building. Plus, lower trucking kilometers will reduce carbon 
emissions and so contribute to minimizing Canada’s contribution to climate change. Another 
narrative is the industry’s repeated insistence that there is a scarcity of aggregate resources 
relative to anticipated demand. Chambers and Sandberg note that the industry’s demand 
projections are also socially constructed in that an elite group whose interests are vested in a 
paradigm that promotes highway construction and urban development determines them. 
Community narratives too have typically described Caledon as “predestined for aggregate 
production” (p. 331) by highlighting the rich deposits and their proximity to the GTA. Other 
path-dependent, positive feedback processes may also be at play. Chambers and Sandberg, for 
example, highlight that traditional patterns of employment and income (e.g. local farmers 
supplement their income with wayside pits for road maintenance) contribute to the persistence of 
Caledon’s identity as an aggregates Town. These norms are reinforced by the Province: “The 
provincial state is keenly keyed into and complicit in the aggregate industry’s scaled narrative 
with respect to resource protection and the distance/cost relationship…” (p. 331). This has been 
demonstrated over the years in the shift that occurred from the 1960s to the mid-1990s in the 
legislative framework guiding aggregate extraction operations in southern Ontario.  
Caledon’s culture of stewardship and the desire felt by many residents for Caledon to 
remain a small town stand in stark contrast with the economic growth and urban development 
pressures broadly present in the GGH region and locally evident in Caledon. These pressures 
may be magnified by Caledon’s rich deposit of the aggregate resource and its position just north 
of such intensely populated and urbanized municipalities as Brampton and Mississauga. 
Moreover, the tensions between social groups, values and interests representing small town 
advocacy and growth pressures ultimately influence municipal and regional land use planning. 
These tensions, coupled with the complex web of legislative constraints that guide land use 
planning and decision making in the Town, generate complex land use issues. One such complex 
land use issue in Caledon centres on is the Rockfort Quarry project, which will be discussed in 
more detail in section 5.7. The Rockfort Quarry project is like many other quarry projects in the 
GGH in that it involves a diverse range of stakeholders and community concerns, notably loss 
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and degradation of water quality and quantity, and cultural and natural heritage.  
 
5.7 The evolution of Caledon’s mineral resources policies  
According to Chambers and Sandberg (2007), Caledon’s aggregate deposits were one of 
the first in Ontario to undergo extraction in the 1940s. During this time and up to approximately 
1970, Municipalities had primary control over the location and operation of pits and quarries. 
The Ontario Planning Act and the Municipal Act gave municipalities land use planning tools to 
restrict the location of extraction operations. There was limited provincial control in that the 
regulation of the resource was decentralized over a range of statutes and provincial regulating 
agencies. Demand for the resource was low and based on local needs. Municipal control over the 
resource was not necessarily more sustainable, however. According to one interviewee who is a 
long-time resident of Caledon, these were the “wild west” days of aggregate extraction; a 
proponent could literally drive up to a source of aggregate, blow it up with dynamite, and drive 
away with a truck full of gravel.  
By the mid-1950s, demand for aggregates began to increase with economic growth and 
urban and suburban development in the GTA. Larger companies began to form to supply the 
increasing demand and it became more common for aggregates to be hauled beyond the rural 
boundaries within which the pits were located. By the late 1960s, the aggregates industry began 
to lobby the provincial government for remedial action against a perceived shortage of resources. 
According to Baker et al. (2001), this “shortage of supply” discourse emerged out of a lack of 
understanding of the amount of sand, gravel and bedrock resources available for extraction; 
rising conflict between public concern for the environmental impacts of aggregate extraction and 
increasing public demand for aggregate resources; and increasing competition between the 
aggregates industry and municipalities for land for aggregate mining versus other land uses.  
In 1969, the Province created the Mineral Resources Committee to examine the 
industry’s concerns and make recommendations that would guarantee the ongoing availability of 
aggregates close to demand. The Committee’s 1969 report recommended increased provincial 
control over the aggregates industry. This was the beginning of the loss of municipal control over 
aggregate extraction: “…the industry, realizing the growing ‘crisis’ for aggregate producers, 
‘captured’ the provincial government and began to dominate policy-making” (Baker et al., 2001, 
p. 468). Chambers and Sandberg (2007) assert that the aggregate industry was successful in its 
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demands partly because both the provincial government and the industry were profiting from 
increasing urbanization. 
The Pits and Quarries Control Act came into effect in 1971, transferring control of 
aggregate resources from municipal governments to the Province through the establishment of a 
licensing and site plan procedure system enforced by the Ministry of Natural Resources. The 
Ministry became the central planning agency, with power to licence, regulate, and rehabilitate 
pits and quarries. Municipalities, however, were allowed to maintain control over the location of 
future pits and quarries through land use planning tools. In a significant step, the Act also 
required the rehabilitation of pits and quarries. It recognized the growing conflicts between the 
aggregates sector and the interests of private citizens: “…while there is a general acceptance 
within the Province that aggregate extraction is necessary, there is also a very real concern by the 
citizens involved to see that their interests are protected” (Baker et al., 2001, p. 470). According 
to one interviewee who is a long time resident of Caledon, citizens of the Town have always 
been concerned with protecting the tranquility and rural aesthetic of Caledon’s countryside, as 
these are valued components of a particular quality of life.  
By the early 1970s, Caledon had been well established as a town with an ample supply of 
prime aggregate to feed the needs of the GTA. According to the Caledon Community Resources 
Study (Planning & Engineering Initiatives Ltd. & Associates, 1998), by 1970, Caledon was 
surrounded by a significant amount of land disturbed by aggregate extraction operations. Indeed, 
many of these pits and quarries were opened before the Pits and Quarries Control Act came into 
effect; therefore, they were not subjected to rehabilitation obligations. For residents of Caledon, 
the Province made a significant move in 1979 when the Ministry of Natural Resources released 
the Mineral Aggregate Policy for Official Plans, which directed municipalities to protect lands 
identified as having significant aggregate deposits from being allocated to any other land use. 
Then, in the early 1980s, the new Planning Act allowed the provincial government to issue 
policy statements to guide municipal authorities in land use planning. The Mineral Aggregate 
Resources Policy Statement was the first of these provincial policy statements. It was based on 
an inventory of aggregates in Ontario, projected demands, and estimated volumes to be produced 
by local jurisdictions (Chambers & Sandberg, 2007). Like the 1979 policy, the objectives of the 
Mineral Aggregate Resources Policy Statement ensured that official plans identify and protect 
existing pits and quarries and future aggregate reserves from incompatible land uses. 
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Municipalities did not have to zone the identified areas for extraction but the Mineral Aggregate 
Resources Policy Statement prevented such lands from being used for any other purpose.  
These legislative changes are evidence of the institutionalization of the norm of 
unfettered access to the resource close to demand, driven by the industry’s shortage of supply 
discourse and the provincial need for affordable aggregate to feed urban development in the 
GGH region. It also represents the establishment of a land use planning and natural resource 
management system that gives priority to aggregate extraction over other land uses. Prior to this 
policy, municipalities could control the location of pits and quarries through Official Plan zoning 
by-laws. According to one citizen who lived in Caledon during this time, Town Council was 
pressured by the Ministry of Natural Resources to adopt an aggregate resources area map in 
Caledon’s Official Plan to designate certain parts of the Town for extraction. This caused an 
immediate uproar among concerned citizens who were accustomed to having more control over 
the location of pits and quarries, and who wanted to protect the cultural and natural heritage that 
defines their rural quality of life. Some of these citizens formed the Caledon Ratepayer’s 
Association to defeat the aggregate resources area map proposal and associated municipal 
policies. After about two years of lobbying, Town Council sided with the Ratepayer’s 
Association. Eventually, negotiations between the Town, Ratepayers, and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources led to a decision popularly known as “Cabinet Corners”, the nickname for the area of 
Town described in Caledon’s 1981 mineral resources policies as an area to which the Town 
would “have regard to” preserving for future aggregate extraction. Indeed, Caledon was no 
stranger to quarry land use battles by the early 1980s.  
Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies set out particular requirements for proponents 
of new aggregate operations or extensions to existing operations in applying for a zoning by-law 
change and an amendment to the Plan. The policies provided a list of criteria upon which 
amendment applications would be evaluated. Among other evaluation criteria was the need for 
the operation. Little detail was set out with respect to the assessment of biophysical and social 
impacts. Moreover, “environment” was defined narrowly along biophysical lines (air, water 
quality and quantity, noise, hydrology). Assessment of social impacts was not elaborated beyond 
the requirement to consider public concerns and impacts on residents adjacent to the project. The 
nature of the proposed rehabilitation was to be considered in the amendment approval process 
and progressive rehabilitation was to be promoted. The Town also laid out an intention to 
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develop a rehabilitation program and prepare an inventory of abandoned and rehabilitated pits 
and quarries with the assistance of the Ministry of Natural Resources. With respect to land use 
priorities, Caledon’s Cabinet Corners policies explicitly stated that, when considering Official 
Plan Amendments, it would “…consider the goals and objectives of this plan to preserve and 
encourage agricultural activity and maintain the scenic and rural character of the Municipality in 
maintaining a land use balance between competing land uses…” (Town of Caledon, 1983, p. 95). 
Moreover, it stated that priority would be given to “…the protection of existing and approved 
residential development from undue adverse impact of the new extractive industrial use” (Town 
of Caledon, 1983, p. 95). These Cabinet Corners policies were in effect in Caledon until 1996. 
By the early 1980s, Caledon’s identity had been defined, in part, by the aggregates 
industry and the demands of urban development in the GTA and beyond. Chambers and 
Sandberg (2007), for example, highlight the powerful role of corporate narratives that construct 
particular locations as “predestined producers of aggregate” (p. 328). Caledon’s position within 
the Region of Peel and just north of the GTA meant that it was an easy target as an area that 
could be pegged as a major supplier of aggregates. Moreover, Caledon’s farming community has 
traditionally welcomed aggregate extraction: “From using wayside pits for road upgrades to 
supplement their income in the past, farmers now seek to sell their land as aggregate resources, 
while young men from farm backgrounds seek employment as heavy equipment operators or 
labourers at the local pits” (p. 331). Moreover, between the early and late ‘80s, aggregate 
production increased dramatically, contributing to Caledon’s identity as an aggregates town. But 
such factors as the influx of well-to-do, ex-urban retirees and commuting professionals, 
Caledon’s commitment to protect its rural and scenic character, and a rise in environmental 
awareness and activism also contributed to Caledon’s identity. According to one interviewee, 
historically, the Town’s attitude has always been to go to the Ontario Municipal Board to oppose 
applications for aggregate extraction in order to protect citizens from the adverse social and 
environmental impacts.   
In 1989, the Aggregate Resource Act replaced the Pits and Quarries Control Act, handing 
more responsibility to the aggregates industry for the mitigation of the biophysical and social 
impacts of extraction. This may have been, in part, a response to the significant increase in the 
rate of aggregate extraction in southern Ontario. Between 1979 and 1989, aggregate production 
increased from 131 million tonnes to 197 tonnes annually: “With this dramatic rise in mining 
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activity came heightened awareness of the overall costs of the industry and weaknesses in the 
policy framework” (Baker et al., 2001, p. 471).  
Meanwhile, control over the aggregates industry was shifting again – from provincial to 
joint provincial-industry control. Ontario’s land use planning and natural resource management 
legislative framework reinforced this shift. In December 1994, the province adopted a 
comprehensive set of provincial policy statements, which came into effect in 1995. These 
statements were based on the work of the Commission on Planning and Development Reform. 
Among these statements was the Mineral Aggregate and Mineral Petroleum Resources Policy 
Statement, the chief objective of which was to “…ensure mineral aggregates are available at a 
reasonable cost and as close to markets as possible to meet future local, regional and provincial 
needs” (Winfield & Taylor, 2005, p. 13). The goals of 1979 Mineral Aggregate Resources Policy 
Statement were carried over in this policy statement. Other types of land uses were permissible 
only in areas where mineral extraction was not feasible, if development would not preclude 
aggregate extraction, and if the proposed land use or development was in the greater interest of 
the general public. Under the Planning Act, municipal planning authorities had to adhere to this 
policy in their Official Plans. The trend to reinforce aggregate law with land use planning policy 
continued, therefore, with the new Provincial Policy Statement, which came into effect in March 
1995. 
A further shift in responsibilities from the Ministry of Natural Resources to the aggregate 
industry occurred later in 1995, when the Ministry of Natural Resources experienced a dramatic 
reduction in funding for their aggregates program. In response to the reductions, the Aggregate 
and Petroleum Resources Statute Law Amendment Act was passed in 1996 and proclaimed in 
force in June 1997. It amended the Aggregate Resources Act. Notably, it handed compliance 
inspection and reporting, management of rehabilitation funds and the Management of 
Abandoned Aggregate Properties Program, and operational accountability responsibilities to the 
industry, while the province retained responsibility for conducting enforcement, setting 
standards, and issuing approvals. Under this amendment, the Minister created the Aggregate 
Resources Trust and appointed The Ontario Aggregate Resources Corporation as trustee. The 
sole shareholder of The Ontario Aggregate Resources Corporation is the Ontario Stone, Sand & 
Gravel Association, formerly called the Aggregate Producers’ Association of Ontario.  
In 1995, when Mike Harris became Premier of Ontario, the Planning Act was amended to 
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weaken the Provincial Policy Statement, especially by requiring planning decisions only to “have 
regard to” provincial policies rather than to be consistent with the policies. But the new 
Provincial Policy Statement strengthened the priority given to aggregate resources over other 
land uses. By the mid 1990s, a partnership had solidified between the Province and the 
aggregates industry in the management of the industry and mitigation of its environmental 
impacts. Unfettered access to the resource, based on the “shortage of supply” discourse, was 
firmly institutionalized and implemented to varying degrees at the local level across southern 
Ontario.  
According to one interviewee who was a Town Councilor during this time, it was around 
1996 when the Town became aware that the 1981 Cabinet Corners policies were antique. 
Moreover, by 1996, the Town had spent millions of dollars on aggregate extraction related 
Ontario Municipal Board hearings. If the aggregate producers did not win at the Board, they 
would appeal the Board’s decision to Cabinet. Most often, Cabinet would overturn the Board’s 
decision. The Town, therefore, was not gaining ground from these battles. Still, according to one 
interviewee who was a Town planner around this time, the Town’s willingness to go to the 
Ontario Municipal Board was underpinned by its desire to have more control over the industry, 
and to achieve a balance between the interests of the aggregates industry and community 
concerns. In response to these local, industry, and provincial stresses, the Town initiated the 
Caledon Community Resources Study: “As a result of the number of local Ontario Municipal 
Board referrals to the Regional and Town Official Plans, the need for a study was recognized…” 
(Planning & Engineering Initiatives Ltd. & Associates, 1999, p. 1). It was to be completed in 
three phases. The overall objective of the study was to “…develop a sustainable community 
model for the management of the aggregate resource that will enable the Caledon ecosystem and 
community to be maintained over the long term” (Planning & Engineering Initiatives Ltd. & 
Associates, 1998, p. 1). A Community Advisory Group was established to assist the Study Team 
during the Caledon Community Resources Study process. The Community Advisory Group 
consisted of residents, representatives of the aggregate industry, and municipal and regional 
officials. According to one Town official interviewee, this collaborative approach was 
groundbreaking for Caledon, a Town that had experienced decades of precarious relations 
between the aggregates industry and residents and local politicians. The above stakeholders, 
however, had reached a point where they realized that the time and money that they were 
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spending on Ontario Municipal Board hearings were not contributing to a solution to the 
essential problem – a land use planning issue. Town officials realized that it was unlikely that the 
provincial legislative framework would change to their advantage in the foreseeable future. 
Caledon would continue to receive more applications for aggregate extraction; somehow, pits 
and quarries had to be accommodated. Everyone wanted some certainty. The Town, certain 
concerned citizens and representatives from the aggregates industry were willing, therefore, to 
negotiate a transition to a local institutional system that would help to avoid costly Ontario 
Municipal Board hearings.  
Meanwhile, the Region of Peel was experiencing a lot of pressure from certain Ministry 
of Municipal Affairs and Housing staff to adopt a Regional Official Plan. Up until this point, the 
Region did not have one. According to one interviewee who was a Councilor during this time, 
this was because Peel’s lower-tier Municipalities (Brampton, Mississauga, and Caledon) were 
historically accustomed to and wanted to maintain the custom of having primary control over 
local concerns. The Regional planners were content with merely delivering services. In order to 
force the Region’s hand, certain staff within the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
decided to stop the approval process for municipal plans in Peel Region. The Minister, for 
example, refused to review Caledon’s 1991 Growth Management Plan until Peel developed an 
ROP. Although the Caledon Community Resource Study had already been initiated, Town and 
Regional officials and staff temporarily shifted their focus to developing Peel’s first Regional 
Official Plan.   
On July 11, 1996, the Region of Peel adopted its first Official Plan. With respect to 
mineral aggregate resources, the new Plan built on Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies. 
According to one interviewee who was a Town Councilor during this time, the Town of Caledon 
simply uploaded many of its policies to the ROP. The new Plan, therefore, retained the old 1981 
requirement to “have regard to” preserving lands within a defined area of Caledon for future 
extraction of mineral resources. But it refined toughened this policy to prohibit new aggregate 
operations outside of that area of the Town. It also retained the requirement for proponents to 
demonstrate need. The 1996 Regional Official Plan also adopted more of the language of the 
1996 Provincial Policy Statement. For example, it directed area municipalities to identify and 
protect pits and quarries from incompatible land uses and permit aggregate uses in Prime 
Agricultural Areas with policies in their Official Plans. As required by the Provincial Policy 
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Statement, the new Plan directed area municipalities to permit the establishment, operation, 
expansion and rehabilitation of pits and quarries with policies in their Official Plans. It allowed 
for municipal consideration of environmental and social impacts. Concern for community, social 
and biophysical impacts was explicit, as was consideration for the cumulative effects of 
aggregate extraction on Peel’s communities, cultural features, and environmental integrity. 
Progressive rehabilitation was required and the Region set out an objective to “actively promote” 
rehabilitation of abandoned pits and quarries. Rehabilitation requirements, however, were 
somewhat diminished in that the old 1981 intention to develop an inventory of abandoned and 
rehabilitated pits and quarries was removed. This may have been due to a lack of capacity on the 
part of the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Town to collect and maintain inventory data. 
The Regional Official Plan prohibited new aggregate operations within Peel’s entire Greenlands 
system. Plus, it retained the requirement for the town to, when considering applications for new 
aggregate developments, give priority to protecting existing communities from the impacts of 
aggregate operations, and “preserve and encourage agricultural activity and maintain the scenic 
and rural character and land use balance between competing land uses” (Region of Peel, 1996, 
p.37). Overall, Peel’s new Regional Official Plan maintained the above-described orientation of 
Caledon’s 1981 mineral extraction policies. One important detail is that the new Plan directed 
the Town of Caledon to continue the Caledon Community Resource Study in order to recommend 
new policy and management directions for the Region and for the Town of Caledon in particular.  
In the summer of 1996, the Region forwarded the new Plan to the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing for approval. Near the end of the summer, Regional Council was notified 
that the Minister intended to modify Peel’s new aggregate resources policies because, according 
to the Minister, they did not properly address provincial policy. Negotiations were held between 
the Ministry and the Region around key issues in the proposed modifications. According to one 
interviewee who was a municipal planner during this time, the Town refused to attend these 
negotiations because it wanted to maintain control over the aggregate policies and the 
management of the resource. Among the key negotiated issues was the incorporation of a High 
Potential Mineral Aggregate Resource Area (HPMARA) map prepared by the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, based on the Ministry of 
Northern Development and Mines’ aggregate resources geological inventory for the Region of 
Peel. The HPMARA map identified areas of significant mineral resources in Caledon. In keeping 
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with ensuring unfettered access to the resource close to demand, the Minister wanted the map to 
be used to designate lands for extraction. The Region and Town, however, insisted that the map 
should be used to identify mineral resources only – as a basis for further refinement at the local 
level through the Caledon Community Resource Study. Also at stake was the Region’s 
Greenlands system, within which extraction was prohibited in Peel’s Regional Official Plan. The 
Minister wanted to modify this restriction by prohibiting extraction within the core areas of the 
Greenlands system only, opening ecologically sensitive areas for extraction. The Region and 
Town further rejected the HPMARA map on the grounds that it included settlement areas and 
residential estate communities. Moreover, the map would designate significant portions of the 
Town’s rural system for aggregate protection with few other uses. Municipal and Regional 
Councils strongly recommended that the modifications be deferred until the completion of the 
Caledon Community Resource Study or replaced with policies that required the Caledon 
Community Resource Study. On October 22, 1996, however, the Minister approved Peel’s 
modified Regional Official Plan. The requirement for the Caledon Community Resource Study 
was retained and it continued under its original purpose.  
Around this time, the Rockfort Quarry land use issue appeared on the Town of Caledon’s 
horizon. Nestled within the western reaches of the Town, the Rockfort lands are a well-known 
remnant of Caledon’s early-nineteenth century farming community. The Scottish pioneers who 
settled the land built the stone barn, which remains on the site, and the farmhouse was at one 
time the Post Office for the old village. According to more recent history, the previous owners 
who had maintained the heritage property for over thirty years sold the Rockfort lands to a 
“lovely young couple” who showed great admiration for the historic farmhouse, stone barn, and 
surrounding landscape. It turned out that the young couple represented James Dick Construction 
Limited (JDCL), an aggregate production and processing company that had been operating in the 
Caledon area since 1964. To the dismay of the local residents, the property had been purchased 
with the intent to quarry. 
In reaction to the Rockfort Quarry proposal, the Coalition of Concerned Citizens was 
formed, a nongovernmental organization comprised of citizens primarily from Caledon and the 
neighbouring Town of Erin. Defeating JDCL’s quarry proposal was and remains its main raison 
d’être. Their broader mandate is to encourage all levels of government to adopt sustainable land 
use planning policies. 
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The Minister’s modifications to Peel’s aggregate extraction policies prompted dozens of 
appeals to the Ontario Municipal Board. Key appellants included the Town, Region, Niagara 
Escarpment Commission, Credit Valley Conservation Authority, Metro Toronto Conservation 
Authority, and private landowners. Key reasons for the appeals were that the modifications (i) 
were made without any notification or input by the public, whose property interests would be 
affected; (ii) undermined the recommendations of the Caledon Community Resource Study; (iii) 
involved a level of detail that the Town asserted was inappropriate for a Plan that must be high-
level and strategic; and (iv) failed to provide a balanced approach to future land use planning. 
The Town appealed the policies that would (i) allow for extraction operations within the 
Greenlands System; (ii) limit the ability of area municipalities to require that aggregate 
operations minimize negative biophysical, community, and social impacts, and limit their ability 
to undertake studies to consider cumulative effects; (iii) be unclear with respect to whether a 
Regional Plan Amendment would be required within the HPMARA for a use that would be in 
accordance with the policies of the Plan; (iv) protect existing and future aggregate operations 
from other land uses while not providing protection for other landowners from the effects of 
aggregate operations; and (v) eliminate the Town’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policy to “preserve 
and encourage agricultural activity and maintain the scenic and rural character and land use 
balance between competing land uses” (Manning, 1996, p. 13). The modifications were 
perceived to demonstrate a preference for the aggregate industry over the interests of the 
residents of Caledon: “As a result of these changes, and an overall lack of balance, as supported 
through Provincial Policy, the Mineral Aggregate policies, as modified, do not provide a 
balanced approach to planning and fail to give adequate recognition to interests other than 
aggregate extraction” (Manning, 1996, p.3).  
An Ontario Municipal Board pre-hearing on the Minister’s modified version of Peel’s 
Regional Official Plan was held on April 2, 1997. During this time, the Region and the Town 
were under pressure from the aggregates industry and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing to proceed with the Ontario Municipal Board hearing before the completion of the 
Caledon Community Resource Study, i.e. before Caledon’s aggregate policies could be revised. 
The Region, Town, Coalition, and Niagara Escarpment Commission, however, pushed to have 
the hearing after the Caledon Community Resource Study was completed and following the 
amendments to the Municipal Official Plan. In June 1997, the Ontario Municipal Board decided 
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to concur with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing to not delay in the hopes that the 
Caledon Community Resources Study would be completed by the fall of 1998. In February 1998, 
the appeals to the Minister’s modifications were resolved in a settlement agreement between all 
parties and finally approved by the Ontario Municipal Board. Meanwhile, the Town and the 
Region continued with the Caledon Community Resource Study with its original objectives. 
For the key appellants, the revised new Regional Official Plan represented some wins and 
some losses. It was decided in the negotiations the HPMARA map would be a tool to identify 
aggregate resources as opposed to a designation tool, and it would require further refinement by 
local municipalities. The Regional Plan incorporated policies to permit joint regional-municipal 
studies that would address the social, cultural, environmental, and cumulative effects of 
aggregate developments. It also gave area municipalities some control over aggregate 
developments by directing them to develop policies regarding the location, operation, and 
expansion of pits and quarries; Official Plan Amendment criteria for new and/or expanded 
operations; and rehabilitation policies. The new Regional Official Plan, however, prohibits 
aggregate operations within the Core Areas of the Greenlands System only, as opposed to the 
entire system. Perhaps the most significant loss was that it diluted previous policies that 
explicitly sought to maintain a balance between competing land uses and give priority to the 
protection of existing and approved residential developments from the adverse impacts of 
aggregate operations. The new Plan retained a regional-level requirement that aggregate 
developments should be located, designated and operated in such a way that biophysical and 
social impacts would be minimized. And it incorporated in the Objectives section the goal to 
achieve a balance between the demand for and economic benefits of aggregates and the 
protection of Peel’s communities and natural environment. But the previous policies that 
explicitly sought to “preserve and encourage agricultural activity and maintain the scenic and 
rural character and land use balance between competing land uses” were not carried over. 
Instead, greater attention was devoted to Provincial interests with respect to aggregate resources 
as expressed in the Provincial Policy Statement. 
In March 1998, JDCL submitted an application to the Town of Caledon for an Official 
Plan Amendment and Zoning By-Law Amendment. The company also applied to the Ministry of 
Natural Resources for a Category 2 licence to quarry below the water table. Town Official Plan 
and Zoning By-Law Amendments were required to designate the Rockfort lands from “Rural 
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Area” to “Extractive Industrial” to permit the establishment of the quarry. Because the Town’s 
Caledon Community Resource Study was not yet complete at the time of JDCL’s application, the 
Town’s 1981 aggregate policies remained in force.  
In April and September 1998, Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Caledon Community Resource 
Study were completed and approved by Caledon Council. Around this time, the Coalition 
continued to work with local citizens, the Credit Valley Conservation Authority, the Town, and 
the Region to raise awareness of the potential impacts of the Rockfort Quarry. The Coalition’s 
key concerns were for property values, the water table, the aquifer system and other sensitive 
features (including cultural heritage) of the rural countryside around the Rockfort site. Their 
activities included fundraising through garage sales, dinner theatre, and golf tournaments. By 
2002, the Coalition’s membership had reached approximately 3600 individuals. Fundraising was 
especially important to the Coalition because its strategy included hiring legal, environmental, 
and engineering consultants to review JDCL’s quarry proposal and associated reports. By 2003, 
the Coalition had spent over $600, 000 in direct costs and over $1 million in indirect costs.  
By the spring of 1999, Phase 3 of the Caledon Community Resource Study was complete. 
It culminated in the preparation of recommendations by hired consultants for a new set of 
mineral resources policies for the Town, popularly known as Official Plan Amendment 161 
(OPA 161). Council finally adopted OPA 161 in March 2000, after meetings with key 
stakeholders (Town, Region, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Transportation, Niagara Escarpment 
Commission, Credit Valley Conservation Authority, Aggregate Producers’ Association of 
Ontario, and the Coalition of Concerned Citizens), and numerous revisions of the policy by 
planning staff. Thirteen parties promptly appealed OPA 161 to the Ontario Municipal Board, 
including JDCL, other individual citizens and aggregate producers, the Ontario Producers’ 
Association of Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Niagara Escarpment Commission, and the Coalition of Concerned Citizens. In June 
2000, the Ministry of Natural Resources referred JDCL’s licence application to the Ontario 
Municipal Board at the request of JDCL and because of the outcry against the quarry from the 
public and other agencies, including the Town, Region, Niagara Escarpment Commission, Credit 
Valley Conservation Authority, and the Coalition of Concerned Citizens. In September 2000, 
JDCL also appealed its Official Plan and Zoning By-Law Amendment applications on the 
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grounds that the Town had failed to adopt the proposed amendments within the legislated 
timeframe. Also in September, JDCL filed a motion with the Ontario Municipal Board for an 
order based on the “Clergy Principle” that OPA 161 was not applicable to its quarry application. 
JDCL wanted its application to be assessed under Caledon’s 1981 mineral extraction policies. 
The Clergy Principle will be discussed in more detail later, below. 
From about the winter of 2000 to the fall of 2003, settlement discussions on OPA 161 
were undertaken among all parties. A settlement agreement was finally reached and the Ontario 
Municipal Board approved OPA 161 on April 28, 2003. The status of the Rockfort lands was 
deferred to a February 2004 hearing. The most controversial issues that were negotiated by the 
parties to the Ontario Municipal Board settlement included the following: 
• prioritization of aggregate resource lands for extraction operations 
• requirement for a comprehensive broader scale environmental impact study 
• requirement for an independent social impact study, and 
• demonstration of need for extraction. 
OPA 161 incorporated a Caledon High Potential Mineral Aggregate Resource Area map, 
which refined the Regional HPMARA map. The municipal map eliminated portions of the 
HPMARA in order to be consistent with Caledon’s environmental policies and to exclude 
residential clusters and parcels of land that were determined to be too small for extraction 
operations. Certain Environmental Policy Areas, therefore, were removed from HPMARA. This 
was underpinned by the town’s desire to protect Caledon’s cultural and natural heritage as an 
integral part of its unique identity and character (Town of Caledon 2004b, p. 5-105). In a bold 
move by the town, the map incorporated an aggregate extraction prioritization strategy in that it 
divided the resource lands into ten resource areas. According to one interviewee who was a 
planner during this time, this was the first time at an attempt to prioritize aggregate extraction in 
southern Ontario. Before OPA 161 was appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board, these ten 
resource areas were categorized according to certain criteria as “Priority 1” and “Priority 2” 
lands. Extraction would be encouraged in Priority 1 areas and prohibited in Priority 2 areas. 
Town planners would examine the Plan every five years and adjust the restricted area policies 
according to certain criteria. According to five interviewees, two Town Planners and three 
Councilors, for the town, prioritization was essential to its capacity to maintain some control 
over the timing and location of pits and quarries, and to ensure that an acceptable level of 
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rehabilitation was underway before extraction could occur in Priority 2 lands. The town was 
especially devoted to ensuring that Priority 1 areas were near appropriate haul routs in order to 
avoid paving over rural roads, which are a valued component of Caledon’s cultural heritage. 
Many old rural roads in Caledon, for example, are lined with the original stone fences erected by 
the European settlers who farmed the land during the early 19h century. According to one 
interviewee who was a Town Councilor during this time, the prioritization idea was underpinned 
by the Town’s acceptance that it would have to obey the Provincial legislative framework. But 
the Town was determined to deal with the Provincial framework in a way that was somehow 
favourable to them. According to Konefat (2000), the Aggregate Producers’ Association of 
Ontario, individual aggregate producers, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, and 
Ministry of Natural Resources were “…fundamentally opposed to the concept of prioritization” 
(p. 3). They wanted policies that ensured unfettered access to the resource, fair competition, and 
low prices for aggregate. These interest are is evident in the Aggregate Producers’ Association’s 
comments on the draft Official Plan Amendment: “The proposed prioritization has the effect of 
limiting resource availability and further, serves to potentially constrain competition in the 
market place. This would have a negative effect on aggregate prices…” (Aggregate Producers’ 
Association of Ontario, 1999, p.1). Another interviewee who was a Town Official during this 
time asserts that the industry players resisted this policy because they were afraid that it might 
become the norm across southern Ontario. Finally, the Town’s lawyer threatened to take the 
negotiations to a full-blown Ontario Municipal Board hearing if the industry could not agree to a 
compromise on the prioritization issue. Eventually, the industry players agreed to some 
prioritization policies and the Town agreed to provide more flexibility. In the end, the “Priority 
1” and “Priority 2” wording was changed to “Resource Area” and “Reserve Area”. New pits and 
quarries would be encouraged in Resource Lands but would also be considered in Reserve 
Lands, subject to more onerous study requirements and informally higher standards for approval. 
JDCL’s Rockfort Quarry lands were identified as being located within Aggregate Reserve 
(Priority 2) lands.   
Among these additional study requirements is one that calls for a Comprehensive Broader 
Scale Environmental Study (CBSES), equivalent to a Subwatershed Study if one had not been 
undertaken prior to the extraction application. Applications for extraction in Reserve (Priority 2) 
areas must complete a CBSES and many other studies as part of their application for an Official 
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Plan and Zoning By-Law Amendment to permit extraction in CHPMARA lands. The Town of 
Caledon, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Niagara Escarpment Coalition, and 
Coalition of Concerned Citizens supported this additional CBSES study because it requires 
proponents to evaluate how extraction will impact any areas identified as having functional 
linkages to the Resource Area, including hydrologic features, wetlands, woodlots, riparian 
communities, aquatic communities, groundwater recharge areas, etc. Prior to the settlement 
negotiations, proponents only had to investigate their individual sites, which provided only an 
incremental understanding of potential impacts. According to an interviewee who was a Town 
Planner during this time, industry stakeholders resisted this new policy because they felt it was 
unfair to ask them so study lands they may not own. They also felt that the study would be too 
expensive to undertake. The Aggregate Producers’ Association of Ontario argued that the 
CBSES requirement is redundant and would only cause unwarranted delay (Ontario Aggregate 
Producers’ Association, 1999, p. 4).  
According to Konefat (2000), the Aggregate Producers’ Association of Ontario and 
individual aggregate producers were generally concerned with the number of reports that OPA 
161 requires to be submitted for an Official Plan and Zoning By-Law Amendment. OPA 161, for 
example, requires for all extraction applications a Traffic Impact Study, an assessment of social 
impacts (noise, dust, traffic levels and vibration), a Visual Impact Report, a Cultural Heritage 
Survey, a Water Resources Study, and a land use planning analysis. Moreover, OPA 161 requires 
the applicant to pay for the costs of an independent peer review of these reports. All of these 
studies have to demonstrate that there will be no unacceptable impacts. With respect to the Water 
Resources Studies, OPA 161 further requires applicants to demonstrate that “…water resources 
will be protected, maintained and, where applicable, enhanced…” (Town of Caledon, 2004b, p. 
5-119). Subsequent sections provide details on what these reports and assessments must address, 
including specifics on what information must be provided. OPA 161 also requires a pre-
submission consultation meeting with the applicant, Town, Region, Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Conservation Authorities, and other relevant agencies before these reports be 
submitted to the Town as part of an application package. These reports, along with the detailed 
site plans required for submission to the Ministry of Natural Resources under the Aggregate 
Resources Act must be delivered to the Town in order to be made available to the public. The 
Town and other approval agencies may reject an application on the basis of these reports. The 
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“unacceptable impacts” wording had to be negotiated during the settlement talks. According to 
one interviewee who was a Town planner and present during the negotiations, the “unacceptable 
impact” wording was one of the last remaining controversial issues settled between the Town’s 
lawyer and the aggregates industry representatives. According to another interviewee who is a 
Town planner, one reason for the industry’s resistance towards the study requirements is that the 
general trend in the aggregates industry is to submit the bare minimum studies in order to 
maximize profits. 
The original OPA 161 also included the requirement for an independent social impact 
study. An independent social impact study was very important to the Town because they wanted 
to protect communities from the negative social impacts of pit and quarries. According to one 
interviewee who was involved in the negotiations, the Town’s demand for an independent social 
impact study and the CBSES was due to their view that the Provincial framework was tilted in 
the direction of the aggregates industry. The stand-alone social impact study and CBSES became 
part of the planners’ aim to achieve a fair and balanced approach to land use decision-making. 
Truck traffic, noise, dust, and contamination of well water were especially stressed as significant 
negative social impacts. According to one interviewee, however, industry stakeholders argued 
that social impacts are too precarious to measure because of their subjectivity. They felt that any 
independent social impact study would result in a negative reaction towards a particular 
extraction project and threaten the success of the application. The independent social impact 
study was a major issue on the Ontario Municipal Board negotiation table. Eventually, the Town 
conceded. The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing/Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Aggregate Producers’ Association of Ontario, and independent aggregate producers fought hard 
to avoid the stand-alone study. Instead, they agreed to assess social impacts, where appropriate, 
“based on predictable, measurable, significant, objective effects on people caused by such factors 
as noise, dust, traffic levels and vibration…based on Provincial standards, regulations and 
guidelines…” (Town of Caledon, 2004b, p. 5-123).  
The original official plan amendment also included a requirement to demonstrate need for 
an extraction operation. This was negotiated out of OPA 161 during the Ontario Municipal 
Board settlement process. According to one interviewee, the Town wanted the requirement to 
consider need because, based on its previous experience with the aggregates industry, pits and 
quarries were being opened and closed without proper regard to rehabilitation. From the Town’s 
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point of view, a requirement to consider need would help to curb the rehabilitation problem. The 
industry and the Province, however, argued that there is always a need for aggregate, especially 
in light of the Province’s population growth forecasts and urban densification targets. According 
to one interviewee representing the aggregates industry, more and higher quality aggregates are 
required for the Province’s aim to grow up instead of out. Moreover, need is closely tied to 
demand. The aggregates industry, then, is merely responding to the demand from Municipalities 
and developers for roads and homes, etc. Thirdly, according to this industry representative, 
sources for high quality aggregate close to demand are disappearing quickly. Producers are 
starting to have to go farther and farther from the demand to access the resource. There is, 
therefore, a need to excavate the remaining resources close to demand. Plus, the foundation for 
the rejection of the requirement to demonstrate need was well established over fifteen years 
earlier. In 1986, the Ontario Municipal Board made a precedent setting decision in an aggregate 
extraction related Ontario Municipal Board hearing in the Township of Puslinch. The Board 
decided that the Planning Act prohibits any concept of “need” for aggregate resources (Planning 
& Engineering Initiatives Ltd. & Associates, 1998, page 59).  
Aside from these contentious issues, Caledon’s Ontario Municipal Board approved OPA 
161 met the Provincial Policy Statement’s core requirements for aggregate policies to protect 
aggregate resources from incompatible land uses, to allow as much of the resource as is 
realistically possible to be made available for use, and to require progressive and final 
rehabilitation. The thirty-three-page amendment is divided into sections that set out policies in a 
level of detail and complexity that was not present before OPA 161. The “balance” and 
“preservation” ideas were carried over to OPA 161, although they were not translated to the 
same degree. In 1981, these ideas had been present as considerations in the approval of Official 
Plan Amendments to permit new aggregate operations. In OPA 161, however, preservation was 
deleted and balance is present only as an objective in the Town-Wide Aggregate Management 
Objectives section: the Town seeks to “ensure that the extraction of aggregate resources is 
undertaken in a balanced manner…which will recognize Caledon’s community character and 
social values over the short and long term” (Town of Caledon, 2004b, p. 5-105). Rural character 
was replaced with community character, indicating a change in Caledon’s identity and/or an 
attempt to broaden the interpretation of Caledon’s character beyond rural features. According to 
Konefat (2000), the Aggregate Producers’ Association of Ontario argued that the objectives 
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should be modified to ensure that community/social values were not given priority over the 
provincial interest in aggregate extraction.  
OPA 161 worked around the Regional Official Plan policies that allow aggregate 
operations within parts of the Greenlands system by stipulating that aggregate extraction would 
be prohibited in certain Environmental Policy Areas, some of which are located outside of the 
Core Greenlands area. But policies that allow extraction within some types of Environmental 
Policy Areas, subject to additional studies and informally higher standards of approval, have also 
been incorporated. Extraction is prohibited in kettle lakes and their catchments to protect surface 
and groundwater, and ecological functions and features. The Amendment also requires two 
different Extractive Industrial designations, one for above the water table (Extractive Industrial 
A) and one for below the water table (Extractive Industrial B) and a requirement to amend the 
plan to change an extraction operation from “A” to “B”. Konefat (2000) notes that the aggregate 
producers objected to this approach. Town planning staff, however, fought for this approach on 
the grounds that it would allow for appropriate assessment of impacts. Cumulative impacts are 
also considered by OPA 161, which sets out a requirement for the Town to conduct studies and 
address when appropriate the cumulative effects of new and expanded pits and quarries on 
Caledon’s communities and natural and cultural heritage. 
OPA 161 also requires the preparation of Rehabilitation Master Plans for the ten 
aggregate resources areas. The Town will request that consideration for area Rehabilitation 
Master Plans be included in the Ministry of Natural Resources’ conditions of licence and the 
Town will not approve an Official Plan Amendment to permit extraction until the applicant has 
shown that the application meets the intent of the Rehabilitation Master Plan. The rehabilitation 
policies state that the Town will assess existing extraction sites to determine the extent to which 
progressive rehabilitation is taking place, a function normally undertaken by Ministry of Natural 
Resources inspectors; and develop and maintain a database of existing and abandoned pits and 
quarries. The database will keep track of the progress of extraction, licence conditions 
compliance, extent of disturbed area, extent of rehabilitation, noise, dust, truck traffic, and 
effects on water resources and ecosystem integrity. According to one interviewee who is a Town 
planner, there is much resistance on the ground with respect to monitoring dust and noise. First, 
it is difficult to determine an acceptable level of dust. Second, there are technical difficulties in 
setting up monitoring systems on site. Third, there is a general attitude among operators that they 
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should not have to adhere to Caledon’s requirements because they are not required in other 
municipalities and because operators have never before had to adhere to them.  
According to one interviewee who was a planner for the Town of Caledon during this 
time, the potential social-ecological impacts of the Rockfort Quarry land use issue profoundly 
influenced the development of OPA 161. As the planners revised the policies, one eye was 
always kept on the implications that the policies would have on the Rockfort Quarry application. 
The Rockfort Quarry site, for example, is situated within a Reserve area, in the middle of the 
Credit River watershed. The site is nestled between the base of the Paris Moraine to the north 
and the Niagara Escarpment to the south. Adjacent to the site are two Areas of Natural and 
Scientific Interest and two Provincially Significant Wetlands are in the immediate vicinity. The 
Jefferson salamander, Western Chorus Frog, Blandings Turtle, and Butternut trees are among the 
species at risk living in the area. The proposal is for extraction to a depth of 23 to 39 meters (128 
feet) below the water table. One especially controversial aspect of the proposal includes the use 
of a grout curtain to reduce the flow of groundwater during extraction. Installation of the grout 
curtain involves drilling holes into the rock and then filling them with grout. The grout fills the 
holes and the natural fractures of the rock and then hardens to a solid, reducing water flow by 
reducing the hydraulic conductivity of the rock mass. According to one interviewee who lives in 
Caledon, residents who live near the site fear that the carcinogens in the grout will contaminate 
their well water. At a March 2009 public Town Council meeting, one Councilor argued that 
JDCL’s extraction proposal is a “Walkerton” crisis begging to happen. Moreover, there is also a 
high level of uncertainty associated with how the Rockfort site is connected to adjacent cold-
water fishery streams, wetlands and surface water features. During the development of OPA 161, 
then, the planners continually asked themselves, “Are we going to be able to achieve a proper 
evaluation of Rockfort with these policies?” They aimed to develop policies that would allow the 
Town to reject an application like Rockfort.  
 In November 2003, the Ontario Municipal Board hearing commenced about whether 
JDCL’s quarry application should be assessed under Caledon’s 1981 policies or the new policies 
enacted under OPA 161. The key appellants were JDCL, the Town of Caledon, the Region of 
Peel, the Niagara Escarpment Commission, and the Coalition. JDCL wanted the Ontario 
Municipal Board to enact the “Clergy Principle”, which is based on a long-standing 
interpretation of fairness at the Ontario Municipal Board. It rests on the notion that “every 
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applicant is entitled to have their application evaluated on the basis of the laws and policies that 
existed on the date that the application was made” (Ontario Municipal Board, 2003, p.1). 
According to JDCL, the Board should consider the new policies but not evaluate the application 
under the new policies. JDCL sought relief from the new, more stringent, study requirements, 
prioritization scheme, and transportation policies set out by OPA 161. The Town, Region, 
Niagara Escarpment Coalition, and Coalition of Concerned Citizens, however, insisted that the 
new policies should be determinative. They explicitly challenged the Clergy institution by 
arguing that it is a kind of procedural policy or practice as opposed to an absolute rule. Second, 
they argued that the formulation of OPA 161, in which JDCL was a participant, had started with 
the Caledon Community Resource Study, in which JDCL was also a participant. OPA 161 was a 
continuation of the Caledon Community Resource Study, which represented a new regime for 
aggregate management in Caledon. JDCL, therefore, was well aware of the changing local policy 
framework. But instead of embracing it, they resisted it. Third, they recognized the duty of the 
Board to balance private interests with public interests and so appealed to the Board’s “logic of 
appropriateness”:  
…Applying the most recent, more stringent policies would simply represent good 
planning as it is now known, understood and practiced…It will not be sufficient, 
in order to achieve an acceptable standard of planning and environmental 
management, to comply with the study requirement provided in the Town’s 1981 
Official Plan (Ontario Municipal Board, 2003, p. 7-10).   
 
In the end, the Board sided with the Town, agreeing that the Clergy principle is not a law 
or inviolate rule. Moreover, the Board decided for the Town that applying the Clergy principle in 
the Rockfort case would effectively ignore the appropriateness of current practices and policies 
in favour of 20-year-old policies. 
The Ontario Municipal Board’s November 2003 decision for the Town was a major 
milestone in the community’s campaign against the Rockfort quarry. As per the directives laid 
out in OPA 161 for aggregate extraction proposals in Reserve Areas, JDCL was required to 
update its site-specific studies and undertake a Comprehensive Broader Scale Environmental 
Study (CBSES). The company agreed to begin preparing the CBSES even though the status of 
the lands was still deferred. Major deficiencies have since been found in JDCL’s reports, 
especially with respect to hydrological studies and the Adaptive Water Management Plan. 
Overall, the predicted impacts of JDCL’s proposed project on water quality and quantity, 
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surrounding natural habitat, and hydrogeology have been determined to be unacceptable. As per 
the permission of OPA 161, then, the Niagara Escarpment Commission, Credit Valley 
Conservation Authority, Wellington County, Region of Peel, and the Town of Caledon have 
taken formal positions against JDCL’s application.  
The full Ontario Municipal Board hearing on the status of JDCL’s Official Plan and 
Zoning By-Law Amendments is scheduled to begin on September 15, 2009 and will take place 
over six weeks. Although many variables will undoubtedly contribute to the final outcome of the 
Ontario Municipal Board hearing, in many ways JDCL’s Rockfort Quarry application has been a 
good test of OPA 161. The proof with respect to OPA 161’s capacity to protect community 
interests from such applications in Reserve Areas is in the fact that the major local players were 
able to reject the Rockfort application based on their dissatisfaction with the CBSES and other 
studies. Because the Provincial Policy Statement and the Ontario Planning Act favour aggregate 
extraction over other land uses, however, Caledon’s policies are vulnerable to Ontario Municipal 
Board decisions.  
According to interviewees representing the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
and Caledon planning staff, OPA 161 has affected and continues to impact the aggregate 
resources policies of other Municipalities in the GGH Region. One of the key planners involved 
in developing OPA 161, for example, now works in Woolwich Township in the Region of 
Waterloo. This planner has incorporated Caledon’s OPA 161 policies that distinguish between 
above and below water table extraction and associated study requirements into Woolwich’s 
Official Plan. Because the Region of Waterloo is currently undertaking a review of its ROP, this 
planner is attempting to influence the Regional-level aggregate extraction policies, especially 
with respect to ensuring that the Region’s HPMARA map is clearly an identification tool as 
opposed to a designation tool. According to a planner for the Town of Caledon, the County of 
Wellington Planning Committee has asked Caledon’s planners to do a presentation on OPA 161 
to explain the policies to them. According to one interviewee who represents the Province, other 
such major aggregate supplying municipalities as Clarington in the Region of Durham, and the 
Township of Oro-Medonte in Grey County are currently reviewing Caledon’s approach.  Any 
diffusion of Caledon’s mineral resources policies may contribute to progress towards 
sustainability across local to provincial scales. OPA 161 is examined in light of requirements for 
progress towards local, regional, and provincial sustainability, below.  
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CHAPTER 6: OPA 161 and progress towards sustainability 
6.1 Introduction and methods 
This chapter analyses Caledon’s OPA 161 for steps towards local-to-provincial 
sustainability. Since the rise to popularity of the concept of sustainability in the mid 1980s, many 
governments, businesses, and civil society organizations around the world have officially 
embraced it, though not clearly on the basis of a widely shared understanding of the concept or 
its implications. There are many theoretical and practical approaches to understanding and 
pursuing sustainability. Dobson’s (1996) review and typology, for example, found more than 300 
definitions of the concept, ranging from “weak” to “eco-centric” views. This has led some 
scholars to argue that the concept is still dangerously vague (eg. Mebratu, 1998; Faber et al., 
2005). Gibson et al. (2005), however, argue that after two decades of deliberation and experience 
common concerns and principles are now discernible.  
This study adopts Gibson et al.’s (2005) essentials of the concept of sustainability. They 
were derived from a thorough review of the theoretical literature. The essentials that Gibson et 
al. chose for their understanding are underpinned by their intention to delineate “…those that lie 
at the core of the idea and that should inform its application anywhere” (p. 59). They are rooted 
in the origins of the concept and are apparent in a variety of interpretations. Box 4, below, 
depicts Gibson et al.’s essentials of the concept of sustainability.  
 
Box 4. The essential elements of the concept of sustainability  
(Gibson et al., 2005, p. 62) 
 
The concept of sustainability is: 
• a challenge to conventional thinking and practice; 
• about long- as well as short-term well-being; 
• comprehensive, covering all the core issues of decision making; 
• a recognition of links and interdependencies, especially between humans and the 
biophysical foundations for life; 
• embedded in a world of complexity and surprise, in which precautionary approaches are 
necessary;  
• a recognition of both inviolable limits and endless opportunities for creative innovation; 
• about an open-ended process, not a state; 
• about intertwined means and ends – culture and governance as well as ecology, society 
and economy; 




Based on these essential elements and an examination of various applications of 
sustainability around the world, Gibson et al. (2005) developed a set of core decision-making 
criteria for sustainability. Individually and as a whole, these criteria describe what is required for 
progress towards sustainability. They represent the full range of social, economic, political, and 
ecological concerns that influence the long-term well being of social-ecological systems. Box 5, 
below, depicts Gibson et al.’s core decision-making criteria for sustainability. 
 
Box 5. Core decision-making criteria for sustainability  
(Gibson et al., 2005, p.116) 
 
Socio-ecological system integrity: 
Build human-ecological relations to establish and maintain the long-term integrity of socio-
biophysical systems and protect the irreplaceable life support functions upon which human as 
well as ecological well-being depends. 
 
Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity: 
Ensure that everyone and every community has enough for a decent life and that everyone has 
opportunities to seek improvements in ways that do not compromise future generations’ 
possibilities for sufficiency and opportunity. 
 
Intragenerational equity: 
Ensure that sufficiency and effective choices for all are pursued in ways that reduce dangerous 
gaps in sufficiency and opportunity (and health, security, social recognition, political influence, 
etc.) between the rich and the poor. 
 
Intergenerational equity: 
Favour present options and actions that are most likely to preserve or enhance the opportunities 
and capabilities of future generations to live sustainably. 
 
Resource maintenance and efficiency: 
Provide a larger base for ensuring sustainable livelihoods for all while reducing threats to the 
long-term integrity of socio-ecological systems by reducing extractive damage, avoiding waste 
and cutting overall material and energy use per unit of benefit. 
 
Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance: 
Build the capacity, motivation and habitual inclination of individuals, communities and other 
collective decision making bodies to apply sustainability requirements through more open and 
better informed deliberations, greater attention to fostering reciprocal awareness and collective 
responsibility, and more integrated use of administrative, market, customary and personal 
decision making practices. 
 106 
 
Precaution and adaptation: 
Respect uncertainty, avoid even poorly understood risks of serious or irreversible damage to the 
foundations for sustainability, plan to learn, design for surprise and manage for adaptation. 
 
Immediate and long-term integration: 





For practical applications, Gibson et al.’s criteria need to be specified for the particular 
context, in this case the current institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in southern 
Ontario. For this purpose, context-specific factors were drawn from the broadly felt impacts of 
the institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the 
institutional system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system. 
These factors were categorized appropriately under the sustainability criteria. Caledon’s OPA 
161 was then evaluated against this context specific set of sustainability requirements. The 
results illustrate the strengths and insufficiencies of OPA 161 with respect to progress towards 
sustainability at the local and provincial scales. OPA 161 was then compared with Caledon’s 
older, 1981 Cabinet Corners policies in order to investigate the extent to which the Amendment 
represents institutional change towards sustainability.  
 
6.2 Broadly felt benefits and negative impacts of the current institutional system guiding 
aggregate extraction in southern Ontario 
 Box 6, below, summarizes a specification of the criteria in light of the major, broadly felt, 
benefits and negative impacts of the current institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in 
southern Ontario. The points below each criterion were derived mainly from secondary sources, 
including peer reviewed, academic journal articles, and reports published by nongovernmental 
environmental organizations, and provincial, municipal, and regional governments. Interviews 
with the key players involved in the development of OPA 161 also revealed many of the benefits 




Box 6. Broadly felt benefits and negative impacts of aggregate extraction under the current 
regime 
 
Socio-ecological system integrity: 
• Loss and degradation of natural habitat (Winfield & Taylor, 20005) 
• Loss and degradation of form and function of hydrological and hydrogeological systems 
(Winfield & Taylor, 20005) 
• Loss and degradation of surface and groundwater quality and quantity (Winfield & Taylor, 
2005) 
• Inadequacy of progressive and final rehabilitation (Gravel Watch, 2006) 
• Air pollution (especially dust and CO2 emissions from trucks) (Huntzinger & Eatmon, 2009) 
• Higher cumulative effects due to lack of phasing in of extraction operations (e.g. many pits 
are allowed to operate at once, before others close and before rehabilitation is finished) 
• Rehabilitation of pits and quarries to other productive land uses, with social and ecological 
benefits (Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, 2006) 
 
Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity: 
• Costs of road construction and maintenance of haul routes (Dorfman, 2009) 
• Costs of damage to cultural and natural heritage (e.g. hydrological and hydrogeological 
systems, surface water quality and quantity) (Centre for Spatial Economics, 2009) 
• Costs of damage to private property and property values (Centre for Spatial Economics, 
2009) 
• Costs of administration and conflict resolution (e.g. legal and consultant fees)  
• Loss of use of prime agricultural land for food production (K. Smart Associates, 2008) 
• Priority given to aggregate extraction over other land uses (Winfield & Taylor, 2005) 
• Local employment opportunities (Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, 2006b) 
• More affordable building and infrastructure construction (Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel 
Association, 2006b) 
• Tax revenues and economic multiplier effects from the industry and its employees (Ontario 
Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, 2006b) 
 
Intragenerational equity: 
• Local communities must deal with all immediate and cumulative effects (noise, vibrations, 
dust, truck traffic, safety and health issues)  
• Insufficient licence and permit fees (Toronto Environmental Alliance, 2009) 
• Centralized regulation of the industry by the industry and the provincial government (Baker 
et al., 2001) 
 
Intergenerational equity: 
• Inadequacy of progressive and final rehabilitation  
• Higher cumulative effects due to lack of phasing in of extraction operations (e.g. many pits 
are allowed to operate at once, before others close and before rehabilitation is finished) 
• Loss of natural and cultural heritage resources  
• Loss of use of prime agricultural land for food production 
• Depletion of a valuable resource (aggregates near urban demand) 
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Resource maintenance and efficiency: 
• Inadequacy of progressive and final rehabilitation  
• Absence of aggregates demand management (Toronto Environmental Alliance, 2009) 
• Facilitation of urban and suburban sprawl 
• Lower GHG emissions with short fun aggregates transportation 
• Rehabilitation of pits and quarries to other productive land uses, with social and ecological 
benefits  
 
Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance: 
• Lack of funding for individual intervenors in Ontario Municipal Board hearings (Ontario 
Greenbelt Alliance, 2007) 
• Insufficient time allotted for public comment on site plans and reports (Ontario Greenbelt 
Alliance, 2007) 
• Lack of transparency with respect to the amount of aggregate produced/pit or quarry 
(Toronto Environmental Alliance, 2009) 
• Centralized regulation of the industry by the industry and the provincial government 
• Lack of public participation in decision making 
• Priority to aggregate extraction land uses reinforced by Provincial Policy Statement and 
Planning Act (Winfield & Taylor, 2005) 
• Insufficient Ministry of Natural Resources staffing and expertise to inspect sites 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2007) 
• Insufficient funding for the Ministry of Natural Resources to administer the aggregate 
resources program (e.g. site inspection) (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2007) 
 
Precaution and adaptation: 
• Use of unproven technologies to mitigate negative impacts of extraction (e.g. grout curtain) 
• Insufficient understanding of the complex biophysical systems affected by aggregate 
extraction and the long-term cumulative impacts of aggregate extraction 
 
Immediate and long-term integration: 
• Little integration of aggregates sustainability considerations in overall growth management 
planning 
• Limited explicit attention to trade-offs 
 
 
The vision for “Green Gravel” advanced by many advocates of sustainability has 
emerged out of the context of the above, broadly felt benefits and negative impacts of the 
prevailing institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in southern Ontario.  
 
6.3 Green Gravel: An alternative vision for aggregate extraction in Ontario 
As previously described in section 5.4, other jurisdictions (e.g., United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Denmark) provide excellent illustrations of alternative institutional frameworks for 
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aggregate resources (see Winfield & Taylor, 2005). This study focuses on priorities for Green 
Gravel in Ontario, which have been set out by the Ontario Greenbelt Alliance (2007) and 
Toronto Environmental Alliance (2009). Winfield and Taylor’s recommendations for an 
aggregate conservation strategy in Ontario are also considered here. As previously described, 
Green Gravel objectives represent some of the local-to-provincial changes that are required to 
reform the prevailing institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in Ontario. The vision for 
Green Gravel essentially seeks a reorientation of the current legislative framework away from its 
current position of allowing unfettered access to the resource close to market. Among other 
things, it would reduce the demand for the resource, maximize the use of recycled materials, 
extend broader participation in the management of the resource, and increase the transparency of 
and access to production data and demand forecasts. The vision for Green Gravel proposes the 
following: 
• lift regulatory barriers to the use of recycled materials;  
• develop and implement Provincial laws, policies, strategies, etc. that encourage 
infrastructure and building design standards that reduce the need for aggregates; 
• implement Provincial policies and guidelines, strategies, etc. for the use of recycled 
materials for Provincial and Municipal projects (e.g. a comprehensive conservation 
strategy based on the 3Rs, including changes in MTO and Municipal highway 
specifications); 
• modify the Provincial Policy Statement to prohibit aggregate extraction in prime 
agricultural lands, natural heritage, and source water areas; 
• amend the Greenbelt, Oak Ridges Moraine, and Niagara Escarpment Acts and Plans to 
prohibit new aggregate extraction in these designated areas, and the Class I, II, and III 
agricultural lands adjacent or contiguous to them; 
• strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act to require at least 50% of rehabilitation in one 
licenced area before the expansion of an existing operation or a new operation by the 
same owner in a particular Municipality can occur;  
• phase in new extraction operations so that existing licences are optimized before new 
licences are granted; 
• allow more time in addition to the 45 days provided by the Aggregate Resources Act for 
public review of licence and permit applications; 
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• provide intervenor funding for the application review process; 
• increase public access to application documents (site plans, technical reports, background 
studies, etc.); 
• impose higher charges for extraction (to promote efficient use of the resource, fund the 
implementation of a conservation strategy, and to help to internalize the costs of impacts) 
• eliminate perpetual licences and permits and unlimited annual tonnage allowances; 
• increase capacity of the Ministry of Natural Resources to conduct inspections and 
increase the frequency of inspections; 
• require greener modes of transport of the resource (boat, barge, rail); 
• introduce mandatory standards and monitoring for dust and carbon dioxide; and 
• create an independent Provincial authority to collect and maintain publicly accessible 
production statistics and forecasts of future demand and supply. 
 
The extent to which institutional change towards sustainability has occurred in Caledon’s 
OPA 161 policies depends, in part, on the extent to which they help to achieve this vision for 
Green Gravel. The above Green Gravel priorities represent progress towards sustainability in 
many areas. Box 7, below, summarizes a specification of the criteria in light of the contributions 
of Green Gravel to Gibson et al.’s sustainability requirements. 
 
Box 7. Contributions of Green Gravel to progress towards sustainability 
 
Socio-ecological system integrity: 
• Modify the Provincial Policy Statement to prohibit aggregate extraction in prime 
agricultural lands, natural heritage, and source water areas 
• Amend the Greenbelt, Oak Ridges Moraine, and Niagara Escarpment Acts and Plans to 
prohibit new aggregate extraction in these designated areas, and the Class I, II, and III 
agricultural lands adjacent or contiguous to them 
• Strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act to require at least 50% of rehabilitation in one 
licenced area before the expansion of an existing operation or a new operation by the 
same owner in a particular Municipality can occur 
• Require greener modes of transport of the resource (boat, barge, rail) 
• Introduce mandatory standards and monitoring for dust and carbon dioxide 
 
Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity: 
• Impose higher charges for extraction (to promote efficient use of the resource, fund the 




• Allow more time in addition to the 45 days provided by the Aggregate Resources Act for 
public review of licence and permit applications 
• Provide intervenor funding for the application review process 
• Impose higher charges for extraction (to promote efficient use of the resource, fund the 
implementation of a conservation strategy, and to help to internalize the costs of impacts) 
 
Intergenerational equity: 
• Modify the Provincial Policy Statement to prohibit aggregate extraction in prime 
agricultural lands, natural heritage, and source water areas 
• Amend the Greenbelt, Oak Ridges Moraine, and Niagara Escarpment Acts and Plans to 
prohibit new aggregate extraction in these designated areas, and the Class I, II, and III 
agricultural lands adjacent or contiguous to them 
• Impose higher charges for extraction (to promote efficient use of the resource, fund the 
implementation of a conservation strategy, and to help to internalize the costs of impacts) 
 
Resource maintenance and efficiency: 
• Develop and implement provincial laws, policies, strategies, etc. that encourage 
infrastructure and building design standards that reduce the need for aggregates 
• Implement provincial policies and guidelines, strategies, etc. for the use of recycled 
materials for provincial and municipal projects (e.g. a comprehensive conservation 
strategy based on the 3Rs, including changes in MTO and municipal highway 
specifications) 
• Strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act to require at least 50% of rehabilitation in one 
licenced area before the expansion of an existing operation or a new operation by the 
same owner in a particular Municipality can occur 
• Eliminate perpetual licences and permits and unlimited annual tonnage allowances 
• Phase in new extraction operations so that existing licences are optimized before new 
licences are granted 
• Impose higher charges for extraction (to promote efficient use of the resource, fund the 
implementation of a conservation strategy, and to help to internalize the costs of impacts) 
• Require greener modes of transport of the resource (boat, barge, rail) 
 
Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance: 
• Allow more time in addition to the 45 days provided by the Aggregate Resources Act for 
public review of licence and permit applications 
• Provide intervenor funding for the application review process 
• Increase public access to application documents (site plans, technical reports, background 
studies, etc.) 
• Increase capacity of the Ministry of Natural Resources to conduct inspections and 
increase the frequency of inspections 
• Create an independent provincial authority to collect and maintain publicly accessible 
production statistics and forecasts of future demand and supply 
 
Precaution and adaptation: 
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• Create an independent provincial authority to collect and maintain publicly accessible 
production statistics and forecasts of future demand and supply 
• Introduce mandatory standards and monitoring for dust and carbon dioxide 
 
Immediate and long-term integration: 
• Lift regulatory barriers to the use of recycled materials  
• Develop and implement provincial laws, policies, strategies, etc. that encourage 
infrastructure and building design standards that reduce the need for aggregates 
• Implement provincial policies and guidelines, strategies, etc. for the use of recycled 
materials for provincial and municipal projects (e.g. a comprehensive conservation 
strategy based on the 3Rs, including changes in MTO and Municipal highway 
specifications) 
• Create an independent provincial authority to collect and maintain publicly accessible 
production statistics and forecasts of future demand and supply 
• Increase capacity of the Ministry of Natural Resources to conduct inspections and 
increase the frequency of inspections 
 
 
An in-depth sustainability assessment of Green Gravel priorities is beyond the scope of 
this study. Briefly, as illustrated above, Green Gravel priorities take significant steps towards 
sustainability at the local and provincial scales. In particular, the objectives to amend the 
Aggregate Resources Act and the Provincial Policy Statement, etc., and implement higher fees 
for extraction take steps towards protecting and enhancing Socio-Ecological System Integrity, 
Livelihood Sufficiency and Opportunity, and Inter- and Intragenerational Equity. Also, many 
Green Gravel objectives (e.g. regulated use of recycled aggregates, increase in extraction fees, 
conservation strategy, infrastructure and building design standards, greener modes of transport, 
more stringent rehabilitation requirements) take immediate steps towards Resource Maintenance 
and Efficiency. Intervenor funding, more time for public review, increased public accessibility to 
application documents, increased capacity of the Ministry of Natural Resources to conduct 
inspections, and the creation of an independent provincial authority to collect and maintain 
publicly accessible production statistics address most of the broadly felt impacts under the 
Social-Ecological Civility and Democratic Governance criterion. Green Gravel objectives, 
however, do not take significant steps towards fulfilling the Precaution and Adaptation 
sustainability requirement. The vision for Green Gravel, for example, does not consider the risks 
associated with some of the technologies that proponents of extraction propose to use to mitigate 
certain environmental impacts. Many of these technologies (e.g. grout curtain) are unproven 
and/or have no long-term performance track record. Additionally, although they require more 
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transparency with respect to publicly accessible application documents, they do not fully address 
the need for a better understanding of the complex biophysical systems affected by aggregate 
extraction and the long-term cumulative impacts of aggregate extraction. Funded research on 
immediate, long term, and cumulative impacts would address this need.  
Regardless of these weaknesses, realization of the above Green Gravel priorities would 
cause a “cascading effect” through the prevailing institutional system. Among other effects, the 
proposed changes to the Greenbelt Act and Plan, and consultation process would force a change 
in the Aggregate Resources Act, Provincial Policy Statement and Regional and Municipal 
Official Plans. Relationships between stakeholders and the balance of power would shift from 
the industry and the provincial government to the province and the general public. Pressure for 
alternative transportation methods and to prohibit extraction in the Greenbelt, Niagara 
Escarpment, and Oak Ridges Moraine areas would chip away at the “unfettered access to the 
resource close to demand” norm that has existed since the 1960s. Changes in building standards 
would impact sectors beyond the aggregates industry, notably developers. For major aggregate 
producing Towns like Caledon, these changes would decrease the number of pits and quarries 
operating within their jurisdiction at one time and reduce the pressure that extraction operations 
exert on surrounding social-ecological systems. 
 
6.4 OPA 161 and progress towards local to provincial sustainability 
 Caledon’s OPA 161 was evaluated against a set of context specific evaluation criteria. 
They integrate attention to Gibson et al.’s (2005) basic generic sustainability objectives, the 
above-described broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the institutional system; 
current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional system; and Green 
Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system. Box 8, below, summarizes the 
context specific criteria. Some overlap among the categories has been retained to illustrate the 
interconnected nature of sustainability requirements. Intervenor funding for the application 
review process for extraction operations, for example, would take steps towards multiple 
sustainability objectives. An asterisk (*) marks the Green Gravel priorities for reform of the 
provincial institutional system. They are marked in order to emphasize the criteria that, if 
addressed by OPA 161, represent steps towards sustainability at the provincial scale. 
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Box 8. Sustainability assessment criteria specified for the case and context of the 
institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in southern Ontario 
 
Socio-ecological system integrity 
 
How does OPA 161 address the following broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the 
institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional 
system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system? 
 
• Loss and degradation of natural habitat (Winfield & Taylor, 20005) 
• Loss and degradation of form and function of hydrological and hydrogeological systems 
(Winfield & Taylor, 20005) 
• Loss and degradation of surface and groundwater quality and quantity (Winfield & Taylor, 
2005) 
• Air pollution (especially dust and CO2 emissions from trucks)  
• Loss of farmland for food production (K. Smart Associates, 2008) 
• Inadequacy of progressive and final rehabilitation (Gravel Watch, 2006) 
• Higher cumulative effects due to lack of phasing in of extraction operations (e.g. many pits 
are allowed to operate at once, before others close and before rehabilitation is finished) 
• Rehabilitation of pits and quarries to other productive land uses, with social and ecological 
benefits (Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, 2006) 
• *Modify the Provincial Policy Statement to prohibit aggregate extraction in prime 
agricultural lands, natural heritage, and source water areas 
• *Amend the Greenbelt, Oak Ridges Moraine, and Niagara Escarpment Acts and Plans to 
prohibit new aggregate extraction in these designated areas, and the Class I, II, and III 
agricultural lands adjacent or contiguous to them 
• *Introduce mandatory standards and monitoring for dust and carbon dioxide 
• *Strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act to require at least 50% of rehabilitation in one 
licenced area before the expansion of an existing operation or a new operation by the same 
owner in a particular Municipality can occur 




Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity 
 
How does OPA 161 address the following broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the 
institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional 
system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system? 
 
• Costs of road construction and maintenance of haul routes (Dorfman, 2009) 
• Costs of damage to cultural and natural heritage (e.g. hydrological and hydrogeological 
systems, surface water quality and quantity) (Centre for Spatial Economics, 2009) 
• Costs of damage to private property and property values (Centre for Spatial Economics, 
2009) 
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• Costs of administration and conflict resolution (e.g. legal and consultant fees)  
• Loss of use of prime agricultural land for food production (K. Smart Associates, 2008) 
• Priority given to aggregate extraction over other land uses (Winfield & Taylor, 2005) 
• Insufficient licence and permit fees 
• Local employment opportunities (Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, 2006b) 
• More affordable building and infrastructure construction (Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel 
Association, 2006b) 
• Tax revenues and economic multiplier effects from the industry and its employees (Ontario 
Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, 2006b) 
• *Impose higher charges for extraction (to promote efficient use of the resource, fund the 
implementation of a conservation strategy, and to help to internalize the costs of impacts) 





How does OPA 161 address the following broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the 
institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional 
system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system? 
 
• Local communities must deal with all immediate and cumulative effects (noise, vibrations, 
dust, truck traffic, safety and health issues)  
• Insufficient licence and permit fees (Toronto Environmental Alliance, 2009) 





How does OPA 161 address the following broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the 
institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional 
system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system? 
 
• Inadequacy of progressive and final rehabilitation  
• Higher cumulative effects due to lack of phasing in of extraction operations (e.g. many pits 
are allowed to operate at once, before others close and before rehabilitation is finished) 
• Loss of natural and cultural heritage resources  
• Loss of use of prime agricultural land for food production 
• Depletion of a valuable resource (aggregates near urban demand) 
• *Modify the Provincial Policy Statement to prohibit aggregate extraction in prime 
agricultural lands, natural heritage, and source water areas 
• *Amend the Greenbelt, Oak Ridges Moraine, and Niagara Escarpment Acts and Plans to 
prohibit new aggregate extraction in these designated areas, and the Class I, II, and III 
agricultural lands adjacent or contiguous to them 
• *Impose higher charges for extraction (to promote efficient use of the resource, fund the 




Resource maintenance and efficiency 
 
How does OPA 161 address the following broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the 
institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional 
system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system? 
 
• Inadequacy of progressive and final rehabilitation  
• Absence of aggregates demand management (Toronto Environmental Alliance, 2009) 
• Facilitation of urban and suburban sprawl 
• Lower GHG emissions with short run aggregates transportation 
• Rehabilitation of pits and quarries to other productive land uses, with social and ecological 
benefits 
• *Develop and implement provincial laws, policies, strategies, etc. that encourage 
infrastructure and building design standards that reduce the need for aggregates 
• *Implement provincial policies and guidelines, strategies, etc. for the use of recycled 
materials for provincial and municipal projects (e.g. a comprehensive conservation strategy 
based on the 3Rs, including changes in MTO and municipal highway specifications) 
• *Strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act to require at least 50% of rehabilitation in one 
licenced area before the expansion of an existing operation or a new operation by the same 
owner in a particular Municipality can occur 
• *Eliminate perpetual licences and permits and unlimited annual tonnage allowances 
• *Phase in new extraction operations so that existing licences are optimized before new 
licences are granted 
• *Impose higher charges for extraction (to promote efficient use of the resource, fund the 
implementation of a conservation strategy, and to help to internalize the costs of impacts) 
• *Require greener modes of transport of the resource 
 
 
Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance 
 
How does OPA 161 address the following broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the 
institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional 
system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system? 
 
• Lack of transparency with respect to the amount of aggregate produced/pit or quarry 
(Toronto Environmental Alliance, 2009) 
• Centralized regulation of the industry by the industry and the provincial government 
• Lack of public participation in decision making 
• Priority to aggregate extraction land uses reinforced by Provincial Policy Statement and 
Planning Act (Winfield & Taylor, 2005) 
• Insufficient Ministry of Natural Resources staffing and expertise to inspect sites 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2007) 
• Insufficient funding for the Ministry of Natural Resources to administer the aggregate 
resources program (e.g. site inspection) (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2007) 
• *Allow more time in addition to the 45 days provided by the Aggregate Resources Act for 
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public review of licence and permit applications 
• *Intervenor funding for the application review process 
• *Increased public accessibility to application documents (site plans, technical reports, 
background studies, etc.) 
• *Increased capacity of the Ministry of Natural Resources to conduct inspections and increase 
the frequency of inspections 
• *Creation of an independent provincial authority to collect and maintain publicly accessible 
production statistics and forecasts of future demand and supply 
 
 
Precaution and adaptation 
 
How does OPA 161 address the following broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the 
institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional 
system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system? 
 
• Use of unproven technologies to mitigate negative impacts of extraction (e.g. grout curtain) 
• Insufficient understanding of the complex biophysical systems affected by aggregate 
extraction and the long-term cumulative impacts of aggregate extraction 
• *Creation of an independent provincial authority to collect and maintain publicly accessible 
production statistics and forecasts of future demand and supply 
• *Introduce mandatory standards and monitoring for dust and carbon dioxide 
 
 
Immediate and long-term integration 
 
How does OPA 161 address the following broadly felt, negative social-ecological impacts of the 
institutional system; current provincial and industry claims about the benefits of the institutional 
system; and Green Gravel priorities for reform of the provincial institutional system? 
 
• Little integration of aggregates sustainability considerations in overall growth management 
planning 
• Limited explicit attention to trade-offs 
• *Lift regulatory barriers to the use of recycled materials  
• *Develop and implement provincial laws, policies, strategies, etc. that encourage 
infrastructure and building design standards that reduce the need for aggregates 
• *Implement provincial policies and guidelines, strategies, etc. for the use of recycled 
materials for provincial and municipal projects (e.g. a comprehensive conservation strategy 
based on the 3Rs, including changes in MTO and Municipal highway specifications) 
• *Create an independent provincial authority to collect and maintain publicly accessible 
production statistics and forecasts of future demand and supply 
• *Increase capacity of the Ministry of Natural Resources to conduct inspections and increase 





Results indicate that OPA 161’s greatest steps towards local sustainability are in 
protecting and enhancing Social-Ecological System Integrity (see Appendix C, Table 2). This 
reflects the Town’s intention to develop policies that would protect the natural and cultural 
heritage resources that are so vital to its socioeconomic and cultural identity. Key policies in this 
regard include the prioritization policies, policies that allow approval authorities to reject an 
application based on unacceptable impacts, comprehensive study requirements for applications 
in Resource and Reserve areas and other Environmental Policy Areas, two Extractive Industrial 
designations, prohibition of extraction in Core Areas of Peel’s Greenlands system, kettle lakes 
and their catchments; monitoring requirements, and Rehabilitation Master Plan requirements. 
These policies addressed many of the locally felt negative impacts of pits and quarries in this 
category (e.g. loss and degradation of natural habitat, hydrological and hydrogeological systems, 
groundwater quality). However, they did not address most of the provincial-scale sustainability 
objectives in this category, notably modification of the Provincial Policy Statement and other 
such land use planning laws and policies as the Greenbelt Act and Plan, etc., and mandatory 
standards and monitoring of carbon dioxide. Current provincial legislative constraints and a lack 
of direction from the province on certain sustainability priorities for aggregate extraction and 
consumption stand as major roadblocks to more substantive progress towards local-to-provincial 
sustainability in this category. Moreover, in developing OPA 161, key stakeholders were 
understandably most concerned with the local social-ecological impacts of aggregate extraction 
operations. 
It should be noted too that the strength of OPA 161’s prioritization scheme in the above-
mentioned and other sustainability requirements is more informal than formal. OPA 161 allows 
for extraction in both Resource and Reserve areas and in other Environmental Policy Areas. 
However, applications for extraction in Reserve areas and other Environmental Policy Areas are 
subject to additional, more onerous and costly study requirements, and informally higher 
standards for approval. The prioritization scheme and additional study requirements, then, may 
help to establish an unwritten code of conduct among Town and industry players based on the 
understanding that if a proponent of an aggregate development applies for a license to quarry in a 
Resource area, he or she will have a far easier time in getting approval than if the proponent 
applies for a license in a Reserve area or Environmental Policy Area. Moreover, if prioritization 
is successful, many existing and new pits and quarries located in resource areas will have had 
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more time to undergo progressive and final rehabilitation before extraction occurs in Reserve 
areas.  
By extension, the above-mentioned key policies take some steps towards protecting and 
enhancing local livelihood sufficiency and opportunity and intra- and intergenerational equity. 
Notably, if the above policies are successful, some of the external costs of aggregate extraction 
operations will be reduced in Caledon (costs of road construction, damage to private property). 
Also, the requirement for proponents to pay for the costs of an independent peer review of 
reports reduces the administrative costs associated with the review process, and by extension, 
protects and enhances these sustainability requirements in Caledon. Many broadly felt negative 
impacts and provincial-scale sustainability objectives in these categories, however, remain 
unaddressed by OPA 161. Notably, OPA 161 did not address the loss of use of prime agricultural 
land for food production, insufficient licence and permit fees, lack of intervenor funding for the 
application review process, and the need for higher charges for extraction. Moreover, the above 
policies do not change the nature of aggregate extraction operations. The predicted and 
unpredicted impacts of a pit below the water table, for example, will exist regardless of the 
quality and quantity of required studies. In this way, the above policies can only reduce the 
negative impacts of extraction by avoiding them. The benefits of extraction in these 
sustainability categories (e.g. local employment opportunities) were also unaddressed. Again, 
current provincial legislative constraints and a lack of direction from the province on 
sustainability priorities for the management of prime aggregate resources stand as roadblocks to 
more substantive progress towards local-to-provincial sustainability in these categories. 
Moreover, OPA 161’s lack of progress towards sustainability beyond Caledon reveals the 
Town’s preoccupation with local concerns, especially to protect valued natural and cultural 
heritage. It may also reveal a lack of awareness of broader social equity issues. Indeed, the 
concept of sustainability, as it is defined by this study, did not explicitly guide the development 
of OPA 161. 
 For similar reasons, again, OPA 161 did not contribute significantly to Gibson et al.’s 
Resource Maintenance and Efficiency, and Social-Ecological Civility and Democratic 
Governance sustainability criteria. Notably, with respect to efficient use of aggregates, OPA 161 
does not facilitate the development of an aggregates demand management strategy for Caledon. 
Nor does it develop policies that encourage infrastructure and building design standards that 
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reduce the need for aggregates. If successful, the prioritization policies, however, may enhance 
resource maintenance and efficiency by phasing in extraction operations and allowing more time 
for rehabilitation.  
OPA 161 takes some steps towards facilitating more public participation in the 
application review process. One key policy in this regard is the requirement for a pre-submission 
consultation meeting with the proponent and other relevant approval agencies. Prior to OPA 161, 
proponents could submit their Official Plan and Zoning By-Law amendment application 
packages without first consulting with the municipality about potentially important community 
concerns. Now, there will presumably be more direct communication between the Town and the 
aggregates industry with respect to unacceptable impacts, study requirements and standards. This 
pre-consultation requirement is underpinned by the Town’s desire to maintain some control over 
the management of the resource, protect valued natural and cultural heritage, and maintain a 
balanced approach to land use planning and natural resource management.  
Another key policy that takes steps towards facilitating more public participation in the 
application review process is the requirement to make all reports and detailed site plans available 
to the public. One interviewee who is a member of the Coalition of Concerned Citizens asserts 
that access to site plans and reports is essential in that it helps to educate the public about the 
impacts of extraction and the biophysical systems that will be affected by a particular extraction 
operation. The Coalition, for example, has borrowed information from JDCL’s reports in order to 
highlight unacceptable impacts through peer reviews. One effect of publicly accessible site plans 
and reports, then, is to empower concerned citizens in their efforts to protect valued community 
assets. Again, due to provincial legislative constraints, OPA 161 cannot take steps towards 
provincial-scale objectives to extend broader participation in the centralized regulation of the 
industry, empowering the Ministry of Natural Resources to better administer the Aggregate 
Resources Program through increased funding for site inspections and enforcement, and 
increasing the transparency in the amount of aggregate produced per pit or quarry. The Ontario 
Aggregate Resources Corporation, for example, publishes yearly production statistics but 
municipalities cannot ask individual site operators for monthly production records due to 
corporate privacy laws.  
OPA 161’s comprehensive study requirements may over the long-term take steps towards 
a better understanding of the immediate and cumulative social and biophysical impacts of pits 
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and quarries. This understanding may help to facilitate a more precautionary and adaptive 
approach in the management of aggregate resources. The requirement for two Extractive 
Industrial designations, one for above the water table and one for below the water table, 
encourages a more adaptive approach to management. If an operator, for example, applies for an 
extension of an existing pit to below the water table, an additional Zoning By-Law amendment 
and additional studies are required. Depending on the information provided by the studies, under 
OPA 161 the extension may not be approved. Also, OPA 161’s approval policies allow for the 
rejection of projects that involve high levels of uncertainty and/or the use of unproven 
technologies. In JDCL’s case, for example, two major issues that led local approval authorities to 
reject the application included uncertainty surrounding the quarry’s impacts on immediate and 
surrounding hydrological and hydrogeological systems. This is an area where groundwater from 
the Paris Moraine flows rapidly down a steep slope towards JDCL’s site. There is fear that the 
amount of pressure from groundwater flow in this area would exceed JDCL’s capacity to pump 
and to mitigate any impacts to the water table. Secondly, there is a high level of uncertainty 
about the grout curtain technology. As previously noted, many Town Councilors fear the grout 
curtain will not hold for very long against the groundwater pressure, and contaminate nearby 
wells. 
 Finally, OPA 161 did not address any of the factors listed under the Immediate and Long-
Term Integration criterion. Notably, OPA 161 does not incorporate the integration of aggregates 
sustainability considerations in overall growth management planning. It does not begin to lift 
institutional barriers to the use of recycled materials, and it does not develop and implement 
provincial guidelines, etc. to reduce the need for aggregates and promote the efficient use of the 
resource. The insufficiencies of OPA 161 in this category are, again, understandable. The above-
described provincial constraints, preoccupation with immediate, local concerns and issues, and 
lack of awareness of sustainability objectives, as defined by this study, contributed to the 
weaknesses of OPA 161 in this regard.  
 
6.5 Institutional change towards sustainability? Evaluation of Caledon’s 2003 OPA 161 
against Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies 
 An evaluation of OPA 161’s policies against the Town of Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet 
Corners policies reveals that in some ways Caledon’s Cabinet Corners policies represent, at least 
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potentially, more substantive steps towards sustainability objectives (see Appendix C, Table 3). 
For example, Caledon’s Cabinet Corners policies are stronger than the OPA 161 policies in that 
they did not have to incorporate the provincial HPMARA map for Peel Region. Rather, the 
Town in the early 80s fought to draw strict boundaries around a particular area where the Town 
would “have regard to” the necessity to preserve lands for future extraction. This area was much 
smaller than the 1996 HPMARA map area and it ensured that extraction operations would be 
located near appropriate haul routes, where most extraction was already occurring, and away 
from sensitive lands and settlement areas. Second, under the Cabinet Corners policies, in 
considering Official Plan Amendments for extraction purposes, the Town could consider the 
need for extraction and whether a particular project would interfere with the Town’s objective to 
“preserve and encourage agricultural activity and maintain the scenic and rural character of the 
Municipality in maintaining a land use balance between competing land uses including extractive 
uses” (Town of Caledon, 1983, p.95). Third, the 1981 policies explicitly stated that, in 
considering Official Plan Amendments, the Town would give priority to existing and approved 
residential development from the negative impacts of new extraction operations. Whether the 
1981 policies were effectively authoritative is, however, open to debate. The industry 
consistently appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board when it received unfavourable decisions 
from the Town based on the 1981 policies, and typically the Ontario Municipal Board sided with 
the industry in its rulings in these cases. The negotiations leading the OPA 161 were initiated, in 
part, to reduce uncertainties and Ontario Municipal Board appeal costs by establishing actually 
authoritative aggregates policies.  
 The above Cabinet Corners policies were significantly diluted and/or eliminated 
completely through the Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations for Peel’s 1996 ROP 
and, later, OPA 161. The demonstration of need requirement, for example, was eliminated from 
Peel’s 1996 ROP and, later, the original draft of OPA 161 due to resistance from the province 
and the industry. The objective to preserve and encourage agricultural activity and maintain the 
scenic and rural character of the municipality in maintaining a land use balance between 
competing land uses was diluted in OPA 161 in two ways. First, the wording changed to “ensure 
that the extraction of aggregate resources is undertaken in a balanced manner…which will 
recognize Caledon’s community character and social values over the short and long term” (Town 
of Caledon, 2004, 5-105). The language in OPA 161 is more flexible in that is allows for a 
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broader range of interpretations of “community character” and “social values”. Second, in 
contrast to the Cabinet Corners policies, the objective was not presented as something the Town 
could consider when reviewing applications for Official Plan Amendments for extraction. 
Rather, it is presented in OPA 161 merely as a Town-wide objective. Additionally, the objective 
to give priority to existing and approved residential development from the negative impacts of 
new extraction operations was not carried over from Cabinet Corners to OPA 161.  
 The Town fought throughout the OPA 161 Ontario Municipal Board negotiations to 
maintain some control over management of the local resource, protect Caledon’s cultural and 
natural heritage, and maintain a balanced approach to aggregate management and land use 
planning. The Town, for example, pursued these core community values through the refinement 
of the HPMARA map, the protection of Core Areas of Peel’s Greenlands system, kettle lakes 
and their catchments, and especially by developing the Resource versus Reserve area 
prioritization strategy. These policies, however, are more a reflection of the Town’s responses to 
the changing provincial legislative framework, subsequent imposition by the province of the 
HPMARA map, and provincial rejection of Caledon’s Cabinet Corners policies. The above 
policies therefore do not represent a significant change towards sustainability when compared to 
Caledon’s Cabinet Corners policies. Nor do they reflect a significant change in the values of the 
Town. Local control over and a balanced approach to land use planning and natural resource 
management have persisted in the Town for generations, and have underpinned the Town’s 
readiness to go to the Ontario Municipal Board over aggregate extraction issues. While the above 
policies do take steps towards the previously described sustainability requirements, then, they are 
more a reflection of the ingenuity of the Town to find creative ways to maintain core community 
values under new, increasingly unfriendly provincial constraints. 
OPA 161 does represent incremental institutional change towards sustainability, at least 
potentially, in its requirements for proponents to pay for independent peer reviews of site plans 
and reports, undertake pre-consultations with the Town and other approval agencies before 
submitting an application, and ensuring site plans and reports are publicly accessible through the 
Town. OPA 161 also takes further steps towards ensuring progressive and final rehabilitation 
through the requirement for proponents to consider Rehabilitation Master Plans in their 
applications to the Town and the Ministry of Natural Resources. The intent to develop a database 
to keep track of all existing and abandoned aggregate operations, however, is not a significant 
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change from Caledon’s 1981 policies, which set out the same aim. Unlike the Cabinet Corners 
policies, however, OPA 161 incorporates monitoring of truck traffic, noise, dust, and the effects 
on water resources and ecosystem integrity. The requirement for two different Extractive 
Industrial Area zoning designations also represents incremental change towards sustainability. 
Previously, for example, if a site operator wanted to extend a site from above the water table to 
below the water table, he or she did not have to apply for rezoning at the Municipal level. The 
level of detail present in OPA 161 with respect to study requirements also represents incremental 
change towards sustainability in that they empower the Town to take a more precautionary 
approach to decision-making and raise awareness in the community about the impacts of pits and 
quarries. OPA 161, then, represents incremental change towards sustainability particularly with 
respect to protecting and enhancing Social-Ecological System Integrity, Civility and Democratic 
Governance, and Precaution and Adaptation.   
The above incremental changes are underpinned by the Town’s desire to maintain control 
over the management of the resource. They also reflect a respect for community participation in 
aggregate-related land use issues. According to one interviewee who was present during the 
Ontario Municipal Board negotiations for OPA 161, Town Officials and planners have always 
held community participation in land use issues in high regard. In this way, then, OPA 161 has 
formally caught up to persistent Town and community values, which were present long before 
OPA 161 was developed. Transferring of the costs of peer reviews of reports to the industry is 
underpinned by the Town’s knowledge that it will continue to receive applications for extraction 
as long as it possesses plenty of the prime resource and the Town’s experiences in having to pay 
for expensive application review processes. The detailed study requirements and Rehabilitation 
Master Plans reflect an increase in knowledge and awareness about the impacts of pits and 
quarries since the 1981 policies were in place and an increased valuing of vital ecological goods 
and services. OPA 161 policies also reflect industry-provincial interests in that they allow for 
extraction to occur in reserve areas, other locally significant areas, and in prime agricultural 
lands. These policies are underpinned by the “shortage of supply” discourse created by the 
industry in order to ensure unfettered access to the resource and maintain resource affordability.  
Although the above policies represent incremental institutional change towards 
sustainability, real progress towards sustainability will require the successful implementation of 
OPA 161 “on the ground”. According to the preliminary theoretical propositions, successful 
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implementation will involve, among other things, sufficient resources, and broad support from 
private and public sectors. Some aspects of OPA 161 were highly contested by the industry 
during the Ontario Municipal Board negotiations; therefore, there might be some resistance 
towards implementing OPA 161 on the ground. With respect to “fit”, most of the above 
mentioned policies (publicly accessible reports, pre-consultations, peer review fees, zoning 
changes) could be incorporated in the existing local administrative context. But changes in 
practice, particularly requirements for pre-consultation meetings, monitoring of individual pits 
and quarries by the Town and the industry, and progressive rehabilitation, require changes in 
everyday behaviour. Well-established norms of behaviour in the aggregates industry, then, stand 
as significant challenges to successful implementation of OPA 161.  
Institutional change towards sustainability in the prevailing institutional system guiding 
aggregate extraction in southern Ontario may occur through mechanisms beyond and in addition 
to implementation of Green Gravel objectives. OPA 161 has and continues to influence the 
aggregate resources policies of other municipalities in the GGH Region. The diffusion of some 
of OPA 161’s policies, then, may also contribute to institutional change towards sustainability 
across local to provincial scales. More research is required to determine the extent to which 
diffusion is occurring.  
Finally, the positive changes in OPA 161 are a reflection of the strong commitment and 
growing sophistication and innovation on the part of the Town to protect and maintain core 
community values under new, increasingly unfriendly provincial constraints. They also reflect 
continuing quite effective resistance to change on the part of the industry, Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. OPA 161 could have taken greater 
steps towards sustainability if industry and provincial stakeholders had accepted the Town’s 
original prioritization strategy, independent social impact study, and demonstration of need 
policies. Through the lens of the theoretical framework developed by this study, Chapter 7, 
below, discusses why these and other policies were rejected and/or embraced.  
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CHAPTER 7: Understanding and explaining institutional change and 
resistance to change  
7.1 Introduction and methods 
This section analyses institutional change and resistance to change towards sustainability 
in the development of OPA 161 through the lens of the combined preliminary theoretical 
propositions. Informal, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, Ontario Municipal Board 
rulings, Town and Regional planning documents, community websites and newsletters, 
newspaper articles and articles from In the Hills: A Magazine of Country Living in Erin, 
Caledon, Mono and Mulmur informed this discussion. The discussion centers on the original, 
more substantive OPA 161 policies that were the subjects of negotiation during the 2000-2003 
Ontario Municipal Board hearings: the prioritization of lands for extraction, the requirements for 
a Comprehensive Broader Scale Environmental Study for applications for extraction in Reserve 
areas, an independent social impact study, and demonstration of need for extraction. It also 
considers the Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations for Peel’s first ROP and the 
Ontario Municipal Board’s decision for the Town to allow OPA 161 to be applied in the Town’s 
evaluation of JDCL’s application. This discussion will lead to an analysis of the strengths and 
limitations of the preliminary theoretical propositions, recommendations for refinement of the 
propositions, and future research directions. Each of the theoretical propositions is discussed in 
turn.  
 
7.2 Interests, appropriateness and legitimacy 
Proposition: Actors may resist or facilitate institutional change in order to maximize individual 
and/or collective interests and/or to achieve cultural appropriateness and legitimacy as defined 
by a particular, culturally embedded institutional environment. An actor’s interests are 
determined, in part, by the institutional system and by long-term historic processes (e.g. 
socialization).  
 Economic interests clearly played a determinative role in the development of OPA 161. 
In 1996, the Town initiated the Caledon Community Resources Study because, among other 
reasons, the major players that had historically been involved in and/or affected by aggregate 
extraction in Caledon (Town Officials, concerned citizens, members of the aggregates industry) 
had reached a point where they were willing to come to a consensus on local policies that they 
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believed would help to avoid costly Ontario Municipal Board hearings.   
Additionally, throughout the development of OPA 161, the major argument used by the 
key provincial agencies (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources) and key individuals representing the aggregates industry to oppose the original, more 
substantive policies was that they have the effect of limiting resource availability. Many 
government agencies (e.g., Ministry of Transportation), the aggregates industry, and other 
private sector groups (e.g. developers) profit from unfettered access to prime aggregate resources 
close to demand. It is in their best interests, therefore, to ensure that as much of the resource as 
possible is available to the industry, especially to keep the costs of gravel low. This economic 
interest has been reinforced by the industry’s “shortage of supply” discourse and institutionalized 
over the years in land use planning and natural resource management law. The aggregates 
industry and key provincial ministries also profit from a system of centralized control over the 
management of the resource. Their opposition to the original, more substantive policies of OPA 
161, therefore, was essentially political as well as economic. These economic and political 
interests reflect core industry and provincial values, which are rooted in the intertwined histories 
of economic growth, profit seeking, urbanization, demand for prime aggregates, and provincial 
land use planning and natural resource management legislation.  
Aside from wanting to avoid costly Ontario Municipal Board hearings, Town planners 
and officials were concerned with gaining or maintaining local control over aggregate extraction 
operations, protecting Caledon’s natural and cultural heritage (notably Caledon’s countryside 
aesthetic, quality of life, and rural character), serving the interests of ratepayers and residents, 
and maintaining a balanced approach to land use planning and natural resource management. 
These economic, political, cultural and ecological interests reflect core Town values, which are 
rooted in Caledon’s custom of having primary control over land use planning and management 
of natural resources, culture of stewardship and sense of place, and long history of disputes over 
aggregate extraction related land use issues. Protection and maintenance of these core values 
underpinned the Town’s rejection of the Minister’s modifications to Peel’s 1996 ROP and the 
institutional change reflected in OPA 161.  
 A sense of what is “fair” (or appropriate) also played a role in the development of OPA 
161. One interviewee who was a Town planner involved in writing OPA 161 recalls that the 
planners wanted to develop mineral resources policies that were fair in that they would work to 
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level the “playing field” between citizens’ interests and the interests of the aggregates industry. 
This Town planner believes that the provincial policy framework unfairly favours the interests of 
the aggregates industry. This interviewee also asserted that the Town planners also wanted to 
develop policies that were appropriately robust enough to allow the Town to reject such 
controversial quarry applications as JDCL’s, which propose to undertake extraction in a highly 
sensitive Reserve area. This latter point demonstrates that concern for protection of Caledon’s 
natural and cultural heritage played a major role in the development of OPA 161. It also 
demonstrates the role played by Caledon’s rich natural heritage in the development of the 
amendment.  
Appropriateness and legitimacy were also considerations in the Ontario Municipal Board 
case that ended in the Board’s ruling for the Town to apply OPA 161 policies in its review of 
JDCL’s application. JDCL rejected the idea that OPA 161 should be determinative because the 
company did not want to be subjected to new, more onerous and costly study requirements. The 
Board, however, asserted that the public would not have confidence in an evaluation process that 
ignored policies and adopted standards that are not current and modern: “The Board considers it 
appropriate and necessary that the application should satisfy most recent available policies and 
the best standards of planning and environmental management…This approach represents the 
best expression of the public’s interest in good planning principles and sound planning practice” 
(Ontario Municipal Board, 2003, p.14). This ruling was based on the Board’s interpretation of 
the Clergy Principle as a “…practice meant to promote fairness in the planning process” (p. 11), 
in stark contrast to a law or inviolate rule to be applied in every circumstance.   
 
7.3 Renegotiation and reinterpretation 
Proposition: Actors may resist or facilitate institutional change through the process of 
renegotiation and reinterpretation and/or by creating innovative institutions from previously 
existing institutional elements. These processes lead to path-dependent change because the 
range of options available to institutional entrepreneurs is constrained by the particular factors 
(e.g. power relationships, actors’ interests, laws and informal norms, etc.) of the existing 
institutional system.  
 Periods of renegotiation and reinterpretation occurred throughout the evolution of 
Caledon’s mineral resources policies. The development of Peel’s ROP, for example, involved 
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resistance on the part of Town planners and officials to the new provincial legislative framework 
and in particular to the HPMARA map and the Minister’s modifications. The mineral resources 
policies in Peel’s original ROP were based on Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies. The 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, however, rejected these policies on the grounds that 
they did not give proper regard to provincial interests. Eventually, Peel’s modified ROP was 
appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board where the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 
Region, and Town could negotiate various versions of the Region’s original and modified 
policies. The Region and the Town fought to maintain and protect core community values while 
the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing fought to protect industry-provincial interests by 
enforcing the legislated norm of unfettered access to aggregate resources close to demand. As 
previously described in section 5.7, the Region’s most significant loss was that the approved 
ROP diluted previous policies that explicitly sought to maintain a balance between competing 
land uses and give priority to the protection of existing and approved residential developments 
from the adverse impacts of aggregate operations. 
 The Town’s collaborative approach to the development of OPA 161 and the Ontario 
Municipal Board settlement negotiations were integral to the Town’s capacity to push back 
against powerful industry-provincial government interests. These opportunities for collaboration 
and negotiation provided the venue for renegotiation and reinterpretation of both Peel’s ROP 
and, later, the Town’s OPA 161. In both cases, however, the actors involved in the negotiations 
were constrained and/or empowered by the provincial legislative framework and the power 
relationship between the industry and the provincial government. The Town planners involved in 
developing OPA 161, for example, had a limited range of land use planning tools upon which 
policies could be based that could protect core community values and stand up against aggregate 
extraction applications in sensitive Reserve areas. These land use planning tools (zoning by-laws 
and Official Plan Amendment and zoning-by law amendment criteria) are granted to 
municipalities under the Ontario Planning Act but the municipalities’ independent authoritative 
power is diminished or constrained by the Provincial Policy Statement and other such provincial 
policies. As previously noted, Ontario’s land use planning laws and policies have been 
significantly influenced by powerful industry-provincial interests to favour aggregate extraction 
operations over all other land uses. The returns of this legislative framework empower industry 
and provincial players and represent attractive incentives for them to maintain and protect these 
 130 
interests and, by extension, the existing legislative framework. Even under this oppressive 
balance of power, however, the existing legislative framework provided the source for creativity 
in the development of the Town’s local polices. Caledon’s original and more substantive 
prioritization policies, for example, reflect an ingenious interpretation of the Provincial Policy 
Statement’s requirement for Official Plans to protect existing and future aggregate resources 
from incompatible land uses. The Town estimated that it has enough undeveloped gravel 
deposits to supply the demand well beyond the lifetime of the Official Plan. Town planners and 
officials argued that they would protect all of these deposits from incompatible land uses but 
they would not make all of these deposits available all at once. As previously described, industry 
and provincial resistance to the prioritization policies resulted in a watering down of the more 
substantive, original version. The industry and the province cited the Provincial Policy Statement 
in order to ensure that as much of the resource as possible would be available under OPA 161. In 
response, under the Ontario Planning Act, the Town planners devised the more onerous and 
costly study requirements for Official Plan and Zoning By-Law amendment approval for 
aggregate extraction applications in Reserve areas, sending an informal but explicit message to 
the industry to avoid these sensitive areas. In this case, then, the most powerful players fought to 
maintain the institutions that they require to protect and maintain their core values, while the 
Town planners pushed back against these powerful players by creatively interpreting the 
legislative framework to their advantage in order to maintain and protect core community values. 
Despite the Town’s ingenious interpretation of the legislative framework, however, the more 
substantial policies of OPA 161 with respect to institutional change towards sustainability were 
rejected and/or watered down through the Ontario Municipal Board negotiations. Provincial 
constraints and the industry-provincial power relationship undoubtedly contributed to path-
dependent change in the final version of the Amendment. This is also evident in the results of the 
evaluation of OPA 161 against Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies; altogether, only 
incremental change towards sustainability was accomplished.    
 
7.4 Adaptive cycle 
Proposition: Institutional change and resistance to change occur within a four-phase adaptive 
cycle of growth, conservation, release, and reorganization. Long-term path dependent processes 
(positive feedbacks, increasing returns, and transaction costs) influence change and resistance 
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to change throughout the adaptive cycle. Path dependent processes are reinforced by the cross- 
scale interconnections and interdependencies between the institutions that comprise the 
institutional system. The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is 
determined, in part, by the resilience and resistance of the institution(s) and/or institutional 
system as it progresses through the four phases of the adaptive cycle. 
 In Caledon’s case, the 1940s and ‘50s mark the beginning of the growth and conservation 
phases in the institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in southern Ontario. During these 
decades, municipalities had primary control over the location and operation of pits and quarries. 
The Ontario Planning Act and the Municipal Act gave municipalities land use planning tools to 
restrict the location of extraction operations. The regulation of the resource was decentralized 
over a range of statutes and provincial regulating agencies. Demand for the resource was low and 
based on local needs.  
The conservation phase was well underway by the mid-1950s and has extended to today. 
During these decades, the aggregates industry and the Ministry of Natural Resources forged a 
reciprocal power relationship that has culminated in centralized industry-provincial control over 
prime aggregate resources. The evolution of this partnership was concurrent with increasing 
economic growth and urbanization in the GTA, and a subsequent increase in the demand for 
aggregates. Moreover, as the system became more influenced by the aligned interests of the 
province and the aggregates industry, provincial land use planning law and policy began to 
reinforce aggregate resources law. From about 1997 to present, industry-provincial control has 
maintained the mutually reinforcing nature of land use planning and aggregate resources 
management law; consequently, as previously discussed, it is conceivable that the short and 
medium term transactional costs of significant institutional change for industry and provincial 
players (e.g. towards Green Gravel objectives) would be high. According to the theoretical 
propositions, as long as the industry and the province continue to profit from centralized control, 
resistance may also continue to be high. The resilience of the present institutional system, 
however, may be low due to the tight interconnections and interdependencies between industry 
and provincial governmental players, the high costs of change, and the limited room for adapting 
and accommodating institutional change.  
Meanwhile, during this conservation phase, Caledon became well known as a Town with 
plenty of aggregate to feed the needs of the GTA. As described in section 7.5, below, the above-
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described regime shift was a major driver in Caledon’s shift from the 1981 Cabinet Corners 
policies to the 2003 OPA 161 policies. A threshold in Caledon’s Cabinet Corners rule system 
was crossed in 1996-97, when Town officials came to realize that (a) the Town had no choice 
under the existing provincial legislative framework but to somehow accommodate the aggregates 
industry, but that (b) it was nevertheless of paramount importance for the Town to develop 
policies that would protect and maintain Caledon’s natural and cultural heritage and local control 
over aggregate extraction operations. Moreover, members of the aggregates industry and Town 
officials reached a point where they were willing to negotiate a local policy framework that 
would help to avoid future disputes at the Ontario Municipal Board. Thus, a period of renewal 
and reorganization began in Caledon with the 1996 Caledon Community Resources Study and 
ended with the Ontario Municipal Board’s approval of OPA 161 in 2003. Institutional change 
towards sustainability through OPA 161 was incremental, in part, because of the continued 
constraining influence of the industry-provincial power relationship and the provincial legislative 
framework. Although in the OPA 161 negotiations the aggregates industry was moved to accept 
some changes enhancing authority at the local level in Caledon, the provincial-scale institutional 
system remained dominant. Arguably, however, the dominant system continued somewhere in 
the latter half of the conservation phase with perhaps declining ability to accommodate further 
adjustments.   
Also, during this conservation phase, awareness about the environmental and social 
impacts of aggregate extraction increased. Baker et al. (2001), for example, describe how the Pits 
and Quarries Control Act and the Aggregate Resources Act both responded to demands for 
consideration of local social and biophysical impacts and especially improved rehabilitation 
practices. The industry’s rehabilitation records remain dismal (see Gravel Watch, 2006), 
however, indicating a high level of resistance towards progressive and final rehabilitation among 
key players. According to one interviewee who represents the aggregates industry, there are 
many local challenges to rehabilitation (e.g. land use changes over the lifetime of a licence) that 
influence the successful rehabilitation of a particular site. Priorities for Green Gravel have 
emerged out of the above-described institutional context of centralized industry-provincial 
control over aggregate resources.  
As previously demonstrated, sustainability priorities are essentially subversive and would 
cause a cascading effect in the prevailing institutional system for aggregates. A number of 
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scenarios or new equilibrium orders (stable states) may result from increasing pressure from 
nongovernmental organizations and community groups for institutional change – if the 
provincial system crosses a critical threshold and well-established norms begin to unravel. 
Indeed, it may take more than pressures from nongovernmental and community groups to force a 
change at the provincial scale. Increasing competition over land use for aggregate extraction 
versus other uses and changes in local-to-provincial water quality and quantity, etc., are other 
potential pressures for institutional change in the prevailing institutional system. As long as a 
critical threshold is not crossed, however, it is likely that institutional change at the provincial 
scale will continue to be incremental. The Ministry of Natural Resources and the industry, for 
example, may choose to adopt certain Green Gravel priorities that would satisfy certain pressure 
groups while maintaining core industry-provincial values, notably centralized control over prime 
aggregate resources and largely unfettered access close to demand.  
Whatever might happen, the provincial-scale institutional system remains tightly locked 
in a position of centralized control where, according to theory, system resilience is low. It should 
be noted, however, that it is difficult to determine the exact position of the institutional system 
within the conservation phase. This demonstrates a need within Panarchy theory for threshold 
indicators that help to more precisely reveal the position of a particular system in the 
conservation phase of the adaptive cycle.  
 
7.5 Regime shifts 
Proposition: The extent to which institutional change occurs is determined, in part, by whether a 
regime shift occurs. A regime shift involves rapid and large changes in the internal feedbacks of 
a particular institutional system. They are less frequent than incremental changes and they may 
occur when a system crosses a critical threshold, especially when the resilience of a particular 
institutional system is low. 
 Clearly, a regime shift did not occur as a result of OPA 161. Indeed, key features of the 
institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in southern Ontario remain intact, notably 
centralized control of the industry by the industry and the Ministry of Natural Resources. A slow, 
provincial-scale regime shift did occur, however, from the late 1940s to the late 1990s (see Baker 
et al., 2001). Over the course of approximately 50 years, the institutional framework guiding 
aggregate extraction in southern Ontario evolved from decentralized provincial responsibility 
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over aggregate extraction, which gave municipalities primary control over aggregate extraction 
operations through land use planning tools, to provincial control in the 1970s with the Pits and 
Quarries Control Act, to the institutionalization of industry-provincial control by the mid 1990s 
with the Aggregate and Petroleum Resources Statute Law Amendment Act. This 
institutionalization included, from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s, evolution of Ontario’s land 
use planning laws and policies to reinforce the Aggregate Resources Act and the objective of 
unfettered access to the resource (see Winfield & Taylor, 2005). Increasing urbanization and 
economic growth in the GTA and a subsequent increase in the demand for aggregate resources 
were key drivers of these changes. In southern Ontario, for example, consumption of aggregate 
increased from 3.86 tonnes/person in 1950 to 14.33 tonnes/person in 1996 (Baker et al., 2001, p. 
467). The effects of this regime shift are discussed in section 7.6, below. 
 
7.6 Cascading effects 
Proposition: The extent to which institutional change occurs is determined, in part, by whether 
change at one scale causes a cascade of changes at other scales. Sometimes, when a single 
threshold is crossed, a cascading effect can occur in which multiple thresholds across scales are 
breached. A regime shift in one institutional arrangement in one domain may affect change 
and/or induce a regime shift in other institutional arrangements in other domains. 
The above described regime shift profoundly influenced regional and municipal mineral 
resources policies across southern Ontario and the balance of power among industry, provincial, 
and municipal stakeholders. Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies, for example, were a 
response to Ontario’s first provincial policy statement, the Mineral Aggregate Resources Policy 
Statement, which ensured that official plans identify and protect existing pits and quarries and 
future aggregate reserves from incompatible land uses. Under this provincial policy, 
municipalities did not have to zone the identified areas for extraction but were prevented them 
allocating aggregates areas for any other purpose. Moreover, the Caledon Community Resources 
Study was initiated, in part, because Town officials realized in 1996 that the Cabinet Corners 
policies were continually being appealed and overturned at the Ontario Municipal Board.  
Baker et al. (2001) assert that the above described regime shift has effectively pushed 
municipalities through legislation from the centre to the periphery of the policy process 
dedicated to aggregate mining. This allowed the province to give greater consideration to the 
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demands of the aggregates industry despite rising awareness of the social-ecological impacts of 
aggregate mining. It also eroded the capacity of municipalities to protect the interests of local 
citizens and anti-aggregate groups. This trend to move the municipality to the periphery of the 
policy process occurred alongside a demand from aggregate producers to have access to 
resources close to markets to minimize transportation costs, and for guaranteed access to stocks 
in order to avoid perceived supply shortages.  
 
7.7 Socioeconomic costs 
Proposition: The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is 
determined, in part, by the socioeconomic costs associated with change. Path-dependent 
processes involve high socio-economic costs of reversal or reorganization, especially when the 
interconnections and interdependencies between and among the institutions, organizations, and 
certain socioeconomic groups in a particular institutional system are tight. 
 As urbanization increased in the GTA during the 50s and 60s, the demand for aggregate 
increased and it became more common for prime aggregate to be transported outside the local 
areas within which it was extracted. Large companies soon formed to supply the increasing 
demand. Crying “shortage of supply” in the early 1970s, the aggregates industry began to 
dominate provincial policy making in the management of aggregate resources. Today, the 
industry and the province profit from a system of centralized control over the management of the 
resource, which protects prime aggregate resources from incompatible land uses and keeps 
aggregate prices relatively low. OPA 161’s original, more substantive policies (e.g. 
demonstration of need, prioritization, stand alone social impact study, etc.) threatened to unravel 
this centralized control and the legislated modus operandi of unfettered access to prime 
aggregate resources close to demand. According to one interviewee who was a Town Councilor 
during the Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations for OPA 161, one reason why the 
province and the aggregates industry representatives resisted the original prioritization strategy 
was that they were concerned that if they accepted, prioritization would soon become the norm 
across southern Ontario.   
In contrast, the Town stood to lose vital components of its cultural identity, which are 
important to the Town’s social and economic well-being. The potential social-ecological impacts 
of JDCL’s quarry application exemplified for the Town and community the risks associated with 
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the OPA 161 Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations. Caledon enjoyed primary control 
over land use planning and natural resource management up until 1996, when, among other 
important events, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing demanded from Peel a 
Regional Official Plan. Local control over local resources was by 1996 a deeply ingrained 
feature of the Town’s character. According to one interviewee who was a Town planner during 
the development of OPA 161, it has also been historically customary for Peel’s southern 
municipalities, Brampton and Mississauga, to assert local control over land use planning and the 
management of natural resources. Additionally, for generations, residents of Caledon have 
valued the Town’s rural aesthetic, tranquility, and cultural heritage as components of the Town’s 
identity. Many long time residents of Caledon have a strong sense of place based on these 
qualities. Moreover, Caledon’s culture of stewardship has been built on the Town’s valued 
cultural and natural recourses, which include portions of such provincially significant landforms 
as the Niagara Escarpment, Peel Plain, and Oak Ridges Moraine. The socio-economic fabric of 
the Town has evolved around these valued natural and cultural resources. The Town’s rural 
aesthetic and natural and cultural heritage, for example, have been and continue to be attractive 
to newcomers who choose to reside or establish businesses (e.g. golf courses, inns and spas) in 
Caledon. The Town therefore rejected the Minister’s modifications to Peel’s ROP, initiated the 
Caledon Community Resources Study (as the basis for local mineral resources policies), and 
subsequently argued for the original, more substantive policies in the proposed OPA 161 in order 
to protect these valued components of its identity.  
 
7.8 Power and resources (financial, political, administrative, ecological, etc.) 
Proposition: The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is 
determined, in part, by the power and resources (esp. financial, ties to people in power, political 
support, opportunities for participation, ecological) held by particular socioeconomic groups to 
translate and enact the innovation(s).  
 According to interviewees who were Town Councilors in 1996 and during the settlement 
negotiations for OPA 161, the Town has historically been willing to front the costs of Ontario 
Municipal Board hearings to protect citizens from the negative impacts of pits and quarries. 
Caledon’s community of well-to-do, educated landowners has reinforced the Town’s willingness 
in this regard. Enjoyment of property and protection of the Town’s cultural and natural heritage 
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have been and continue to be chief among their local political concerns.   
Aside from financial resources, the Town had wide political and community support for 
the Caledon Community Resources Study. Certain community champions were also integral to 
the development of OPA 161. According to interviewees, these champions included Mayor Carol 
Seglins and Mayor Marolyn Morrison, who stood as major supporters of OPA 161 in the face of 
adversity from the aggregates industry. Other champions included key Town planners, Dan 
Kennaley and Heather Konefat. According to interviewees who are long time residents of 
Caledon, the integrity of these planners was influential in the development of OPA 161. Also, 
according to interviewees who were Town planners during the settlement negotiations for OPA 
161, the Town’s lawyer, for example, was instrumental in arguing for OPA 161’s prioritization 
policies, social impact study requirements, and additional study requirements. Certain members 
of the Coalition of Concerned Citizens also emerged as community heroes who were 
instrumental in the Ontario Municipal Board hearing that allowed OPA 161 to be determinative 
in the review of JDCL’s quarry application.  
It should be noted too that Caledon’s cultural and natural heritage resources played a 
profound role in the development of OPA 161. According to interviewees who are long time 
residents of Caledon and members of the Coalition of Concerned Citizens, OPA 161 could 
transpire in a Town like Caledon because, among other reasons, Caledon has a rich inheritance 
of natural and cultural heritage. Again, the socio-economic fabric of the Town has evolved 
around this rich legacy and so many citizens and Town officials aim to protect it. Moreover, the 
integrity of the Town’s ecological systems is a form of capital from which Caledon’s residents 
draw vital sustenance for such political struggles as OPA 161.  
Clearly, then, there was sufficient economic, political (municipal, regional, provincial 
and community), administrative, and ecological support for the development of the proposed 
OPA 161 and negotiating with the Province and industry to strengthen the Town’s hand in 
promoting its interests in management of the aggregates industry in Caledon. Implementation, 
however, will also require these supportive resources. According to one interviewee who is a 
Town planner, the Town has not yet developed the Rehabilitation Master Plans because they are 
short staffed and therefore have not found the time to dedicate to it. There has also been some 
resistance from individual extraction operators to OPA 161’s requirements for, pre-consultation 
meetings, on-site monitoring of dust and progressive rehabilitation. Negotiations among Town 
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planners and the aggregates industry are ongoing with respect to the site-by-site implementation 
of OPA 161.  
The Town’s efforts were, however, were only partly successful, in part because of the 
constraining influence of the power relationship that has over the years been established between 
the aggregates industry and key provincial ministries. As Baker et al. (2001) and Winfield and 
Taylor (2005) emphasize, this power relationship has pushed municipalities to the periphery of 
the provincial policy making process and is currently reinforced by provincial land use planning 
and natural resource management law and policy. The constraining influence of the existing 
provincial legislation during the development of OPA 161 and the subsequent Ontario Municipal 
Board settlement negotiations is supported by this infrastructure of power. Moreover, the 
industry-provincial government power relationship has been and continues to be reinforced by 
considerable financial, legal, political, etc. resources available to the Province and the aggregates 
industry. As previously noted in section 5.4, they can afford to maintain sophisticated lobbying 
efforts and to hire the best lawyers and consultants for the municipal and provincial application 
review process and Ontario Municipal Board hearings. As noted, above, OPA 161’s incremental 
progress towards sustainability, therefore, is partly a consequence of the constraints of the 
industry-provincial government power relationship, which is manifest in their centralized control 
over prime aggregate resources. According to theory, however, the rigidity of the current 
centralized system and the high transaction costs associated with institutional change are signs of 
decreasing resilience. The current centralized system, then, is somewhat self-destructive on its 
own and vulnerable to internal and external disturbances.   
 
7.9 Diffusion 
Proposition: The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is 
determined, in part, by the capacity of actors to translate and enact an innovation (with suitable 
accommodation but no alterations that undermine the essentials) across a range of organizations 
or across a population. Translation and enactment occur within and are constrained by a 
particular institutional context and by a particular set of actors. 
 The stakeholders involved in the development of OPA 161 did not set out to translate and 
enact Caledon’s mineral resources policies in other municipal jurisdictions. As described in 
section 5.7, however, OPA 161 has influenced other local mineral resources policies through 
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word of mouth and because the Town planners involved in writing OPA 161 have since been 
hired by other municipalities. One planner who worked for Caledon during the settlement 
negotiations for OPA 161 is now a planner in another Township where aggregate extraction 
related land use issues are not uncommon. This planner has incorporated Caledon’s approach to 
above and below water table extraction designations and study requirements in this Township’s 
Official Plan. Approval of these Caledon-based policies is currently before the Ontario 
Municipal Board. Clearly, this planner is faced with similar local-to-provincial constraints as 
Caledon faced in the development of OPA 161. At best then, even if some diffusion of Caledon’s 
policies occurs, it will constitute incremental institutional change.  
 
7.10 Fit 
Proposition: The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is 
determined, in part, by the nature of the proposed new institution. The more the actors can 
demonstrate that a particular innovation “fits” the prevailing institutional framework, the more 
likely that it will be adopted by particular actors (powerful elites, communities, organizations, 
etc.) and stick.  
The Town of Caledon took a collaborative approach in the development of OPA 161 by 
forming the Community Advisory Group for the Caledon Community Resources Study, which 
included powerful industry representatives, for the purpose of stakeholder input. Additionally, 
before Council adopted the original OPA 161, it was subjected to meetings for feedback from 
key stakeholders (Town, Region, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing/Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Aggregate Producers’ Association of Ontario, Niagara Escarpment Commission, 
Credit Valley Conservation Authority, and the Coalition of Concerned Citizens). These key 
stakeholders scrutinized the controversial details of OPA 161 again during the Ontario Municipal 
Board settlement negotiations, which resulted in an approved set of significantly revised policies. 
Evidently, the most powerful players at the negotiating table (industry and provincial 
government representatives) were persuaded that the contents of the revised and approved OPA 
161 “fit” well enough to be accommodated within the prevailing provincial legislative 
framework for aggregate resources. After all, the negotiations resulted in a local rule system that 
accommodates the core values of industry and provincial players, namely centralized control and 
unfettered access to the resource.   
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The practical implementation implications of some OPA 161 policies, however, are 
uncertain and potentially significant. Some practicalities (e.g. pre-consultation meetings, 
monitoring of dust and on progressive rehabilitation, additional study requirements, two 
Extractive Industrial designations) challenge well-established norms of operation in the 
aggregates industry. As a result, OPA 161’s substance may not “fit” as well as expected, and the 
resulting conflicts may present further tensions for the new rule system.  
 
7.11 Variation in fast and slow moving institutions 
Proposition: The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is 
determined, in part, by how much variation occurs in fast and slow moving institutions 
(regulative, normative, and cognitive) over time. Transformative change occurs when there is 
change across most or all of these dimensions. 
 It was demonstrated in section 6.4 that OPA 161 does not reflect or require 
transformative change because it does not contribute significantly to objectives for sustainability 
contributions through aggregates management. Although regulatory changes have occurred at the 
local level in Caledon, many key normative and cognitive institutional elements in the 
institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in southern Ontario remain. While some have 
been undermined by the OPA 161 policies, others have been somewhat reinforced. For example, 
the norm of unfettered access close to demand, which is underpinned by the aggregate industry’s 
shortage of supply discourse and need for affordable gravel, was formally maintained in the 
policies that allow for extraction in Reserve areas, albeit pending more onerous and costly 
studies and informally higher standards for approval.  
 Secondly, persistence in the Town’s core values (local control over land use planning and 
management of natural resources, protection of natural and cultural heritage resources, and a 
balanced approach to land use planning) indicates that change at the local level was also 
restricted to the regulative dimension. Certain key policies (e.g. allowing extraction to occur in 
Reserve areas and other sensitive areas), which are reinforced by provincial land use planning 
policies, appear to trump the Town’s capacity to determine the timing and location of pits and 
quarries. But the Town’s core values have persisted regardless of changes in the local and 
provincial legal framework. This persistence is evident in the Amendment policies that enhance 
local control over land use planning and natural resource management process components and 
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some matters of substance (e.g. publicly accessible site plans and reports, pre-consultation 
requirements, prohibition of extraction in Core Areas of Peel’s Greenlands system, etc., and 
more onerous study requirements for applications for extraction in Reserve areas).  
According to this proposition, then, OPA 161 reflects and will play a role in incremental 
institutional change. This is consistent with the findings of the comparison of OPA 161 with 
Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies. 
 
7.12 Uncertainty 
Proposition: The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occurs is 
determined, in part, by uncertainty: limitations in the quality and quantity of information and 
knowledge about certain problems, available or potential solutions, and the methods available 
for evaluating the effectiveness of certain policies and programmes.  
 There is one example in which uncertainty clearly played a role in resistance to 
institutional change towards sustainability in this case. The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing and the aggregate industry players involved in the settlement negotiations for OPA 161 
rejected the stand-alone social impact study on the basis that social impacts were too precarious 
to measure because of their subjectivity. According to one interviewee who was a Town planner 
involved in writing OPA 161, the planners were uncertain about the methodology that would be 
used to measure the social impacts of extraction operations in Caledon; therefore, they could not 
present a clear framework for the study to the industry during the Ontario Municipal Board 
settlement negotiations. The stand-alone social impact study may have been easier to reject 
because it was still a vague idea and not presented in such a level of detail to facilitate 
negotiations over the particular approach and methods to be applied. The rejection of the study 
was significant because acceptance would have made OPA 161 more substantive in taking steps 
towards sustainability objectives, albeit incremental steps.  
 
7.13 Summary  
 Economic interests clearly played a role in both institutional change and inertia in 
Caledon’s case. For example, Caledon officials, planners, individual aggregate producers, and 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing were 
willing to collaborate in the development of OPA 161 in order to avoid costly Ontario Municipal 
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Board hearings related to aggregate extraction land use issues. Industry and provincial 
government resistance to the more substantive policies in the original Amendment, however, was 
underpinned by their interest in maintaining core industry-provincial government values 
(centralized control over and unfettered access to prime aggregate resources close to demand) to 
ensure a continued supply of affordable gravel to provincial infrastructure and other public and 
private projects in the GGH region and beyond. These core values are rooted in the intertwined 
histories of economic growth, profit seeking, urbanization, demand for prime aggregates, and 
provincial land use planning and natural resource management legislation. 
 Core values held by Town officials, planners, and individual citizens (local control over 
local issues, protection of natural and cultural resources, and a balanced approach to land use 
planning) also played a role in inertia and change in the development of OPA 161. These core 
values, for example, underpinned the Town’s rejection of the Minister’s modification to Peel’s 
1996 Regional Official Plan and the incremental change reflected in the final version of the 
Amendment.  
 Aside from these core values and interests, a sense of what is “fair” (or appropriate) 
played a role in incremental institutional change Caledon’s case. Town planners, for example, 
aimed to develop mineral resources policies that were fair in that they would work to level the 
“playing field” between citizens’ interests and the interests of the aggregates industry. They also 
wanted to develop policies that were appropriately robust to allow Town officials to reject 
controversial quarry applications in sensitive Reserve areas. This latter point also demonstrates 
that the planners’ concern for protection of Caledon’s natural and cultural heritage resources 
played a significant role in the development of OPA 161. By extension, it demonstrates the 
essential role played by Caledon’s rich natural and cultural heritage resources. 
 Periods of collaboration and negotiation provided the venue through which institutional 
change and inertia occurred in Caledon’s case. The Ontario Municipal Board settlement 
negotiations for Peel’s modified Regional Official Plan and OPA 161, for example, provided 
vital opportunities for the renegotiation and reinterpretation of Caledon’s mineral resources 
policies. During both hearings, the Town fought to maintain and protect core community values 
while individuals representing the aggregates industry, the Ministry of Natural Resources, and 
the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing fought to protect industry-provincial government 
interests by enforcing the legislated norms of centralized control over and unfettered access to 
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aggregate resources close to demand.  
It is important to note too that in both Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations, 
the actors involved were both constrained and empowered by the existing provincial legislative 
framework and the industry-provincial government power relationship. The Town planners 
involved in developing OPA 161, for example, had a limited range of land use planning tools 
upon which policies could be based that could protect core community values and stand up 
against aggregate extraction applications in sensitive Reserve areas. The returns of this 
legislative framework (notably, affordable gravel for infrastructure and other public and private 
projects) empower industry and provincial players and represent attractive incentives for them to 
maintain and protect the existing legislative framework. Even under this oppressive balance of 
power, however, the existing provincial legislative framework provided the source for creativity 
in the development of the Town’s local polices. Caledon’s original and more substantive 
prioritization policies, for example, reflect an ingenious interpretation of the Provincial Policy 
Statement’s requirement for official plans to protect existing and future aggregate resources from 
incompatible land uses. Despite the Town’s ingenious interpretation of the legislative 
framework, however, the more substantial policies of OPA 161 with respect to institutional 
change towards sustainability were rejected and/or watered down through the Ontario Municipal 
Board negotiations. In response, the Town planners devised the more onerous and costly study 
requirements for approval for aggregate extraction operations in Reserve areas. These policies 
were eventually adopted, thereby contributing to incremental institutional change towards 
sustainability. The path dependent effects of the existing provincial legislative framework and 
the industry-provincial power relationship undoubtedly contributed to incremental change in the 
final version of the Amendment.  
 The socioeconomic costs of change were also important pressures for institutional change 
and inertia in the development of OPA 161. For example, OPA 161’s original, more substantive 
policies (e.g. demonstration of need, prioritization strategy, stand alone social impact study, etc.) 
threatened to unravel the modus operandi of unfettered access to prime aggregate resources close 
to demand, which work to keep the costs of gravel low. One reason why the province and the 
aggregates industry representatives resisted the original prioritization strategy was that they were 
concerned that if they accepted, prioritization would soon become the norm across southern 
Ontario. In contrast, the Town stood to lose vital components of its cultural identity, which are 
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important to the Town’s social and economic well-being. The potential social-ecological impacts 
of JDCL’s quarry application exemplified for the Town and community the risks associated with 
the outcome of the Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations for OPA 161. The Town 
therefore rejected the Minister’s modifications to Peel’s ROP, initiated the Caledon Community 
Resources Study (as the basis for local mineral resources policies), and subsequently argued for 
the original, more substantive policies in the proposed OPA 161, which resulted in incremental 
institutional change towards sustainability. 
 Additionally, throughout the development of OPA 161, power and resources (ecological, 
economic, political, administrative, community support, etc.) were major enablers for 
institutional change and resistance to change. The Town, for example, had sufficient economic 
resources to participate in the Ontario Municipal Board hearings; and wide political and 
community support for the Caledon Community Resources Study and the development of OPA 
161. The Town’s lawyer, for example, was instrumental in arguing for OPA 161’s prioritization 
policies, and additional study requirements, which contributed to incremental institutional 
change. The Town’s efforts were, however, only partly successful, in part because of the 
constraining influence of the power relationship that has over the years been established between 
the aggregates industry and key provincial ministries. This power relationship has been and 
continues to be reinforced by considerable financial, legal, political, etc. resources available to 
the aggregates industry and provincial government ministries.  
 Issues of fit with respect to how Caledon’s OPA 161 policies could be accommodated by 
key industry and provincial government players also influenced inertia and incremental 
institutional change in this case. For example, the industry and provincial government players at 
the negotiating table were finally persuaded that the revised and approved OPA 161 policies “fit” 
well enough within the prevailing provincial legislative framework for aggregate resources. After 
all, the negotiations resulted in a local rule system that, although contributing to incremental 
institutional change, accommodates the core values of industry and provincial players. The 
practical implementation implications of some OPA 161 policies, however, are uncertain and 
potentially significant. Some practicalities (e.g. pre-consultation meetings, monitoring of dust 
and on progressive rehabilitation, additional study requirements, two Extractive Industrial 
designations) challenge well-established norms of operation in the aggregates industry. As a 
result, OPA 161’s substance may not “fit” as well as expected on the ground, and the resulting 
 145 
conflicts may present further tensions for the new rule system. 
 Another pressure for institutional change and inertia at the local level was the provincial-
scale regime shift that occurred from the late 1940s to the late 1990s, which profoundly 
influenced regional and municipal mineral resources policies across southern Ontario. Caledon’s 
1981 Cabinet Corners policies, for example, were a response to Ontario’s first Provincial Policy 
Statement, the Mineral Aggregate Resources Policy Statement, which ensured that official plans 
identify and protect existing pits and quarries and future aggregate reserves from incompatible 
land uses. Moreover, the Caledon Community Resources Study was initiated, in part, because 
Town officials realized in 1996 that the Cabinet Corners policies were continually being 
appealed and overturned at the Ontario Municipal Board due to the changes in the provincial 
legislative framework and the industry-provincial government power relationship. It is important 
to note too that the Caledon Community Resources Study was also an attempt by Town officials 
and planners to resist the implications of the new provincial legislative framework for the 
socioeconomic identity of the Town.  
 One other key force for institutional change that emerged in this case is the diffusion of 
Caledon’s OPA 161 policies in other municipal jurisdictions. According to interviewees 
representing the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing and Caledon planning staff, OPA 
161 has affected and continues to impact the aggregate resources policies of other Municipalities 
in the GGH Region. This diffusion may contribute to incremental institutional change over the 
long term.  
 Two other pressures that drove institutional inertia in this case include the tensions 
between fast and slow moving elements in the institutional system guiding aggregate extraction 
in southern Ontario, and uncertainty. Although regulatory changes have occurred at the local 
level in Caledon, many key normative and cognitive institutional elements in the institutional 
system remain. For example, the norm of unfettered access close to demand was formally 
maintained in the policies that allow for extraction in Reserve areas, albeit pending more onerous 
and costly studies and informally higher standards for approval. Secondly, persistence in the 
Town’s core values indicates that change at the local level was also restricted to the regulative 
dimension. Institutional change, then, was confined to the regulative dimension; therefore, it was 
only incremental. According to Campbell (2005), institutional change is transformative when 
change occurs in most or all dimensions. 
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 With respect to uncertainty, the Town planners involved in writing OPA 161 were 
unclear about the methodology that would be used to measure the social impacts of extraction 
operations in Caledon; therefore, they could not present a credible framework for the study to the 
industry during the Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations. The stand-alone social 
impact study may have been easier to reject because it was still a vague idea and not presented in 
such a level of detail to facilitate negotiations over the particular approach and methods to be 
applied. The rejection of the study was significant because acceptance would have made OPA 
161 more substantive in taking steps towards sustainability objectives, albeit incremental steps. 
  Additionally, the above analysis suggests that the resilience of the existing institutional 
system governing aggregate extraction in southern Ontario is low due to the tight 
interconnections and interdependencies between key industry and provincial government players, 
the high costs associated with change, and the limited room for adaptive and accommodating 
institutional change. These features of the institutional system suggest that it is positioned 
somewhere in the late conservation phase of the adaptive cycle. The above analysis also 
suggests, however, that resistance is high, perhaps due to the resources to which these players 
have access for the purpose of maintaining the existing provincial legislative framework. As long 
as a critical threshold is not crossed, it is likely that institutional change at the provincial scale 
will continue to be incremental. Indeed, it may take more than pressures from nongovernmental 
and community groups to force a change at the provincial scale. Increasing competition over 
land use for aggregate extraction versus other uses and changes in local-to-provincial water 
quality and quantity, etc., are other potential pressures for institutional change in the prevailing 
institutional system. It is difficult to determine the exact position of the institutional system 
within the conservation phase, however. This demonstrates a need within Panarchy theory for 
threshold indicators that help to more precisely reveal the position of a particular system in the 
conservation phase of the adaptive cycle. 
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CHAPTER 8: Analysis 
8.1. Introduction 
 This chapter discusses the strengths and limitations of the preliminary theoretical 
propositions. General conclusions about the effectiveness of the propositions may not be made 
based on the above application to Caledon’s case alone. This section discusses some initial 
observations and recommendations for potential refinements. These observations and 
recommendations are based on whether and how well the propositions answered some of the 
central questions of this study: Why and how and to what extent have institutional change and 
resistance to change towards sustainability occurred in the development of Caledon’s OPA 161 
policies? 
  
8.2. Strengths and limitations of the preliminary theoretical propositions 
The preliminary theoretical propositions assisted elaboration of why and how and to what 
extent institutional progress towards sustainability occurred in a manner comprehensive of the 
details of the story of Caledon’s mineral resources policies and consistent with the previous 
evaluations of OPA 161 undertaken by this study. The propositions captured the major social-
ecological issues and pressures in the case of OPA 161. In some respects, the propositions 
produced insights about the extent to which institutional change occurred that were not 
illuminated by the previous evaluations of OPA 161. 
The Interests, Appropriateness and Legitimacy and Socio-Economic Costs propositions 
captured the important reasons why certain policies were embraced and/or rejected in Caledon’s 
case. Stakeholder interests and values, for example were among the greatest determinants of 
institutional change and inertia. Also, as demonstrated in section 5.7, history and context 
mattered in Caledon’s case. Because these propositions devote attention to long-term historic 
processes and the constraining influence of the existing institutional environment, they captured 
the foundations and existing supportive structures (e.g. law and policy) of stakeholder power 
relationships and core interests and values. This helped in understanding and explaining the high 
socioeconomic costs associated with change for all stakeholders. Moreover, these propositions, 
especially their attention to the actors’ consideration of appropriateness, also captured the 
integral role played by the planners’ sense of fairness, policy robustness, and the natural 
environment in this case. The potential negative social-ecological impacts of JDCL’s quarry 
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application, for example, profoundly influenced OPA 161’s policies and standards of approval 
for aggregate extraction operations.  
The above propositions were mainly based on insights from the New Institutionalism. 
Again, New Institutionalism’s strength is that it emphasizes the social, economic, and political 
dimensions of institutional dynamics. In this case, the New Institutionalism’s attention to the 
logic of appropriateness also captured the role played the natural environment, which 
complements Panarchy theory’s attention to the interconnections and interdependencies between 
and among human and ecological systems. As previously discussed, the preliminary combined 
theoretical propositions are based on an understanding of certain fundamentals. One of these 
fundamentals is the linked nature of social and ecological systems, where the dynamics of one 
influence and constrain the other. In this case, then, the significance of concern for natural and 
cultural heritage resources in JDCL’s case was explicitly brought to light by the New 
Institutionalism’s logic of appropriateness and Panarchy theory’s perception of social and 
ecological systems as inextricably linked.  
Also, with respect to why institutional change occurred, the Adaptive Cycle, Cascading 
Effects, and Regime Shifts propositions captured the interconnections and interdependencies 
between the provincial and local scales, in particular the implications of the provincial-scale 
regime shift on the Town’s local policies, changes in the relationships between and among local 
municipalities, the aggregates industry and key provincial ministries, and the major 
interconnected, external drivers of this regime shift (economic growth and urbanization in the 
GTA). The history of aggregate extraction in southern Ontario and the evolution of the 
provincial legislative framework were captured by the Adaptive Cycle proposition, 
demonstrating the potential generalizability of Panarchy’s adaptive cycle metaphor. 
Additionally, the Adaptive Cycle proposition contributed important insights about potential 
system resilience and resistance. These insights inspired consideration for the position of critical 
thresholds in the institutional system, threats to the existing system (e.g. land use disputes, 
changes in water quantity and quality), and possible future scenarios. Here, again, Panarchy 
theory has contributed to the explanatory strength of the propositions with respect to devoting 
attention to multi-scalar dynamics. More research is required, however, to uncover the 
relationship between resilience and resistance and to develop threshold indicators in order to 
more precisely determine where a particular system is positioned in the conservation phase of the 
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adaptive cycle.  
With respect to how institutional change and inertia occurred, the Renegotiation and 
Reinterpretation and Power and Resources theoretical propositions captured the importance of 
power and resources (financial, political, administrative, ecological, community heroes), 
collaboration, and opportunities for participation in Ontario Municipal Board settlement 
negotiations in this case. The constraining influence of the power relationship between the 
industry and the provincial government, for example, was a significant determinant of 
incremental change in this case. The resources and opportunities for negotiation were integral to 
the Town’s capacity to adapt to provincial legislative constraints while developing policies that 
would protect core community values. These propositions, then, help to explain why the Town 
officials and planners were able to adapt to the new provincial institutional framework and 
undergo policy changes at the local level while protecting and maintaining core community 
values. New Institutionalism’s emphasis on the constraining influences of the particular 
characteristics of the existing institutional system contributed to the strength of the Renegotiation 
and Reinterpretation propositions. The New Institutionalism highlighted the importance of 
power, financial, political, and administrative and community support in this case.  
With respect to the extent to which institutional change occurred, the theoretical 
propositions support the findings of Chapter 6, which demonstrate that OPA 161 represents 
incremental institutional change towards sustainability. The propositions that were the most 
helpful in this regard were Renegotiation and Reinterpretation, Regime Shifts, Cascading Effects, 
Socio-Economic Costs, Variation in Fast and Slow Moving Institutions, Uncertainty, Fit, and 
Diffusion. The Renegotiation and Reinterpretation, Regime Shifts, and Cascading Effects 
propositions captured the impacts of cross-scale path-dependent effects, especially provincial 
legislative constraints and the constraints of the industry-Provincial power relationship, which 
were paramount in determining the final nature OPA 161. Here, the complementarities of the 
New Institutionalism and Panarchy are especially evident in that both bodies of literature 
emphasize path dependency, while Panarchy theory emphasizes cross-scale dynamics. The 
Socio-Economic Costs proposition captured that resistance to institutional change occurred, in 
part, because the Town’s socioeconomic and cultural identity was threatened by changes in the 
provincial legislative framework. Similarly, socioeconomic costs were involved when core 
provincial-industry interests and values were threatened by the original, more substantive 
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policies in OPA 161. The Variation in Fast and Slow Moving Institutions proposition illuminated 
the importance of change across all institutional dimensions (regulative, normative, and 
cognitive) in understanding the extent to which institutional change occurred in Caledon’s case. 
Identifying a point missing from previous evaluations of OPA 161, this proposition suggests that 
institutional change was incremental because it was mainly confined to the regulative dimension. 
The Uncertainty proposition captured one reason why the independent social impact study was 
rejected and thus why OPA 161 was not more substantive in its contributions to sustainability. 
The Fit proposition captured the significance of potential gaps between policy and 
implementation in progress towards sustainability. Conflicts resulting from discrepancies 
between policy and practice, for example, reflect long-standing norms of operation in the 
aggregates industry and present further tensions for the new rule system. Finally, the Diffusion 
proposition captured the significance of the informal translation of some OPA 161 policies in 
other municipalities’ policies. These latter four propositions were based on insights from the 
New Institutionalism.  
Despite the above-mentioned strengths of the preliminary theoretical propositions, there 
are some early limitations and redundancies. The Interests, Appropriateness and Legitimacy 
proposition, for example, did not explicitly address the role played by core values in Caledon’s 
case. Rather, industry, provincial, and community core values had to be inferred from interests. 
The incorporation of interests in this proposition is based on the tendency within rational choice 
New Institutionalism to favour the logic of instrumentality over the logic of appropriateness in 
institutional analysis. Because the rational choice school has mainly been associated with studies 
that investigate the performance of economies, the word “interests” in this proposition has a 
distinct economic flavour. In Caledon’s case, the Town’s core values are tied not just to 
conventional economic interests but also to Caledon’s more complex socioeconomic and cultural 
identity. While these core values are closely associated with the Town’s economic interests and 
this proposition addresses these, Caledon’s socioeconomic identity is a particular identity based 
on valued cultural and natural heritage. Moreover, protection of this identity underpinned the 
Town’s resistance to institutional change. The “logic of appropriateness” does incorporate 
consideration for values but students who do not have an in-depth understanding of the New 
Institutionalism could easily overlook this. The Interests, Appropriateness and Legitimacy 
proposition was modified to incorporate attention to core values.  
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The Renegotiation and Reinterpretation proposition captured the constraining influence 
of the provincial legislative framework and power on Caledon’s local policies as major 
determinants of change in Caledon’s case. These major reasons for incremental change may not 
have been captured if Caledon’s case had not involved periods of negotiation. The constraining 
influences of the particulars of prevailing institutional systems should be incorporated in other 
propositions beyond this one in order to ensure that they are captured in other cases.  
The Fit proposition assumes that the institutional system within which institutional 
entrepreneurs are participating has wide support, not in the sense that everyone likes the system, 
just in the sense that many established interests are dependent on it or have other reasons to 
worry about what will happen if the system collapses. However, when a particular institutional 
arrangement collapses, it may become broadly discredited or vice versa. In these cases where the 
prevailing institutional system does not have broad public support, Fit may not be as great a 
concern as having a plausible and credible alternative at hand, supported by individuals with 
actual or potential power. The propositions were adjusted to reflect this consideration.  
Additionally, despite the explanatory power of the theoretical framework, important 
questions about institutional change and inertia remain. For example, beyond the above-
described pressures for institutional change and inertia, how have the aggregates industry and 
key provincial ministries been able to maintain the norms of unfettered access close to demand, 
and centralized control over aggregate resources for so long in southern Ontario? What factor 
was most influential in determining incremental institutional change in this case? This study 
focuses on one case study, where Caledon pushed back against powerful political and economic 
interests in order to protect core community values. But many other, similar cases exist in 
southern Ontario. Why has the cumulative pushback from many stakeholders involved in 
aggregate extraction-related complex land use issues in southern Ontario not had a profound 
impact on the norms that characterize the provincial legislative framework? One clue is that 
aggregate extraction in southern Ontario is relatively concentrated geographically in a few key 
areas. The scale of the resistance to the current provincial institutional framework, then, has not 
been province wide; therefore, opposition may not be significant enough to be perceived as a 
political threat that requires governmental action. While the theoretical propositions based on 
Panarchy theory do consider multi-scalar effects, scale was not incorporated in the Power and 
Resources proposition. Scale and its implications for power, institutional change and resistance 
 152 
to chance, then, were not captured. The propositions were adjusted to incorporate consideration 
for scale.  
Also, the central role played by the industry-provincial government power relationship in 
this case suggests that the theoretical propositions should devote more attention to the dynamics 
of power in cases of institutional change and inertia. The propositions that consider power are 
based on insights from the New Institutionalism. However, according to the overview provided 
in Chapter 2, the three major strands of New Institutionalist thought do not explain the 
implications of power for institutional change and inertia beyond suggesting that powerful elites 
will seek to protect their values and interests and certain actors will have more influence over 
others in policy development. More research is required to determine if this is an essential 
limitation of the New Institutionalism as a whole, or if the propositions do not accurately reflect 
various New Institutionalist explanations of the determinative effects of power dynamics in 
institutional systems.  
Finally, there is some perhaps unnecessary overlap among the Adaptive Cycle, Regime 
Shift, and Cascading Effects propositions. Because adaptive cycles are depicted as hierarchically 
nested in space and time, where smaller and larger scales constrain and influence each other, the 
metaphor incorporates room for discussion on regime shifts and cascading effects. These three 
propositions, however, are oriented towards answering different questions about institutional 
change. Briefly, Regime Shifts and Cascading Effects answer questions about the extent to which 
institutional change occurs while the Adaptive Cycle proposition devotes more attention to how 
and why institutional change and resistance to change occurs. The redundancies among these 
propositions, therefore, may enhance their explanatory capacity. More experience in application 
is required to refine this early redundancy.  
Based on the above discussion, the preliminary theoretical propositions were adjusted. 
Box 9, below, presents the modified combined preliminary theoretical propositions. 
 
Box 9. Modified combined preliminary theoretical propositions 
 
1. Actors may resist or facilitate institutional change in order to maximize individual and/or 
collective interests, protect and maintain core values, and/or to achieve cultural appropriateness 
and legitimacy as defined by a particular, culturally embedded institutional environment. Actors’ 
interests and values are determined, in part, by the institutional system and by long-term historic 
processes (e.g. socialization). 
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2. Actors may resist or facilitate institutional change through the process of renegotiation and 
reinterpretation and/or by creating innovative institutions from previously existing institutional 
elements. These processes lead to path-dependent change because the range of options available 
to institutional entrepreneurs is constrained by the particular characteristics (e.g. power 
relationships, actors’ interests and values, laws and informal norms, etc.) of the existing 
institutional system. 
 
3. Institutional change and resistance to change occur within a four-phase adaptive cycle of 
growth, conservation, release, and reorganization. Long-term path dependent processes 
(positive feedbacks, increasing returns, and transaction costs) influence change and resistance 
to change throughout the adaptive cycle. Path dependent processes are reinforced by the cross- 
scale interconnections and interdependencies between the institutions that comprise the 
institutional system. The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is 
determined, in part, by the resilience and resistance of the institutional system as it progresses 
through the four phases of the adaptive cycle:  
 
• During the reorganization and growth phases, resilience is high. As the system matures 
and progresses to the end of the conservation phase, resilience declines. Near the end of 
the conservation phase, internal and/or external stresses may push the institutional 
system beyond a critical threshold, commencing a period of renegotiation and 
reinterpretation of the rules of the game. Uncertainty and instability rule. Significant 
resources are spent to adjust the institutional framework. Actors with access to decision-
making bring forward new and/or old ideas, which create the source for reorganization.  
 
4. The extent to which institutional change occurs is determined, in part, by: 
 
• whether a regime shift occurs. A regime shift involves rapid and large changes in the 
internal feedbacks of a particular institutional system. They are less frequent than 
incremental changes and they may occur when a system crosses a critical threshold, 
especially when the resilience of a particular institutional system is low. 
 
• whether change at one scale causes a cascade of changes at other scales. Sometimes, 
when a single threshold is crossed, a cascading effect can occur in which multiple 
thresholds across scales are breached. A regime shift in one institutional arrangement in 
one domain may affect change and/or induce a regime shift in other institutional 
arrangements in other domains.  
 
5. The extent to which institutional change and resistance to change occur is determined, in part, 
by:  
 
• the socio-economic costs associated with change. Path-dependent processes involve high 
socio-economic costs of reversal or reorganization, especially when the interconnections 
and interdependencies between and among the institutions, organizations, and certain 
socioeconomic groups in the institutional system are tight. 
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• the power and resources (esp. financial, ties to people in power, political support, 
opportunities for participation, ecological) held by particular socioeconomic groups to 
develop, translate and enact innovation(s).  
 
• the scale(s) at which pressures for change and inertia occur. Province-wide pressures for 
change, for example, may be more influential with respect to inducing institutional 
change than pressures from isolated groups or groups concentrated in one geographic 
location.   
 
• the capacity of actors to translate and enact an innovation (with suitable accommodation 
but no alterations that undermine the essentials) across a range of organizations or 
across a population. Translation and enactment occur within and are constrained by a 
particular institutional context and by a particular set of actors.  
 
• the nature of the proposed new institution. The more the actors can demonstrate that a 
particular innovation “fits” the existing institutional framework, the more likely that it 
will be adopted by particular actors (powerful elites, communities, organizations, etc). If 
the existing institutional system has been discredited, however, alternative solutions may 
be welcomed. 
 
• how much variations occurs in fast and slow moving institutions (regulative, normative, 
and cognitive) over time. Transformative change occurs when there is change across 
most or all of these dimensions. 
 
• uncertainty: limitations in the quality and quantity of information and knowledge about 
certain problems; available or potential solutions, and the methods available for 





CHAPTER 9: Conclusions 
The theoretical propositions developed by this study are preliminary and require further 
refinement based on application to many other cases. Regardless of this limitation, the research 
demonstrates the advantages of developing and applying an interdisciplinary theoretical 
framework in analyses of the dynamics of institutional systems. Integrating key concepts from 
the New Institutionalism and Panarchy theory in analysis should enhance our understanding of 
such phenomena in social-ecological systems and, by extension, enrich our comprehensions of 
human-institutional-ecological interactions. As such, the research contributes insights to the New 
Institutionalism and Panarchy theory about the positive implications of exchange between and 
among these theories. The research has also contributes to knowledge about how and why and to 
what extent institutional change and inertia towards sustainability might occur in a given context. 
The academic and practical contributions of the research are discussed, below. 
 
9.1 Contributions to the literature 
The preliminary theoretical propositions developed by this study assisted elaboration of 
why and how and to what extent institutional progress and inertia towards sustainability occurred 
in a manner comprehensive of the social-ecological issues and pressures in the story of the 
development of Caledon’s OPA 161. Moreover, the propositions were able to assist explanation 
of institutional change and resistance to change in a way that overcame the limitations of 
Panarchy theory and the New Institutionalism individually.  
First, the research found that Panarchy theory and the New Institutionalism share many 
concepts (e.g., thresholds or tipping points, path dependency and path dependent effects, 
multiple equilibrium orders or multiple stable states, and fast and slow moving variables) to aid 
in understanding and explaining the dynamics of institutional and ecological realms. More 
research is required to investigate both theories for other shared concepts and to explore the 
subtle yet enlightening differences in interpretation and application. At this early stage, the 
commonalities among these theories attest to their compatibility for the purposes of investigating 
the dynamics of institutional systems. They also provide evidence of the similarities in the 
dynamics of social and ecological worlds.  
Early New Institutionalist investigations into the nonlinear effects of institutional 
dynamics (e.g. Pierson, 2004) would especially benefit from exchange with Panarchy theory. For 
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example, the research found that key concepts and metaphors (adaptive cycle, panarchy, regime 
shifts, cascading effects, thresholds), which have been developed by Panarchy theorists to devote 
attention to scale and vertical and horizontal feedback loops, complement the New 
Institutionalism’s ability to capture important contextual factors affecting institutional change 
and inertia, and help to overcome the current limitation in its capacity to understand and explain 
the nonlinear, multi-scalar dynamics of institutional systems. Notably, Panarchy theory’s 
attention to scale could capture one reason why institutional change towards sustainability in the 
institutional system governing aggregate extraction in southern Ontario has not been more 
profound over the years, and why resistance to change has been the norm: the pushback against 
powerful industry-provincial players has been relatively concentrated geographically in a few 
key areas in southern Ontario. The scale of the resistance to the current provincial institutional 
framework, then, has not been province wide; therefore, opposition may not be significant 
enough to be perceived as a political threat that requires governmental action. Also, in this study, 
Panarchy theory’s understanding of social and ecological systems as inextricably linked 
complemented key concepts from the New Institutionalism (e.g., logic of appropriateness) with 
respect to capturing the determinative role played by Caledon’s rich natural and cultural heritage 
in the development of the Amendment. 
In turn, Panarchy theorists would benefit from exchange with New Institutionalists with 
respect to understanding and explaining the social dimensions of institutional change and inertia 
in social-ecological systems. For example, the research found that key concepts and insights 
from the New Institutionalism complement and enrich the explanatory power of Panarchy 
theory’s key concepts and adaptive cycle metaphor. For example, while both theories emphasize 
the implications of fast and slow moving variables for social and ecological change, the New 
Institutionalism is capable of defining precisely what slow (e.g. informal institutions) and fast 
(e.g. formal institutions) variables are in the context of institutional systems; it distinguishes 
between regulative, normative, and cognitive institutional dimensions and emphasizes the 
implications of the tensions between them for institutional change and inertia. Moreover, in 
contrast to Panarchy theory, the New Institutionalism emphasizes agency and the feedbacks 
between people and institutions. Such essential concepts as uncertainty, bounded rationality, 
diffusion, socioeconomic costs, institutional fit, renegotiation and reinterpretation, power and 
resources, and the logics of appropriateness and instrumentality complement and enhance 
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Panarchy theory’s explanatory strengths  
With respect to inquiries from scholars into the generalizability of the adaptive cycle 
metaphor, the research found that the four-phase depiction of change in ecological systems could 
be applied to Caledon’s case. It was able to capture and contribute to an understanding of the 
history and evolution of the provincial institutional system guiding aggregate extraction in 
southern Ontario. For example, it provided a useful perspective on the regime shift that occurred 
from the late 1940s to the mid-1990s. It also highlighted the critical threshold that was crossed in 
Caledon’s case and the local-to-provincial pressures that helped to induce a period of 
renegotiation and reinterpretation of Caledon’s local mineral resources policies. Notably, the 
adaptive cycle’s attention to connectedness and rigidity versus flexibility could provide clues 
about the resilience of the institutional system, which, according to theory, is low. Resistance to 
institutional change, however, remains strong. Here, the New Institutionalism’s attention to 
power and resources began to explain why industry-provincial resistance has been and continues 
to be so significant.  
More research is required to explore how the adaptive cycle metaphor might be applied to 
the emergence, persistence, and resilience and resistance of institutions and institutional systems. 
Secondly, although the adaptive cycle metaphor contributed insights about the potential 
resilience of the institutional system, neither theory devotes significant attention to understanding 
the dynamics of resilient and resistant but inefficient and/or unproductive institutional and 
ecological systems. Overall, more research is required to better our understanding of the 
relationship between resilience and resistance, and how a negative type of resilience might be 
overcome. Also, although the adaptive cycle metaphor provided clues about the location of the 
institutional system in the conservation phase, more research is required to develop threshold 
indicators that help to more precisely determine the position of a particular system within the 
conservation phase of the adaptive cycle. 
Given the centrality of the constraining influence of path dependent effects in Caledon’s 
case, more research in both New Institutionalists and Panarchy theories should be devoted to 
investigating mechanisms (e.g., social learning, adaptive management, etc.) that help to 
counteract destructive path dependent effects, especially when they work to prevent institutional 
progress towards sustainability. Additionally, given the significant role played by power in this 
case, more research is required to determine if the theoretical propositions accurately reflect New 
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Institutionalist explanations of power dynamics in institutional change and inertia, or if the New 
Institutionalism is essentially limited in its ability to elaborate the implications of power 
dynamics for institutional emergence, persistence, change and resistance to change.   
Overall, the research demonstrates that integrating central concepts and insights from the 
New Institutionalism and Panarchy theory will increase our comprehension of human-
institutional-ecological interactions. In Caledon’s case for example, the theoretical propositions 
captured, among other important factors, that the Town’s natural and cultural heritage resources, 
concern for the integrity of these resources, uncertainty, and the socioeconomic costs associated 
with change played profound roles in institutional inertia and incremental institutional change 
towards sustainability.   
 
9.2 Lessons learned about institutional change and resistance to change towards 
sustainability  
Institutional change towards sustainability in Caledon’s case was incremental in some 
sustainability requirements, notably Social-Ecological System Integrity, Social-Ecological 
Civility and Democratic Governance, and Precaution and Adaptation. More substantive progress 
would have been made in all sustainability requirements if key provincial and industry players 
had accepted the Town’s original Amendment policies.  
The theoretical propositions revealed that both institutional change and inertia in the 
development of OPA 161 were underpinned by core socioeconomic interests and values held by 
key Town officials and planners, individuals representing the aggregates industry, and staff from 
key provincial ministries, notably the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing. For example, the Town, provincial government ministries, and 
individuals representing the aggregates industry were willing to negotiate new local mineral 
resources policies in order to avoid costly Ontario Municipal Board hearings. But industry and 
provincial government resistance to the more substantive policies in the original Amendment 
was underpinned by their interest in maintaining centralized control over and unfettered access to 
prime aggregate resources close to demand. These core values are rooted in the intertwined 
histories of economic growth, demand for affordable prime aggregates for urban development, 
and provincial land use planning and natural resource management legislation. In contrast, Town 
officials, planners, and individual citizens fought to maintain core community values (local 
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control over local issues, protection of natural and cultural heritage, and a balanced approach to 
land use planning) integral to the socioeconomic identity of the Town. These community values 
are rooted in the history of the Town, including the Town’s identity as a major supplier of 
aggregates to the GTA and beyond, dealings with the aggregates industry, strong culture of 
stewardship, and long standing tradition of local control over local issues and interests.  
The significant role played by core values and interests in Caledon’s case highlights the 
implications of the tensions between fast and slow moving elements in the institutional system 
for institutional change and resistance to change. In Caledon’s case, for example, legislative 
changes occurred at the provincial and local levels, but key normative (e.g., unfettered access to 
aggregate resources close to demand) and cognitive (e.g., core values of key Town official, 
planners, and citizens) institutional elements prevail. Institutional change towards sustainability, 
therefore, was incremental.  
The propositions revealed that other pressures for institutional change and inertia in 
Caledon’s case included (a) the provincial regime shift that occurred from the late 1940s to the 
late 1990s, which induced the period of renegotiation and reinterpretation of Caledon’s mineral 
resources policies; (b) the socioeconomic costs of change for the Town of Caledon and key 
aggregates industry and provincial government players; and (c) the path dependent constraints of 
the provincial legislative framework governing aggregate extraction in southern Ontario, and the 
industry-provincial government power relationship. The path dependent effects of these latter 
formal and informal elements of the institutional system were central determinants of the 
trajectory of change in the development of OPA 161. For example, the existing provincial 
legislative framework provided the source for creativity and imposed significant institutional 
constraints in the development of the Amendment.   
Factors that enabled institutional change and resistance to change included the periods of 
renegotiation and reinterpretation of Caledon’s mineral resources policies during the Ontario 
Municipal Board settlement negotiations, and the power and resources (economic, political, 
administrative, community support, etc.) possessed by key stakeholders involved in development 
the Amendment. The Town, for example, had sufficient economic resources to participate in the 
Ontario Municipal Board hearings, and wide political and community support for the Caledon 
Community Resources Study. Similarly, the industry-provincial government power relationship 
has been and continues to be reinforced by considerable financial, legal, political, etc. resources 
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available to the aggregates industry and key provincial government ministries. 
Other pressures for institutional change in Caledon’s case include the diffusion of OPA 
161 policies to other municipalities, which may contribute to incremental provincial-scale 
institutional change towards sustainability over the long term. More research is required to 
determine the extent to which diffusion is occurring. The propositions also revealed that the 
Town planners’ aim to develop appropriately robust policies in order to protect valued natural 
and cultural resources was a significant driver for institutional change. Additionally, such local- 
to-provincial pressures as changes in water quality and quantity, and increasing competition over 
land uses may combine with pressures from environmental nongovernmental organizations to 
push the current institutional system beyond a critical threshold, which may provide an opening 
for institutional change and continues resistance to change.   
Other pressures for institutional inertia in Caledon’s case include issues of fit with respect 
to how the Amendment is implemented on the ground. Certain OPA 161 policies, for example, 
challenge the modus operandi of aggregate extraction operations, which may exacerbate 
resistance to change. More research is required to determine how these issues of fit might 
influence the effectiveness of the policies and the future development of the Amendment. 
Uncertainty presented another influential force for inertia in that the Town planners’ ideas for an 
independent social impact study requirement were too vague to be discussed in detail during the 
Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations for the Amendment.  
The implications of uncertainty in Caledon’s case emphasize the importance of 
developing credible alternatives when pursuing institutional change towards sustainability. In 
fact, the theoretical propositions and lessons learned from Caledon’s case carry many other 
practical insights for advocates of sustainability who seek institutional change. For example, the 
research demonstrates the importance of considering broad contextual factors (e.g., 
interconnections and interdependencies within and between institutional elements across various 
scales, issues of fit, thresholds, resilience, etc.) in efforts to facilitate and/or implement 
institutional change towards sustainability.  
Overall, the theoretical propositions and case study findings suggest that institutional 
change and inertia are interconnected and interdependent and, depending on the case and 
context, they may interact with each other across multiple spatial and temporal scales. Moreover, 
there may be significant overlap in the emergence of pressures for institutional inertia and 
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change across temporal and spatial scales, and both institutional change and resistance to change 
may be present when opportunities arise for renegotiation and reinterpretation of the “rules of the 
game”. For example, a range of interconnected and overlapping, historic and immediate, local-
to-provincial factors (e.g., the provincial regime shift, socioeconomic costs, path dependent 
effects, uncertainty, etc.) and institutional elements (interests and values, power and resources, 
existing provincial legislative framework, fit, etc.), contributed to institutional change and inertia 
in Caledon’s case. Moreover, both institutional change and resistance to change were enabled by 
the Ontario Municipal Board settlement negotiations for OPA 161. The slow moving 
institutional variables in Caledon’s case (core Town, industry and provincial government values 
and interests), which have endured under the Amendment, were perhaps the greatest 
determinants of change and resistance to change towards sustainability. These core values 
persisted under the provincial and local regime shifts and underpinned both incremental change 
and resistance to change throughout the development of OPA 161. The story of Caledon’s 
mineral resources policies, then, is about the resilience and resistance efforts of a small Town 
committed to maintaining core community values under the constraints of a resilient and 
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Appendix A: History of aggregate resources law in Ontario, 1950 – present 
 
Winfield and Taylor (2005) and Baker, Slanz, and Summerville (2001) provide excellent 
descriptions of the evolution of aggregate resources legislation in Ontario. Baker et al. analysed 
the content of 140 Ontario Municipal Board hearings over a twenty-five year period (1971 – 
1996) to investigate the role of legislation and policy in decision-making, and to examine the 
conflict between provincial and municipal governments. Winfield and Taylor examined 30 years 
(1970 – 2005) of Ontario legislation and policy for trends in the aggregate and land use 
legislative framework.  
 
1950s to early 1970s 
Prior to the 1950s, there was limited regulation of the aggregate industry. Demand for 
aggregate was relatively low and the need for aggregate was centered primarily on local road and 
construction projects. This began to change by the mid-1950s with economic growth and 
increasing suburban development. Larger corporations soon formed to supply the demand. This 
meant that sand and gravel was increasingly being hauled beyond the rural boundaries within 
which the pits were situated. The aggregates industry grew rapidly during the 1950-70 period. In 
southern Ontario, for example, where urbanization was concentrated, consumption of aggregate 
increased from 3.86 tonnes/person in 1950 to 14.33 tonnes/person in 1996 (Baker et al., 2001, p. 
467). During this period, regulation of aggregate extraction was decentralized across a range of 
statutes and provincial regulating agencies. Municipalities had primary control over the 
establishment, operation, and location of new pits and quarries. Under the provincial Planning 
Act and Municipal Act, Municipal-level planning tools consisted of Official Plan regulatory by-
laws, and restricted-area zoning by-laws. These planning tools allowed Municipalities to 
establish by-laws that prohibited pits and quarries. A 1959 Planning Act Amendment closed this 
loophole so that municipalities could only control aggregate extraction with zoning by-laws. As 
concern for environmental protection intensified in the mid-1960s, municipalities throughout the 
province used the powers invested in them to control aggregate developments. 
By the late 1960s, the informal “shortage of supply” discourse had emerged. The 
aggregate industry began to lobby the provincial government for remedial action against a 
perceived shortage of resources. According to Baker et al., this perceived shortage was the result 
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of a lack of understanding of the amount of sand, gravel and bedrock resources available for 
extraction; rising conflict between public concern for the environmental impacts of aggregate 
extraction and increasing public demand for aggregate resources; and increasing competition 
between the aggregates industry and municipalities for land for aggregate mining versus other 
land uses. The industry wanted continued unrestrained access to the resource. Municipalities 
were interested in protecting local communities from the negative impacts of aggregate mining, 
and the Province’s interests were aligned with the industry. According to Baker et al., this was 
when the industry began to dominate policy-making. In 1969, the Province created the Mineral 
Resources Committee to examine the industry’s concerns and make recommendations that would 
guarantee the ongoing availability of aggregates close to demand. The Committee was comprised 
of provincial government and industry representatives and no Municipal or Regional 
governmental representation. The Committee’s 1969 report recommended increased provincial 
control over the aggregates industry. This was the beginning of the loss of municipal control over 
aggregate extraction: “…the industry, realizing the growing ‘crisis’ for aggregate producers, 
‘captured’ the provincial government and began to dominate policy-making” (p. 468). Chambers 
and Sandberg (2007) assert that the aggregate industry was successful in its demands partly 
because both the provincial government and the industry were profiting from increasing 
urbanization.  
 
Early 1970s to early 1980s 
In 1971, the Pits and Quarries Control Act came into effect. Significantly influenced by 
the recommendations of the Mineral Resources Committee, this new law transferred control of 
aggregate resources to the province. Responsibility for approvals of aggregate developments 
shifted from Municipalities to the Province. This was accomplished through the establishment of 
a licensing and site plan procedure system enforced by the Ministry of Natural Resources. The 
numerous agencies and regulations that had comprised the former institutional framework were 
streamlined so that the Ministry of Natural Resources became the central planning agency, with 
power to licence, regulate, and rehabilitate pits and quarries. Municipalities were allowed to 
maintain control over the location of future pits and quarries through land use planning but the 
new Act essentially shifted the relatively decentralized system to a centralized one with the 
province at the helm. In a significant step, the Act also required the rehabilitation of pits and 
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quarries. 
In 1976, the Ministry of Natural Resources established the Ontario Mineral Aggregate 
Working Party to review the Pits and Quarries Control Act and make further recommendations 
to the Ontario government on mineral aggregate policy. This Working Party was comprised of 
representatives from the public, municipalities, the aggregates industry, and government. It 
recognized the growing conflicts between the aggregates sector and the interests of private 
citizens: “…while there is a general acceptance within the Province that aggregate extraction is 
necessary, there is also a very real concern by the citizens involved to see that their interests are 
protected” (Baker et al., 2001, p. 470). It recognized other pervasive issues in the industry also, 
including a lack of consistency in the administration of the Pits and Quarry Control Act; a failure 
of enforcement of the Act; deficiencies in the Act; inequities in the supply system within the 
Province; and a severe lack of any rehabilitation. The Working Party’s final report, A Policy for 
Mineral Aggregate Management in Ontario, made many recommendations for improvements in 
policy and legislation and endorsed municipal involvement in the decision-making process: 
“Provincial-municipal shared control was seen as the best way to ensure environmental 
protection, regulatory control, and industry needs” (p. 470). This, however, was not reflected in 
subsequent changes in aggregate policy. For example, the Ministry of Natural Resources’ 1979 
Mineral Aggregate Resources Policy Statement, the “Mineral Aggregate Policy for Official 
Plans,” protected lands identified as having significant aggregate deposits from all other land 
uses until aggregates had first been removed. Aggregate extraction, then, had priority over all 
other land uses. 
Section 3 of the new Planning Act, adopted in 1983, allowed the provincial government 
to issue policy statements to guide municipal authorities in land use planning. The “Mineral 
Aggregate Resources Policy Statement” (MARPS) was the first of these provincial policy 
statements. It was based on an inventory of aggregates in Ontario, projected demands, and 
estimated volumes to be produced by local jurisdictions (see Chambers & Sandberg, 2007). Like 
the 1979 policy, the objectives of MARPS ensured that official plans identify and protect 
existing pits and quarries and future aggregate reserves from incompatible land uses. 
Municipalities did not have to zone the identified areas for extraction but it prevented them from 
being used for any other purpose.  
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1985 – mid 1990s 
The (1989) Aggregate Resources Act (ARA) replaced the Pits and Quarries Control Act. 
It received first reading in 1979 but was not adopted until 1989. The ARA was at this time 
largely based on the recommendations of the Ontario Mineral Aggregate Working Party’s final 
report. According to Baker et al., the ARA was unpopular with the industry. This may have been 
because the ARA placed more responsibility on the aggregate industry for the mitigation of the 
environmental and social impacts of extraction. Municipalities also disliked the new bill because 
it did nothing to reverse the trend to diminish the ability of the municipalities to restrict 
aggregate operations. The move to give more responsibility to the aggregate industry for the 
environmental impacts of aggregate extraction may have been, in part, a response to the 
significant increase in the rate of aggregate extraction in southern Ontario. Between 1979 and 
1989, aggregate production increased from 131 million tonnes to 197 tonnes (Baker et al., 2001, 
p.471): “With this dramatic rise in mining activity came heightened awareness of the overall 
costs of the industry and weaknesses in the policy framework” (p. 471). In December 1994, the 
province adopted a comprehensive set of provincial policy statements, which came into effect in 
1995. These statements were based on the work of the Commission on Planning and 
Development Reform. Among these statements was the Mineral Aggregate and Mineral 
Petroleum Resources Policy Statement, the chief objective of which was to ensure that 
aggregates resources were available at a reasonable cost and as close to markets as possible to 
meet local, regional and provincial needs. The goals of 1979 MARPS policy were carried over in 
this policy statement. Other types of land uses were permissible only in areas where mineral 
extraction was not feasible, if development would not preclude aggregate extraction, and if the 
proposed land use or development was in the greater interest of the general public. Under the 
Planning Act, Municipal planning authorities had to adhere to this policy in their Official Plans. 
The trend to reinforce aggregate law with land use planning policy continued, therefore, with the 
new Provincial Policy Statement, which came into effect in March 1995. 
A further shift in responsibilities from the Ministry of Natural Resources to the aggregate 
industry occurred in 1995, when the Ministry of Natural Resources experienced a dramatic 
reduction in funding for their aggregates program. In response to the reductions, the Aggregate 
and Petroleum Resources Statute Law Amendment Act was passed in 1996 and proclaimed in 
force in June 1997. It amended the ARA. Notably, it handed compliance inspection and 
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reporting, management of rehabilitation funds and the Management of Abandoned Aggregate 
Properties Program (MAAP), and operational accountability responsibilities to the industry, 
while the province retained responsibility for conducting enforcement, setting standards, and 
issuing approvals. Under this amendment, the Minister created the Aggregate Resources Trust 
and appointed the Ontario Aggregate Resources Corporation (TOARC) as trustee. TOARC’s 
sole shareholder is the Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, formerly called the Aggregate 
Producers’ Association of Ontario. The purposes of the Trust include, among others, the 
rehabilitation of abandoned pits and quarries, the collection and disbursement of aggregate fees 
to the Crown, regional and local municipalities, and research on aggregate resources 
management. According to Winfield and Taylor, this shift in responsibilities solidified a 
partnership between the provincial government and the aggregate industry in the management of 
the industry and mitigation of its environmental impacts. It also changed the powers of the 
Ministry of Natural Resources relative to the Ontario Municipal Board. The Ministry of Natural 
Resources, for example, was now responsible for deciding whether a licence application would 
be referred to the Ontario Municipal Board and the issues to be examined at the Ontario 
Municipal Board. And the Minister could also refuse a condition specified by the Ontario 
Municipal Board for a particular licence if he or she determined that the condition was not 
consistent with the purpose of the ARA:  “The effect of these amendments was to allow the 
minister to decide, one, whether appeals of applications for aggregate licences under the ARA by 
individuals or municipalities are allowed to proceed before the Ontario Municipal Board and, 
two, the scope of any case referred to the Ontario Municipal Board” (Winfield and Taylor, 2005, 
p. 13). Also in 1996, the 1995 Provincial Policy Statement was rewritten to further ensure that as 
much aggregate resources as possible be made available as close to market as possible to supply 
market needs without consideration of other land uses.   
 
1996 to present 
The above trend in the evolution of legislation and policy that govern aggregate resources 
prevails. Today, Ontario’s current Planning Act (1990) requires planning decisions and Official 
Plans to be “consistent with” provincial policy statements and to “conform with” or “not conflict 
with” provincial plans. This is an amendment to the 1996 version of the Act, which required 
planning decisions “to have regard to” provincial policy statements. Ontario’s Provincial Policy 
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Statement (2005) continues to protect aggregate resources for long-term use by ensuring that “as 
much of the mineral aggregate resources as is realistically possible shall be made available as 
close to markets as possible” (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2005, p. 23). 
Subsections 2.5.2.4 and 2.5.2.5 give priority to aggregate operations and areas identified as 
having deposits of mineral aggregate resources over other potential land uses. Section 2.5.4 lays 
out a particular stipulation to permit aggregate extraction in prime agricultural areas, on prime 
agricultural land. A demonstration of need, including any type of supply/demand analysis, is not 
required. Social and environmental impacts are laid out in subsection 2.5.2.2, and require 
aggregate extraction undertakings to proceed in a manner that minimizes social and 
environmental impacts. But no direction is provided that elaborates on the interpretation of this 
clause. Section 2.5.3 lays out in scant detail requirements for rehabilitation, the funds for which, 
as previously described, are administered by TOARC. 
From 2003 to 2006, the Office of the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario undertook 
a review of Ministry of Natural Resources’ Aggregate Resources Program. The report released in 
2006 confirms that the Program lacks the capacity to fulfill its responsibilities due to inadequate 
staffing, funds, and expertise: “In addition to overall cuts in funding and staffing, inadequate 
capacity is hindering Ministry of Natural Resources’ aggregates program in the areas of 
approvals and compliance, the oversight of rehabilitation activities, and long-term planning” 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2007, p. 52). For example, since 1995/1996 budget 
for the program was reduced from $5.2 million to $1.7 million and the number of staff inspectors 
was slashed from 41 in 1997 to 20 in 2006. Inspectors are expected to report on as many as 600 
aggregate operations. According to Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (2007), staff 
inspectors can effectively report on approximately 150 sites: “Actual audit rates in the last four 
years have hovered between 10 ad 13 percent, and an average pit or quarry might only be 
inspected only every 6 to 10 years” (p. 52). The study also found that compliance problems and 
complaints have increased: “Ministry of Natural Resources surveyed licencee compliance with 
the ARA within the Oak Ridges Moraine, and found that 100 sites out of 121 had compliance 
problems: “Lack of staff and visibility in the field by inspectors has resulted in an increase in 
illegal operations and numerous complaints to the Ministry of Natural Resources field staff” (p. 
53). As a result, many municipalities have asked for the power to enforce rules on site 
operations. According to the review, the Ministry of Natural Resources and TOARC do not have 
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an adequate database for evaluating rehabilitation activities across the province (p. 53). The 
Ministry of Natural Resources has also lost much of its expertise in hydrogeology, making it 
difficult to assess potential impacts on water resources.  Inadequate staffing has affected the 
Ministry of Natural Resources’ aggregate resource inventorying activities. Every 10 years, an 
evaluation of the state of the resource should be undertaken. But the most recent inventory dates 
back to 1992.  
In response to some of the above issues, the ARA was amended in 2006 to require 
aggregate operators to keep a record of the amount of aggregate removed from a site. Also, 
aggregate inspectors now have the power to issue a “stop work order” for violations of the ARA 
provisions and regulations. Licence and permit fees were also increased for the first time in 30 
years to 11.5 cents/tonne from 6 cents/tonne.  
In February 2009, the Ministry of Natural Resources commenced a State of Aggregate 
Resource in Ontario Study as an attempt to update the 1992 study. Among other objectives, the 
Study aims to develop a methodology to forecast future aggregate demand and analyse 
alternative sources of aggregate. 
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Appendix B: Interview questions 
A.) Questions and prompts to all interviewees (Mayor of Caledon, Town Councilors, Town 
Planners, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing staff, and members of the Caledon 
Coalition of Concerned Citizens, Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association): 
 
1. Why did the Town and the Region initiate the Caledon Community Resources study? 
• Why was it needed? 
• Who was involved in the study? 
 
2. Why did the Region of Peel not have a Regional Official Plan in 1996? 
• Were the Region and the Town under a lot of pressure from the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing to develop a Regional Official Plan? 
 
3. How could Caledon get away with using the Cabinet Corners policies for so long? 
• How did the Cabinet Corners policies come about? 
 
4. What were the key controversial policies in the Region’s 1996 Official Plan? 
• HPMARA map, protection of Peel’s Greenlands system, demonstration of need, policies 
about providing balance and priority to protect settlement areas, rural character, cultural 
heritage 
 
5. What were the key controversial policies in OPA 161? 
• Prioritization, two extraction designations, demonstration of need, independent social 
impact study, protection of Greenlands system, monitoring of dust and rehabilitation, 
Comprehensive Broader Scale Environmental Study requirement 
 
6. In your opinion, why did the players involved in OPA 161 support or reject the more 
controversial policies? 
• Town Council, Regional Council, Town Planners, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing/ Ministry of Natural Resources, Coalition of Concerned Citizens, Niagara 
Escarpment Commission, Credit Valley Conservation Authority, Ontario Stone, Sand & 
Gravel Association, individual quarry owners, James Dick Construction 
 
7. In your opinion, how significant is OPA 161 when it comes to aggregate extraction operations 
in Caledon?  
 
8. In your opinion, how will OPA 161 influence future aggregate extraction operations in 
Caledon?  
 
9. In your opinion, will OPA 161 have an effect beyond Caledon? Why? 
 
10. In your opinion, what contributed to the success of OPA 161, especially with regards to its 
incorporation in Caledon’s OP and the Ontario Municipal Board hearing where it was decided 
that OPA 161 would be applied to JDCL’s case?  
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B.) Additional questions posed to members of the Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel 
Association and Gravel Watch: 
1. Interviewees were asked to speak to the following trends that have emerged or disappeared 
over the years in aggregate extraction law and practice: 
• Rehabilitation problems 
• Demonstration of need 
• Recognition and mitigation of environmental and social impacts 
• Shortage of supply, close to demand discourse 
• Recycling of aggregate 























Appendix C: Evaluations of OPA 161 
 
Table 2 Evaluation of OPA 161 against a consolidated set of context specific sustainability 
criteria 
OPA 161 policies were evaluated against a set of context specific sustainability criteria in 
order to determine the extent to which OPA 161 may contribute to progress towards 
sustainability across local to provincial scales. Section 6.4 discusses the results of this evaluation.  
 
Table 2. Evaluation of OPA 161 against a consolidated set of context specific sustainability 
criteria 







Green Gravel priorities and 
broadly felt benefits and negative 
impacts of pits and quarries 
 
 
Contributions of OPA 161 policies to 




• Loss and degradation of natural 
habitat  
• Loss and degradation of form 
and function of hydrological and 
hydrogeological systems  
• Loss and degradation of surface 
and groundwater quality and 
quantity  
• Loss of farmland for food 
production 
• Inadequacy of progressive and 
final rehabilitation  
• Air pollution (especially dust 
and CO2 emissions from trucks)  
• Higher cumulative effects due to 
lack of phasing in of extraction 
operations  
• *Modify the Provincial 
Policy Statement to prohibit 
aggregate extraction in 
prime agricultural lands, 
natural heritage, and source 
water areas 
• *Amend the Greenbelt, Oak 
Ridges Moraine, and 
Niagara Escarpment Acts 
and Plans to prohibit new 
aggregate extraction in these 
• Prioritization of aggregate resource 
lands to phase in extraction and 
discourage extraction in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study requirements (noise, dust, 
traffic, vibration, visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies may reject an 
application based on the technical and 
scientific information in the required 
reports 
• Prohibition of extraction in Core Areas 
of Peel’s Greenlands system, some 
Environmental Policy Areas, kettle 
lakes and their catchments 
• Two Extractive Industrial designations, 
one for above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial A) and one for 
below the water table (Extractive 
Industrial B) 
• Requirement for Rehabilitation Master 
Plans, included in Ministry of Natural 
Resources’ conditions of licence 
• Monitoring: progress of extraction, 
licence conditions compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent of rehabilitation, 
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designated areas, and the 
Class I, II, and III 
agricultural lands adjacent or 
contiguous to them 
• *Greener modes of transport 
of the resource  
• *Mandatory standards and 
monitoring for dust and 
carbon dioxide 
 
noise, dust, truck traffic, effects on 





• Costs of road construction and 
maintenance of haul routes  
• Costs of damage to cultural and 
natural heritage  
• Costs of damage to private 
property and property values  
• Costs of administration and 
conflict resolution (e.g. legal and 
consultant fees)  
• Loss of use of prime agricultural 
land for food production 
• Priority given to aggregate 
extraction over other land uses  
• Local employment opportunities  
• More affordable building and 
infrastructure construction  
• Tax revenues and economic 
multiplier effects from the 
industry and its employees 
• Higher charges for 
extraction (to promote 
efficient use of the resource, 
fund the implementation of a 
conservation strategy, and to 




• Requirement for Applicants to pay for 
the costs of an independent peer review 
of reports 
• Prioritization of aggregate resource 
lands to phase in extraction and 
discourage extraction in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study requirements (noise, dust, 
traffic, vibration, visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies may reject an 
application based on the technical and 
scientific information in the required 
reports 
• Prohibition of extraction in Core Areas 
of Peel’s Greenlands system, some 
Environmental Policy Areas, kettle 
lakes and their catchments 
• Two Extractive Industrial designations, 
one for above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial A) and one for 
below the water table (Extractive 
Industrial B) 
• Requirement for Rehabilitation Master 
Plans, included in Ministry of Natural 
Resources’ conditions of licence 
• Monitoring: progress of extraction, 
licence conditions compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck traffic, effects on 





• Local communities must deal 
with all immediate and 
cumulative effects  
• Insufficient licence and permit 
fees  
• Centralized regulation of the 
industry by the industry and 
• Approval agencies may reject an 
application based on the technical and 
scientific information in the required 
reports 
• Requirement for Applicants to pay for 
the costs of an independent peer review 
of reports 
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the provincial government  
• *More time in addition to 
the 45 days provided by the 
ARA for public review of 
licence and permit 
applications 
• *Intervenor funding for the 






• Inadequacy of progressive and 
final rehabilitation  
• Higher cumulative effects due to 
lack of phasing in of extraction 
operations  
• Loss of natural and cultural 
heritage resources  
• Loss of use of prime agricultural 
land for food production 
• Depletion of a valuable 
resource (aggregates near 
urban demand) 
• *Modify the Provincial 
Policy Statement to prohibit 
aggregate extraction in 
prime agricultural lands, 
natural heritage, and source 
water areas 
• *Amend the Greenbelt, Oak 
Ridges Moraine, and 
Niagara Escarpment Acts 
and Plans to prohibit new 
aggregate extraction in these 
designated areas, and the 
Class I, II, and III 
agricultural lands adjacent or 
contiguous to them 
• *Higher charges for 
extraction (to promote 
efficient use of the resource, 
fund the implementation of a 
conservation strategy, and to 
help to internalize the costs 
of impacts) 
 
• Requirement for Applicants to pay for 
the costs of an independent peer review 
of reports 
• Prioritization of aggregate resource 
lands to phase in extraction and 
discourage extraction in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study requirements (noise, dust, 
traffic, vibration, visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies may reject an 
application based on the technical and 
scientific information in the required 
reports 
• Prohibition of extraction in Core Areas 
of Peel’s Greenlands system, some 
Environmental Policy Areas, kettle 
lakes and their catchments 
• Two Extractive Industrial designations, 
one for above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial A) and one for 
below the water table (Extractive 
Industrial B) 
• Requirement for Rehabilitation Master 
Plans, included in Ministry of Natural 
Resources’ conditions of licence 
• Monitoring: progress of extraction, 
licence conditions compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck traffic, effects on 





• Inadequacy of progressive and 
final rehabilitation  
• Absence of aggregates demand 
management  
• Facilitation of urban and 
suburban sprawl 
• Lower GHG emissions with 
• Prioritization of aggregate resource 
lands to phase in extraction and 
discourage extraction in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study requirements (noise, dust, 
traffic, vibration, visual impact, cultural 
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short fun aggregates 
transportation 
• *Development and 
implementation of provincial 
laws, policies, strategies, etc. 
that encourage infrastructure 
and building design 
standards that reduce the 
need for aggregates 
• *Implement provincial 
policies and guidelines, 
strategies, etc. for the use of 
recycled materials for 
provincial and municipal 
projects (e.g. a 
comprehensive conservation 
strategy based on the 3Rs, 
including changes in MTO 
and municipal highway 
specifications) 
• *Strengthen the ARA to 
require at least 50% of 
rehabilitation in one licenced 
area before the expansion of 
an existing operation or a 
new operation by the same 
owner in a particular 
Municipality can occur 
• *Elimination of perpetual 
licences and permits and 
unlimited annual tonnage 
allowances 
• *A phasing in of new 
extraction operations so that 
existing licences are 
optimized before new 
licences are granted 
• *Higher charges for 
extraction (to promote 
efficient use of the resource, 
fund the implementation of a 
conservation strategy, and to 
help to internalize the costs 
of impacts) 
 
heritage, water recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies may reject an 
application based on the technical and 
scientific information in the required 
reports 
• Prohibition of extraction in Core Areas 
of Peel’s Greenlands system, some 
Environmental Policy Areas, kettle 
lakes and their catchments 
• Two Extractive Industrial designations, 
one for above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial A) and one for 
below the water table (Extractive 
Industrial B) 
• Requirement for Rehabilitation Master 
Plans, included in Ministry of Natural 
Resources’ conditions of licence 
• Monitoring: progress of extraction, 
licence conditions compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck traffic, effects on 






• Lack of funding for individual 
intervenors in Ontario Municipal 
Board hearings  
• Insufficient time allotted for 
public comment on site plans 
and reports  
• Requirement for a pre-submission 
consultation meeting with the 
Applicant, Town, Region, Ministry of 
Natural Resources, Conservation 
Authorities, and other relevant agencies 
before submission of application 
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• Lack of transparency with 
respect to the amount of 
aggregate produced/pit or quarry  
• Centralized regulation of the 
industry by the industry and the 
provincial government 
• Lack of public participation in 
decision making 
• Priority to aggregate extraction 
land uses reinforced by 
Provincial Policy Statement and 
Planning Act  
• Insufficient Ministry of Natural 
Resources staffing and expertise 
to inspect sites  
• Insufficient funding for the 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources to administer the 
aggregate resources program 
(e.g. site inspection)  
• *More time in addition to 
the 45 days provided by the 
ARA for public review of 
licence and permit 
applications 
• *Intervenor funding for the 
application review process 
• *Increased public 
accessibility to application 
documents (site plans, 
technical reports, 
background studies, etc.) 
• *Increased capacity of the 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources to conduct 
inspections and increase the 
frequency of inspections 
• *Creation of an independent 
provincial authority to collect 
and maintain publicly accessible 
production statistics and 
forecasts of future demand and 
supply 
 
package to the Town 
• Requirement to make all Reports and 
detailed site plans available to the public 
by submitting them to the Town Clerk 
• Other study requirements (noise, dust, 
traffic, vibration, visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies may reject an 
application based on the technical and 





• Use of unproven technologies to 
mitigate negative impacts of 
extraction (e.g. grout curtain) 
• Insufficient understanding of the 
complex biophysical systems 
affected by aggregate extraction 
and the long-term cumulative 
• Prioritization of aggregate resource 
lands to phase in extraction and 
discourage extraction in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study requirements (noise, dust, 
traffic, vibration, visual impact, cultural 
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impacts of aggregate extraction 
• *Creation of an independent 
provincial authority to 
collect and maintain publicly 
accessible production 
statistics and forecasts of 
future demand and supply 
 
 
heritage, water recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies may reject an 
application based on the technical and 
scientific information in the required 
reports 
• Two Extractive Industrial designations, 
one for above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial A) and one for 
below the water table (Extractive 
Industrial B) 
• Monitoring: progress of extraction, 
licence conditions compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck traffic, effects on 





• Little integration of aggregates 
sustainability considerations in 
overall growth management 
planning 
• Limited explicit attention to 
trade-offs 
• *Lift regulatory barriers to 
the use of recycled materials  
• *Development and 
implementation of provincial 
laws, policies, strategies, etc. 
that encourage infrastructure 
and building design 
standards that reduce the 
need for aggregates 
• *Implement provincial 
policies and guidelines, 
strategies, etc. for the use of 
recycled materials for 
provincial and municipal 
projects (e.g. a 
comprehensive conservation 
strategy based on the 3Rs, 
including changes in MTO 
and Municipal highway 
specifications) 
• *Creation of an independent 
provincial authority to 
collect and maintain publicly 
accessible production 
statistics and forecasts of 
future demand and supply 
• *Increased capacity of the 
Ministry of Natural 
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Resources to conduct 
inspections and increase the 
frequency of inspections 
 
 
Table 3: Evaluation of OPA 161 against Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies 
 OPA 161 was evaluated against Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet Corners policies in order to 
determine the extent to which OPA 161 represents institutional change. Section 6.5 discusses the 
results of this evaluation.  
 










Broadly felt benefits and 
negative social-ecological 
impacts of pits and 
quarries 
 
Caledon’s 1981 Cabinet 
Corners Policies 
 
Contributions of OPA 
161 policies to progress 






• Loss and degradation 
of natural habitat  
• Loss and degradation 
of form and function 
of hydrological and 
hydrogeological 
systems  
• Loss and degradation 
of surface and 
groundwater quality 
and quantity  
• Loss of farmland for 
food production 
• Inadequacy of 
progressive and final 
rehabilitation  
• Air pollution 
(especially dust and 
CO2 emissions from 
trucks)  
• Higher cumulative 
effects due to lack of 
phasing in of 
extraction operations  
• Modify the 
Provincial Policy 
• “Have regard” to 
preserving land in a 
particular area 
known as Cabinet 
Corners 
 
• In considering 
OPAs, Town will 





the scenic and rural 
character of the 
Mun, land use 




• Priority given to 
existing and future 
residential dev 
 
• Official Plan 
amendment criteria 
• Prioritization of 
aggregate resource 
lands to phase in 
extraction and 
discourage extraction 
in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for 
CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study 
requirements (noise, 
dust, traffic, vibration, 
visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water 
recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies 
may reject an 
application based on 
the technical and 
scientific information 
in the required reports 
• Prohibition of 
extraction in Core 









source water areas 





and Plans to 
prohibit new 
aggregate 
extraction in these 
designated areas, 






• Greener modes of 









included need for 
the operation & 
impact on the 
environment (air, 
water, noise, water 
table, surface 
drainage on and off 
site) & nature of 
proposed rehab 
 
• Little detail with 
respect to 
assessment of 
envt’l impacts and 
social impacts 
 









• Progressive rehab 
promoted 
 








Policy Areas, kettle 
lakes and their 
catchments 
• Two Extractive 
Industrial 
designations, one for 
above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
A) and one for below 
the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
B) 
• Requirement for 
Rehabilitation Master 
Plans, included in 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources’ conditions 
of licence 
• Monitoring: progress 
of extraction, licence 
conditions 
compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent 
of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck 
traffic, effects on 






• Costs of road 
construction and 
maintenance of haul 
routes  
• Costs of damage to 
cultural and natural 
heritage  
• Costs of damage to 
private property and 
property values  
• Costs of 
administration and 
conflict resolution 
(e.g. legal and 
consultant fees)  
• Loss of use of prime 
• “Have regard” to 
preserving land in a 
particular area known 
as Cabinet Corners 
 
• In considering OPAs, 
Town will consider 
goals to preserve and 
encourage agricultural 
activity, maintain the 
scenic and rural 
character of the Mun, 




• Requirement for 
Applicants to pay for 
the costs of an 
independent peer 
review of reports 
• Prioritization of 
aggregate resource 
lands to phase in 
extraction and 
discourage extraction 
in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for 
CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study 
requirements (noise, 
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agricultural land for 
food production 
• Priority given to 
aggregate extraction 
over other land uses  
• Local employment 
opportunities  




• Tax revenues and 
economic multiplier 
effects from the 
industry and its 
employees 
• Higher charges for 
extraction (to promote 
efficient use of the 
resource, fund the 
implementation of a 
conservation strategy, 
and to help to 
internalize the costs of 
impacts) 
• Priority given to 
existing and future 
residential dev 
 
• Official Plan 
amendment criteria 
included need for the 
operation & impact on 
the environment (air, 
water, noise, water 
table, surface drainage 
on and off site) & 
nature of proposed 
rehab 
 
• Little detail with 
respect to assessment of 
envt’l impacts and 
social impacts 
 
• Assmnt of Social 
impacts not elaborated 
beyond consideration 
of public concerns and 
impacts on residents 
adjacent to project 
 
• Progressive rehab 
promoted 
 
• Intent to dev rehab 
program and inventory 
of abandoned and 
rehab-ilitated pits and 
quarries 
 
dust, traffic, vibration, 
visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water 
recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies 
may reject an 
application based on 
the technical and 
scientific information 
in the required reports 
• Prohibition of 
extraction in Core 
Areas of Peel’s 
Greenlands system, 
some Environmental 
Policy Areas, kettle 
lakes and their 
catchments 
• Two Extractive 
Industrial 
designations, one for 
above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
A) and one for below 
the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
B) 
• Requirement for 
Rehabilitation Master 
Plans, included in 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources’ conditions 
of licence 
• Monitoring: progress 
of extraction, licence 
conditions 
compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent 
of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck 
traffic, effects on 






• Local communities 
must deal with all 
immediate and 
cumulative effects  
• Insufficient licence 
and permit fees  
• “Have regard” to 
preserving land in a 
particular area known 
as Cabinet Corners 
 
• In considering OPAs, 
• Approval agencies 
may reject an 
application based on 
the technical and 
scientific information 
in the required reports 
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• Centralized 
regulation of the 
industry by the 
industry and the 
provincial 
government  
• More time in 
addition to the 45 
days provided by 
the ARA for 
public review of 
licence and permit 
applications 
Intervenor funding for 




Town will consider 
goals to preserve and 
encourage agricultural 
activity, maintain the 
scenic and rural 
character of the Mun, 




• Priority given to 
existing and future 
residential dev 
 
• Official Plan 
amendment criteria 
included need for the 
operation & impact on 
the environment (air, 
water, noise, water 
table, surface drainage 
on and off site) & 
nature of proposed 
rehab 
 
• Assmnt of Social 
impacts not elaborated 
beyond consideration 
of public concerns and 
impacts on residents 
adjacent to project 
 
 
• Requirement for 
Applicants to pay for 
the costs of an 
independent peer 





• Inadequacy of 
progressive and final 
rehabilitation  
• Higher cumulative 
effects due to lack of 
phasing in of 
extraction operations  
• Loss of natural and 
cultural heritage 
resources  
• Loss of use of prime 
agricultural land for 
food production 




• Modify the 
• “Have regard” to 
preserving land in a 
particular area known 
as Cabinet Corners 
 
• In considering OPAs, 
Town will consider 
goals to preserve and 
encourage agricultural 
activity, maintain the 
scenic and rural 
character of the Mun, 




• Priority given to 
existing and future 
• Requirement for 
Applicants to pay for 
the costs of an 
independent peer 
review of reports 
• Prioritization of 
aggregate resource 
lands to phase in 
extraction and 
discourage extraction 
in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for 
CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study 
requirements (noise, 
dust, traffic, vibration, 









source water areas 





and Plans to 
prohibit new 
aggregate 
extraction in these 
designated areas, 






• Higher charges for 
extraction (to promote 
efficient use of the 
resource, fund the 
implementation of a 
conservation strategy, 
and to help to 





• Official Plan 
amendment criteria 
included need for the 
operation & impact on 
the environment (air, 
water, noise, water 
table, surface drainage 
on and off site) & 
nature of proposed 
rehab 
 
• Little detail with 
respect to assessment of 
envt’l impacts and 
social impacts 
 
• Assmnt of Social 
impacts not elaborated 
beyond consideration 
of public concerns and 
impacts on residents 
adjacent to project 
 
• Progressive rehab 
promoted 
 
• Intent to dev rehab 
program and inventory 
of abandoned and 




recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies 
may reject an 
application based on 
the technical and 
scientific information 
in the required reports 
• Prohibition of 
extraction in Core 
Areas of Peel’s 
Greenlands system, 
some Environmental 
Policy Areas, kettle 
lakes and their 
catchments 
• Two Extractive 
Industrial 
designations, one for 
above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
A) and one for below 
the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
B) 
• Requirement for 
Rehabilitation Master 
Plans, included in 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources’ conditions 
of licence 
• Monitoring: progress 
of extraction, licence 
conditions 
compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent 
of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck 
traffic, effects on 






• Inadequacy of 
progressive and final 
rehabilitation  
• Absence of aggregates 
demand management  
• Facilitation of urban 
and suburban sprawl 
• Lower GHG 
• “Have regard” to 
preserving land in a 
particular area known 
as Cabinet Corners 
 
• In considering OPAs, 
Town will consider 
goals to preserve and 
• Prioritization of 
aggregate resource 
lands to phase in 
extraction and 
discourage extraction 
in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for 
CBSES in Reserve 
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emissions with short 
fun aggregates 
transportation 














strategies, etc. for 
the use of 
recycled materials 





strategy based on 
the 3Rs, including 




• Strengthen the 
ARA to require at 
least 50% of 
rehabilitation in 
one licenced area 
before the 
expansion of an 
existing operation 
or a new operation 
by the same 




• A phasing in of 
new extraction 





activity, maintain the 
scenic and rural 
character of the Mun, 




• Priority given to 
existing and future 
residential dev 
 
• Official Plan 
amendment criteria 
included need for the 
operation & impact on 
the environment (air, 
water, noise, water 
table, surface drainage 
on and off site) & 
nature of proposed 
rehab 
 
• Little detail with 
respect to assessment of 
envt’l impacts and 
social impacts 
 
• Assmnt of Social 
impacts not elaborated 
beyond consideration 
of public concerns and 
impacts on residents 
adjacent to project 
 
• Progressive rehab 
promoted 
 
• Intent to dev rehab 
program and inventory 
of abandoned and 




• Other study 
requirements (noise, 
dust, traffic, vibration, 
visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water 
recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies 
may reject an 
application based on 
the technical and 
scientific information 
in the required reports 
• Prohibition of 
extraction in Core 
Areas of Peel’s 
Greenlands system, 
some Environmental 
Policy Areas, kettle 
lakes and their 
catchments 
• Two Extractive 
Industrial 
designations, one for 
above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
A) and one for below 
the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
B) 
• Requirement for 
Rehabilitation Master 
Plans, included in 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources’ conditions 
of licence 
• Monitoring: progress 
of extraction, licence 
conditions 
compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent 
of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck 
traffic, effects on 






• Higher charges for 
extraction (to 
promote efficient 
use of the 
resource, fund the 
implementation of 
a conservation 
strategy, and to 
help to internalize 
the costs of 
impacts) 
• Greener modes of 









• Lack of funding for 
individual intervenors 
in Ontario Municipal 
Board hearings  
• Insufficient time 
allotted for public 
comment on site plans 
and reports  
• Lack of transparency 
with respect to the 
amount of aggregate 
produced/pit or quarry  
• Centralized regulation 
of the industry by the 
industry and the 
provincial government 
• Lack of public 
participation in 
decision making 
• Priority to aggregate 




Planning Act  
• Insufficient Ministry 
of Natural Resources 
staffing and expertise 
to inspect sites  
• Insufficient 
funding for the 
Ministry of 
Natural Resources 
•  • Requirement for a pre-
submission 
consultation meeting 
with the Applicant, 
Town, Region, 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources, 
Conservation 
Authorities, and other 
relevant agencies 
before submission of 
application package to 
the Town 
• Requirement to make 
all Reports and 
detailed site plans 
available to the public 
by submitting them to 
the Town Clerk 
• Other study 
requirements (noise, 
dust, traffic, vibration, 
visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water 
recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies 
may reject an 
application based on 
the technical and 
scientific information 
in the required reports 
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• More time in 
addition to the 45 
days provided by 
the ARA for 
public review of 
licence and permit 
applications 
• Intervenor 
funding for the 
application review 
process 








• Increased capacity 







• Creation of an 
independent 
provincial authority to 
collect and maintain 
publicly accessible 
production statistics 
and forecasts of future 




• Use of unproven 
technologies to 
mitigate negative 
impacts of extraction 
(e.g. grout curtain) 
• Insufficient 
understanding of the 
complex biophysical 
systems affected by 
aggregate extraction 
•  • Prioritization of 
aggregate resource 
lands to phase in 
extraction and 
discourage extraction 
in Reserve areas 
• Requirement for 
CBSES in Reserve 
areas  
• Other study 
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and the long-term 
cumulative impacts of 
aggregate extraction 
• Creation of an 
independent 
provincial authority to 
collect and maintain 
publicly accessible 
production statistics 
and forecasts of future 
demand and supply 
requirements (noise, 
dust, traffic, vibration, 
visual impact, cultural 
heritage, water 
recourses, land use 
analysis) 
• Approval agencies 
may reject an 
application based on 
the technical and 
scientific information 
in the required reports 
• Two Extractive 
Industrial 
designations, one for 
above the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
A) and one for below 
the water table 
(Extractive Industrial 
B) 
• Monitoring: progress 
of extraction, licence 
conditions 
compliance, extent of 
disturbed area, extent 
of rehabilitation, 
noise, dust, truck 
traffic, effects on 












• Limited explicit 
attention to trade-offs 
• Lift regulatory 
barriers to the use 
of recycled 
materials  
















strategies, etc. for 
the use of 
recycled materials 





strategy based on 
the 3Rs, including 













forecasts of future 
demand and 
supply 
• Increased capacity of 
the Ministry of 
Natural Resources to 
conduct inspections 
and increase the 
frequency of 
inspections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
